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ABSTRACT 
The defence of non-pathological capacity presents challenges for both law and psychology 
because it acknowledges that psychological factors other than mental illness, are grounds for 
complete exculpation. In this sense, South African law differs from its Anglo-American 
counterparts as it recognises that non-pathological factors playa role in negating criminal 
responsibility. Legal and mental health professionals are instrumental in the application of the 
defence, but both case law and literature reflect differences in the way in which the defence is 
understood and applied. Disagreement within and between disciplines adds to the controversial 
nature of the defence. 
This study examines the interpretation and practical application of the defence by mental health 
professionals and lawyers. It explores how participants' understanding of the defence informs its 
application in practice. A sample of ten participants including mental health professionals 
(comprising psychologists and psychiatrists) and lawyers (comprising advocates) was chosen, in 
order that a comparison be drawn between the two groups. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted so as to enable in-depth exploration of issues regarding conceptions of criminal 
responsibility, the role of expert testimony and the conceptual understanding and application of 
the defence. 
The data was analysed thematically and the results were tabulated so as to provide a 
comprehensive comparison between mental health professionals and lawyers. Three main themes 
namely, conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility, salient factors considered in the 
defence, and perceptions of the defence, emerged along with several sub-themes. This reflected 
areas of consensus and disagreement between participants. There was overwhelming agreement 
between both groups as to the conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility. The maj ority 
ofpractitioners cited the elements of sane automatism as salient factors in the defence. There were 
several areas of disagreement in the perceptions of the defence which reflected differences both 
within and between groups. 
Two salient issues, regarding the moral undertones of expert testimony, and the conceptual 
confusion between pathology and 'non-pathology', emerged from the analysis. These issues are 
discussed so as to highlight some of the difficulties which arise in the application of the defence 
from a mental health perspective. 
Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 The McNaughton Rules and the Insanity Defence in England 
2.1.1 Insane vs sane automatism 
2.1.2 Diminished responsibility 
2.1.3 Provocation 
2.2 The Insanity Defence in the United States of America 
2.2.1 The legal tests for insanity 
2.2.2 Automatism 
2.2.3 Diminished capacity 
2.2.4 Provocation 
2.3 The Insanity Defence in South Africa 
2.3.l Automatism 
2.3.2 Diminished responsibility 
2.3.3 Provocation 
2.3.4 Non-pathological criminal incapacity 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Research design 
3.2 Sample 
3.3 Method of data collection 
3.4 Data analysis 
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility 
4.2 Salient factors considered in the defence 
4.3 Perceptions of the defence 
4.4 Nature and quality of state expert testimony vs defence expert testimony 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 A contamination of psychological discourse 
5.2 Pathology vs non-pathology 
5.3 Philosophical reflections on the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
REFERENCES 
TABLE OF CASES 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Interview Schedule 
Appendix B: Coding 
Appendix C: Inter-rater reliability 
Appendix D: Interview Transcripts 
Page 
1 - 4 
5 - 28 
29 - 34 
35 - 47 
48 - 58 
59 - 61 
61 - 62 
63 - 85 
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. It contextualises the study by outlining the 
rationale and aims and provides a brief outline of the various chapters. 
Rationale of the study 
Mental illness is one of several factors which is recognised by South African law as negating 
criminal responsibility. Statutory provision in the form of the insanity defence, has been made 
for people who suffer from mental illness and who cannot be held responsible for their actions. 
Consequently, the law acknowledges that mentally ill offenders cannot be sanctioned in the same 
way as sane offenders (Snyman, 1995). Thus where mental illness and criminal responsibility are 
concerned, the law is clear as to the legal test which has to be applied, the nature of expert 
testimony which has to be adduced, and the disposition of such offenders. 
Developments in the last twenty years have resulted in judicial recognition of the role of 
psychological factors, other than mental illness, in the negation of criminal responsibility. This 
notion is enshrined in the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity and encompasses the 
idea that transient mental states are grounds for exculpation. The acceptance of this defence into 
South African law not only signalled a significant step forward, but also widened the scope of 
expert testimony to include psychological evidence. 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity, unlike the insanity defence, is predicated on 
temporary mental impairment. Thus no pathology is present and impairment can be due to a wide 
range of factors including emotional stress or provocation. From a legal perspective, the courts 
are concerned with whether a person's cognitive and/or conative functioning has been impaired to 
such an extent that slhe cannot be held responsible. In the absence of pathology, various 
psychological factors have been held to affect responsibility. The explanatory frameworks 
provided by psychological testimony therefore endeavour to account for temporary impairment. 
The defence has received much attention from legal commentators and these discussions have 
largely focussed on its form and content, as well as the factors which the courts have taken into 
account in passing judgement. These discussions have also focussed on the content of expert 
psychological testimony in cases where it has been adduced, thereby considering reasons why 
courts have either accepted or rejected such testimony (Snyman, 1989; 1991; 1995; Rumpff. 
1990; Burchell, 1995; Boister, 1996). While the defence has been the focus oflegal debate, it has 
also received some attention from mental health professionals, albeit to a lesser extent. The focus 
of discussion in these circles has been on the nature of expert evidence which is adduced (Van 
Rensburg & Verschoor, 1989; Strauss, 1995; Vander Merwe, 1997). However the role of expert 
testimony in these cases has raised particular challenges for experts, and Zabow (1990) says that 
they 'have been less than successful in attempting to adapt theory, diagnosis and clinical method 
to the framework of existing legal standards' (p.5). In addition, Strauss (1995) says that in these 
cases experts do not have recourse to textbook diagnoses which can describe temporary cognitive 
or conative impairment. 
Given that commonly accepted textbook diagnoses for temporary impairment do not exist, the 
defence has been interpreted by experts in various ways. Consequently, various psychological 
terms have been bandied about in an attempt to explain phenomena which do not fall within the 
parameters of pathology. The proliferation of terms to describe various psychological 
phenomena, has coincided with the increasing popularity of the defence and it would seem as if 
such terminology has become part of the parlance of this defence. Gillmer (1996) describes the 
defence as a 'many-headed creature' which can embody anything from a 'total psychological 
disintegration' to a 'narrowing of consciousness', 'a separation of intellect and emotion', 
'annihilator rage', 'dissociation' or 'good old-fashioned automatism' (p. 20). It would seem as if 
psychology has attempted to provide the language and understanding to describe those non-
pathological states which do not fit into the law's conception of human nature. However, Gillmer 
(1996) questions whether psychology has not been complicit in assisting the law with diagnoses 
to support claims of temporary impairment, in order that courts view these as more credible and 
therefore acceptable as grounds for non-responsibility. These ideas beg the question as to what 
exactly constitutes this defence and what role expert testimony fulfils. 
While the defence has been discussed in various articles, it appears as ifvery little research has 
been done in this area. Where studies have been undertaken, they have largely been confined to 
theoretical analyses of the defence either from a legal or psychological perspective. Van der 
Merwe (1996) approaches his study from a legal point of view, and traces the development of the 
defence and the way in which it has become entrenched in South African law. He does not 
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provide a critical analysis of its development nor does he explore some of the contentious issues 
surrounding it. Petty (1998) analyses the defence from a psychological perspective by focussing 
on how current psycho-legal conceptions of conative functioning have resulted in incoherent and 
inconsistent rulings by the courts. His work provides insight into the difficulties which arise when 
the disciplines of law and psychology intersect. It points to how differences in conceptualisation 
have led to ambiguities and inconsistencies in the interpretation of the defence. While Petty's 
(1998) work is incisive, his study is confined to a conceptual analysis which explains how the 
stage is set for a 'veritable semantic and conceptual minefield' (p.12) in court. While there is 
value in a theoretical analysis, it is more useful to explore how it has been interpreted and used in 
practice. An investigation into how legal and mental health practitioners understand and apply 
this defence may add to, and possibly illuminate some ofthe debates surrounding it. 
Aims of the study 
Lawyers and mental health professionals constitute two of the main protagonists in the arena of 
the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity which in itself presents challenges for both 
law and psychology. The differences in interpretation and application has sparked controversy 
both within and between these professions. For example, mental health professionals differ in the 
way they construe the defence, resulting in a myriad of diagnostic categories which ostensibly fall 
with the rubric of temporary mental conditions. Lawyers, on the other han~, have interpreted the 
test for capacity in different ways thus exploring the parameters of the defence. For this reason 
the study compares two groups of mental health professionals and lawyers, to examine the 
practical use of the defence. 
The study focuses on two broad areas: 
1. It compares the conceptual understanding of participants in each group with reference to 
criminal responsibility, the role of expert testimony and the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity. It is important to explore these issues at a conceptual level, so as to establish 
how this informs the interpretation and application of the defence. 
2. It compares how participants apply their understanding of the defence in practice. This is 
important so as to establish whether or not lawyers and mental health professionals are in 
agreement as to what constitutes the defence. 
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Overview of the thesis 
In comparison to Anglo-American jurisdictions, South Africa is unique in its acknowledgment of 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity as a full defence in law. This defence is seen as a 
derivative of the insanity defence which itself has been a source of contention in other 
jurisdictions. As will be shown in Chapter 2, a comparison of the development and application of 
the insanity defence in these jurisdictions, provides a basis for understanding its application in 
South Africa. In addition, the discussion focuses on the contentious debates surrounding the role 
of psychiatric and psychological factors in the assessment of criminal responsibility. It therefore 
provides a foundation for understanding how the defence of non-pathological incapacity has 
posed challenges for both law and psychology. 
Given that the aim of this study was to compare practitioners' conceptions and application of the 
defence, a qualitative framework was employed. The use of semi-structured interviews with a 
small sample oflawyers and mental health professionals, enabled in-depth exploration of their 
views. Chapter 3 focuses on the methodological framework employed in the study and highlights 
the sample selection, the construction of the interview schedule and the way in which the data 
was analysed. 
Three main themes with several sub-themes emerged from the thematic analysis. In order to 
provide a comprehensive comparison of the views of mental health professionals and lawyers, the 
data was tabulated. As will be shown in Chapter 4, there were several areas of consensus which 
seemed to indicate that practitioners shared a common understanding of the defence. The two 
groups agreed on the conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility, while there were 
some differences in the salient factors considered in the defence, and perceptions of the defence. 
The thematic analysis raised interesting questions as to what constitutes 'non-pathology' and 
whether issues of morality permeate practitioners' application of the defence. Chapter 5 explores 
the concept of 'non-pathology' and discusses the moral undertones of expert testimony. In 
conclusion, it deviates from the norm by reflecting on some philosophical ideas about the 
defence. 
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Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
This chapter focuses on the role which psychiatry and psychology play in the assessment of 
criminal responsibility in England, the United States of America and South Africa. It will 
compare the insanity defence (pathological criminal incapacity) as it is applied in Anglo-
American jurisdictions so as to forge an understanding of its application in South Africa. In 
particular, the chapter focuses on how psychological factors other than mental illness, have come 
to be acknowledged in the assessment of criminal responsibility. It will also highlight the debates 
which have arisen within the legal arena, regarding the inel usion of such expert testimony. 
The term insanity refers to a legally defined state of mind and does not refer to a particular 
psychiatric or psychological disorder. In fact, as will be shown, legal conceptions of insanity may 
be far removed from psychiatric or psychological conceptions of mental illness. When this 
defence is raised, the court is concerned as to whether the accused can be held criminally 
responsible in light of the purported mental disease or defect (Reed and Seago, 1999). There are 
various legal tests which have to be complied with when this defence is raised, and while there 
are differences in various jurisdictions, the defence has its roots in English law. 
2.1 The McNaughton Rules and the Insanity Defence in England 
The legal test for insanity in England is rooted in the McNaughton Rules of 1843 which stemmed 
from a murder trial where the accused was found 'not guilty on the ground of insanity'. This 
right-from-wrong test is concerned with the accused's legal responsibility at the time of the 
alleged offence and Card (1992, p.l27) summarises it as follows: 
(a) Everyone is presumed sane until the contrary is proved. 
(b) It is a defence to a criminal prosecution for the accused to show that he was labouring under such a 
defect of reason, due to disease of the mind, as either not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if 
he did know this, not to know that he was doing wrong. 
According to Reed and Seago (1999), in order for the court to return a verdict of 'not guilty by 
reason of insanity', the burden of proof is on the accused to prove that impaired insight or 
inability to appreciate wrongfulness, was caused by a pathological mental condition. If this is 
proven then the accused cannot be held criminally culpable and a successful defence of insanity 
results in commitment to a psychiatric hospital. A verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' 
implies that retribution cannot be exacted from the accused and commitment to a psychiatric 
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hospital is not intended as punishment, instead it serves the purpose of providing the patient with 
treatment while also protecting the pUblic. Given that a sentence is not imposed, a patient can 
theoretically be detained for life. However, hislher progress is reviewed regularly and if the 
prognosis is good and the patient ostensibly does not pose a threat to himlherself or society, then 
the hospital may recommend a discharge which has to be ratified by the court (Kruger, 1980). 
The McNaughton test relies heavily on the accused's cognitive capacity which may have 
compromised his/her insight and judgment. 'Defect of reason due to disease of mind' is central to 
the defence and does not consider other aspects of psychological functioning viz. affective 
(emotional) and conative (volitional) functioning, which are integral to human nature. The 
defence cannot be raised if the offence was committed because of emotional upheaval caused by 
emotions such as rage, jealousy or stress. Equally, it is not possible to raise the defence of 
insanity where the accused has committed an alleged offence because of poor self-control as 
would be in the case of an 'irresistible impulse'. Card (1992) criticises the McNaughton Rules as 
being too restrictive because they do not allow for a defence of 'irresistible impulse'. He says that 
the narrow focus on impaired cognitive capacities, ignores the reality that mental illness can 
impair conative functioning. 
As mentioned previously, insanity is a legal term and may be far removed from psychiatric and 
psychological conceptions of mental illness and mental disorder. The onus is on the court to 
decide on the accused's criminal responsibility but expert testimony is required to ascertain 
whether capacity has been affected by mental illness. The Criminal Procedure (Insanity and 
Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 (cited in Read and Seago, 1999) provides that a jury cannot make a 
finding with regards to insanity and unfitness to plead unless they have received expert testimony 
from at least two medical practitioners, one of whom must be an expert on mental illness. The 
role of the expert is pivotal at various stages of the trial - in the case of unfitness to plead, 
evidence is submitted at the beginning of the trial to ascertain whether the trial can proceed. 
Where the accused is found fit to plead but doubts are raised as to hislher capacity at the time of 
the alleged offence, the testimony will focus on the mental disorder which compromised this 
capacity. 
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English law therefore explicitly reqUIres psychiatric evidence of mental illness and its 
concomitant effects, where the defence of insanity is concerned, and there seems to be no leeway 
for psychologists to impart their expertise. Perhaps this may explain why affective and volitional 
factors do not fall within the ambit of this defence as they can be better understood within a 
psychological framework as opposed to a strictly medical model. 
2.1.1 Insane vs Sane Automatism 
While expert testimony is important, English courts have developed their own conceptions of 
'disease of mind' in the last two decades by referring to internal and external factors which may 
impair reasoning and insight. 
Insane automatism which encompasses unconscious reflex actions caused by mental illness, can 
be seen as a variant of the insanity defence in that it also requires the 'disease of mind' criterion. 
The essential difference is that with automatism the court focuses on the voluntariness of the act 
and consequently whether it constitutes an act in law (Allen, 1995). Internal biological factors 
such as epilepsy, schizophrenia, organic psychosis, senile dementia and diabetes have been held 
to be diseases of the mind in that their symptoms may contribute to psychological impairment. 
The courts have held that an accused who suffers from such a biological condition and acts in an 
automaton state, cannot be held criminally responsible as the act occurred outside of conscious 
awareness. A successful defence of insane automatism results in a verdict of' not guilty by reason 
of insanity' which requires mandatory commitment to a psychiatric hospital for an indefinite 
period of time. The conditions governing commitment are therefore the same as with those who 
have been found not guilty under the insanity plea (Reed and Seago, 1999). 
Sane automatism on the other hand, is not caused by a disease of mind but results from external 
factors such as a blow to the head which may temporarily cloud consciousness. Thus the person 
is not able to exercise volitional control. Sane automatism can also be brought about by severe 
psychological stress which results in dissociation. Dissociation involves 'a disruption in the 
usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity or perception of the 
environment' (Barnard, 1998, p. 28). Given that there is an impairment in the integration of 
functions, the person may be unable to exercise volitional control and cannot be held 
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blameworthy. A successful defence of sane automatism will result in acquittal (Card, 1992). 
English courts have been circumspect when such a defence is raised as it has been viewed as 
providing offenders with an easy way out when all other avenues have failed. 
Card (1992) in commenting on the popularity of the insane automatism defence in England, says 
that instead of risking a 'not guilty by reason of insanity' verdict, pleas are often changed to 
guilty so as to avoid the stigma of an insanity trial. Given the stigma surrounding an insanity 
verdict and the concomitant committal to a psychiatric hospital, the insanity defence is rarely 
raised even though it is a general defence. It is more likely to be raised when the charge is murder 
and even then the accused is likely to enter a plea of diminished responsibility which has greater 
latitude (Reed and Seago, 1999). 
As will be shown, developments in the law have allowed for factors other than cognition and 
rational capacity to be considered in the assessment of criminal responsibility. While English law 
does not employ terms such as non-pathological incapacity (temporary insanity) to describe these 
defences, it has couched this rationale in the defences of diminished responsibility and 
provocation. 
2.1.2 Diminished Responsibility 
Given the narrow scope of the insanity defence, the concept of diminished responsibility was 
introduced into English Law via the Homicide Act 1957, s2 : 
(l)Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder ifhe was 
suffering from such an abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded 
development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his 
mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in doing or being party to the killing .... 
(3) ... [he] shall be liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter. 
(Cited in Power, 1967, p.185) 
This defence only applies to the charge of murder and is therefore not a general defence. In 
essence it is raised if all the elements of criminal liability have been met, but it has been shown 
that the accused's responsibility has been substantially impaired by an 'abnormality of mind' . As 
a result it allows for the charge to be reduced from murder to manslaughter which in tum has 
implications for sentencing. Whereas the penalty for murder is life imprisonment, the court has 
greater discretion where the charge is manslaughter and may impose a prison sentence or remand 
8 
the accused to a psychiatric hospital (Allen, 1995). 
There has been much debate as to what constitutes an 'abnormality of mind' and how this may 
differ from the definition of insanity in the McNaughton Rules. In some instances the courts have 
referred to 'partial or borderline insanity' such as in the case of Byrne (cited in Allen, 1995) 
where the court defined the accused's inability to control his sexual impulses as constituting an 
'abnormality of mind'. What is significant about this case is that the aberration of mind was taken 
to include volitional factors, and his inability to control his impulses was seen as a mitigating 
factor. While provisions in the Homicide Act 1957 s2 were meant to rule out affective factors, the 
courts have subsequently considered emotions such as rage and jealousy as giving rise to an 
'abnormality of mind' which substantially impairs responsibility (Allen, 1995). In fact, the 
inclusion of affective and conative factors have resulted in successful defences involving 
irresistible impulse, reactive depression, dissociative disorders and pre-menstrual syndrome 
(Clarkson and Keating, 1990). This represents a move away from the circumscribed provisions of 
the McNaughton Rules. While the defence of diminished responsibility does not allow for 
complete exculpation, it affords those offenders who do not meet the criteria for the insanity 
defence, a viable recourse. 
It stands to reason that expert testimony is required to establish that an abnormality of mind 
existed at the time of the offence. However legal commentators have questioned the role which 
psychiatrists and psychologists play in assessing diminished responsibility. In a report by the 
Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (cited in Clarkson and Keating, 1990), the 
proficiency of these experts in assessing degrees of mental responsibility was questioned, since 
this is a concept of law and morality and not of psychiatry or psychology. The Committee 
questioned whether the accused's ability to conform to the law could be measured clinically, 
given that the law requires a substantial impairment of mental responsibility. Allen argues that 
'the question of substantial impairment is inappropriate for medical witnesses as it is one of 
degree and whether it exists depends not only on the medical evidence but on all the evidence of 
the case relating to the facts and circumstances of the killing' (1995, p. 128). He argues that the 
courts have allowed expert opinion in these matters so as to produce a greater range of 
exemptions from murder, and medical experts have interpreted the provisions within the Act very 
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widely. As a result, the defence has been used in cases of mercy-killings where the accused kills 
because slhe believes that the victim's suffering is relieved, and killing throughjealousy. Expert 
testimony therefore serves the purpose of providing mitigating evidence which will hopefully 
sway the court's sympathies into reducing the charge (Clarkson and Keating, 1990). 
Legal commentators such as Allen (1995) and Clarkson and Keating (1990) point to the cynical 
manner in which psychiatric testimony has been viewed by the courts. Not only are they 
concerned with the difficulties which arise when psychiatrists have been asked to assist the court 
in answering legal questions, but it would seem that where psychological factors other than 
mental illness are at stake, psychiatry's conceptions and interpretations of human behaviour are 
questioned. Kapardis (1999) argues that psychological evidence has been approached even more 
warily and courts have in fact equated psychological knowledge (excluding knowledge regarding 
mental illness) with common sense. These views of expert testimony are deeply rooted in legal 
principle and have resulted from the rule of evidence of 'common knowledge and experience' 
which allows for the admission of expert testimony only if it provides the court with information 
which lies outside the common knowledge and experience of the jury (Kapardis, 1999). This 
principle was further outlined by Lawton LJ in R v Turner (1975) QB 834 (at 841): 
[i]f on the proven facts a judge or jury can fonn their own conclusions without help, then opinion of an 
expert is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it may make judgement 
more difficult. The fact that an expert witness had impressive qualifications by that fact alone make his 
opin ion on matters of humane nature any more helpfu I than the jurors themselves; but there is a dangerthat 
they may think it does' 
(Lawton LJ cited in Kapardis, 1999, p. 2). 
While provisions within the Turner judgement have largely been expanded so as to allow for the 
inclusion of psychological testimony on a wide range of issues, the' common knowledge' rule has 
not been abrogated by disuse in English law (Kapardis, 1999). Perhaps this may explain why 
courts are wary of such testimony particularly where the assessment of criminal responsibility is 
concerned. This ambivalence also seems to be fuelled by the concern that experts should not be 
imbued with the power to answer what are essentially legal questions. 
10 
2.1.3 Provocation 
In English law, the partial defence of provocation stems from common law and its terms have 
been modified by s3 ofthe Homicide Act 1957 which provides: 
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which a jury can find that the person charged was 
provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the 
question whether provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be 
determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account everything both 
done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man. 
(Cited in Reed and Seago, 1999, p.314). 
The essence of the defence is that the provocation must have caused the accused to suddenly and 
temporarily lose self-control thereby killing the person. It considers that the same kind of 
provocation might also have caused the' reasonable man' to experience such a loss of self-control 
and to react in the same way (Card, 1992). Thus the conduct of the accused isjudged in terms of 
this dual test. As with the defence of diminished responsibility, if a defence of provocation is 
successful, then the charge of murder is reduced to manslaughter. Clarkson and Keating (1990) 
say that with the enactment of this defence, the law seems to regard the conduct of the provoked 
accused as being less blameworthy than an accused who has premeditated murder, although the 
former cannot be completely exonerated. They argue that the 'law recognises that man is not in 
perfect control of his emotions and actions, particularly when subject to great pressure' and 
therefore it has 'compassion for human infirmity' (Clarkson and Keating, 1990, p.641). 
As forementioned, there are two issues at stake in this defence. Firstly, there must be evidence of 
a subjective loss of control which is sudden and temporary. This implies that the offence must be 
in direct response to the provocation and not a response to past provocative words or acts. Thus 
the court will not accept the defence if the accused has had time to collect his/her thoughts and 
feelings before killing the person. This so-called' cooling time' substantially weakens the defence 
in that the act can then be said to contain elements of pre-meditation. However this does not mean 
that the courts have been averse to acknowledging the effect of cumulative provocation which 
may result in the death of the provoker (Clarkson and Keating, 1990). Cases involving women 
who have been charged with killing their abusive partners have been defended under this banner 
and have posed challenges for the law. Battered woman syndrome, which is the effect of the 
partner's continuous abuse on a woman's psychological and emotional state, may result in her 
experiencing the proverbial last straw. This could result in a temporary loss of control in which 
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the partner is killed (Roth and Coles, 1995). However, the law still requires that there be no 
cooling off period between the provocation and the killing. In order for a defence by an abused 
woman to succeed, she will have to prove that her actions were in direct response to some form of 
provocation and not a result of years of cumulative abuse. While the debate regarding the status 
of cumulative provocation continues, it points to the fact that the court is entitled to consider the 
relevant background to the case. Not only will the court focus on the words or conduct which led 
to a loss of self-control but it may also consider the context within which the killing occurred 
(Theron du Toit, 1993). 
The second issue to be considered is the objective question of whether a 'reasonable man' would 
have been provoked to lose self-control and react in the same manner as the accused. How is a 
reasonable man construed by the law? Allen (1995) says that the reasonable man is one who has 
the level self-control which can be expected of an ordinary person who is the same age and sex as 
the accused. In addition, there are other personal characteristics (physical and mental) which may 
explain the gravity of the provocation because these were targeted by the provoker. Thus the 
court must focus on the relationship between the characteristic and the provocation when 
considering the response of the reasonable person. 
Reed and Seago (1999) say that the courts have articulated that psychological factors such as 
battered woman syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder and personality factors should be 
relevant to a defence of provocation as it would help to explain violent reactions. However, since 
the 'reasonable man' test is the yardstick by which these actions are measured, there are no legal 
provisions for expert testimony. It is incumbent upon the defence to find ways of submitting 
mitigating evidence regarding the accused's psychological characteristics in order to paint a more 
complete picture. Reed and Seago (1999) argue that this has been problematic in that there have 
been instances where courts have expressly rejected such evidence as they have felt that it is 
unrelated to the two legs of the test for provocation. It would also seem that while the courts have 
come to acknowledge the salience of psychological factors, they remain mindful of the 'common 
knowledge and experience' rule and as a result have directed juries to concern themselves with 
the 'reasonable man' test without the assistance of expert testimony. 
The preceding discussion has focused on the way in which psychiatric and psychological 
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testimony has been viewed by English courts in the assessment of criminal responsibility. Even 
though the courts have broadened the scope of the common knowledge rule and allowed for the 
admission of such testimony, ultimately issues of criminal responsibility boil down to a question 
of law - it is up to the court to decide if the requirements of the legal tests have been met. 
2.2 The Insanity Defence in the United States of America 
The insanity defence in the United States of America has been the focus of much attention in the 
last two decades. The defence has been considered to be an evidentiary matter which is concerned 
with the essential elements of an offence viz. actus reus and mens rea. Thus in order for the 
defence to succeed, it is incumbent upon the defence to prove that one of these elements is 
lacking. Where mental illness impairs the accused's capacity to appreciate wrongfulness. there 
can be no mens rea (Slovenko, 1995). 
Following the public outcry against the 1982 insanity acquittal of John Hinckley for the 
assassination attempt on President Reagan, state and federal legislatures were forced to re-
evaluate their formulations of the defence. A wide range of reforms were proposed so as to 
restrict its use and to make it less viable as a defence (Steadman, McGreevy. Morrissey. Callahan, 
Robbins and Cirincione, 1993). 
Slovenko (1995) says that these reforms can be broadly classified into 3 areas: 
(1) Adjudication reforms which focus on the plea stage of the court proceedings. These 
reforms have involved modifications of one or more of the following: 
(a) substantive tests of criminal responsibility (i.e. cognition vs control); 
(b) standard of proof ( i.e. preponderance, clear and convincing or evidence beyond reasonable doubt) 
(c) burden of proof ( i.e. accused or prosecution) 
(d) role of expert testimony (i.e. findings offact vs conclusory testimony on ultimate issues) 
(2) Disposition reforms which focus on the post-adjudication stage of the court proceedings. 
These reforms have involved modifications of one or more of the following: 
(a) post-acquittal evaluation 
(b) location of confinement (psychiatric facility or prison) 
(c) burden of proof of mental illness and dangerousness for continued confinement 
(d) right to re lease hearings 
(e) final release authority 
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(3) Combination refonns which involve a mixture of both adjudication and disposition 
refonns. 
Steadman et al. (1993) say that most of these refonns were designed to make the law more 
restrictive and consequently a reduction in insanity pleas and acquittals was envisaged. This 
resulted in some states changing their legal tests for insanity from liberal to more restrictive ones. 
The rush to refonn also prompted other states to change the verdict of 'not guilty by reason of 
insanity' (NGRI) to 'guilty but mentally ill' (GBMI). This made provision for the imprisonment 
of the offender along with psychiatric treatment. Other refonns included the abolition of the 
defence, which resulted in the adoption of the mens rea standard in detennining criminal 
responsibility. 
As previously mentioned, the insanity defence became the subject of public (and subsequently 
legislative) scrutiny only as a result of the Hinckley acquittal. Prior to this there was little public 
concern about the issues and debates regarding the interplay between psychiatry and law. Instead, 
the morality and viability ofthe defence were of central concern. As a result, the pre-Hinckley era 
was characterised by debate regarding the various tests for insanity which were in use in federal 
jurisdictions. 
2.2. 1 The Legal Tests for Insanity 
The McNaughton Rules 
The debate centering on efforts to integrate the burgeoning body of psychiatric knowledge with 
legal principles, led to a reappraisal of the McNaughton Rules which was the standard test for 
insanity until theI950's. While it is still applied in various American jurisdictions. it has been 
criticised for its exclusive focus on cognition which does not pennit complete and adequate 
psychiatric testimony. In addition, it has been criticised for 'forcing' the psychiatrist into the role 
of ethical judge as opposed to delivering expert testimony (Slovenko, 1995). 
The Durham Rule 
Given the difficulties associated with the McNaughton Rules, the Durham Rule was formulated 
so as to circumvent McNaughton's shortcomings. The Durham Rule states that 'an accused is not 
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criminally responsible ifhis unlawful act was the product of mental disease or defect' (Slovenko, 
1995, p.22). In formulating this rule, Judge David Bazelon sought to 'open up' the insanity 
defence to working class people as he reasoned that their crimes resulted from socio-economic 
factors such as poverty. The rationale was that the deprivation and abuse which arose from 
impoverished living conditions, inevitably gave rise to traumatised individuals who could not be 
held responsible for their actions. The euphoria surrounding the medicalisation of poverty was 
short-lived as it did not bridge the gap between law and psychiatry as Judge Bazelon had 
intended. Instead it gave rise to increased tension between jurists and psychiatrists as it allowed 
the latter too much scope in detennining responsibility. This perceived encroachment on what 
was a matter of legal principle, resulted in a decline in the application of this rule (Slovenko, 
1995). 
The application of both the McNaughton and Durham Rules within American jurisdictions has 
been fraught with tension between jurists and expert witnesses. Henderson (1988) argues that 
legal tests regarding criminal responsibility seem to require that psychiatrists give evidence in 
relation to moral issues even though j urists purport to work from the assumption that they are not 
equipped to do so. However, in practice, when expert witnesses are asked to express an opinion 
on the accused's mental state at the time of the offence, that opinion may include some kind of 
moral judgement. The application of both McNaughton and Durham have therefore subtly steered 
expert witnesses into the moral arena which traditionally belongs to the jurist. 
The American Law Institute Test 
Following the failure of the Durham Rule, the American Law Institute (ALI) recommended that: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a resu It of mental disease 
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
(American Law Insititute Model Penal Code, Section 4.01) 
The ALI test was adopted in the majority of American jurisdictions and is currently favoured in 
those where the insanity defence is still in use. Its popularity has superceded the use of the 
McNaughton Rules in that it requires 'substantial' incapacity as opposed to complete incapacity, 
and an appreciation of wrongfulness as opposed to the cognitively oriented 'know' required by 
McNaughton. The ALI test also includes the criterion of volitional incapacity which 
acknowledges that lack of control may be longstanding in duration. This was included In 
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opposition to the 'irresistible impulse' test which implies a sudden and momentary loss of 
control. Various modifications of the ALI test have been adopted in several states which view it 
as providing greater latitude than the McNaughton Rules (Slovenko, 1995). 
Slovenko (1995) argues that it is difficult to establish the current status of the insanity defence in 
America, given the many changes which it has undergone in various states. Current debate has 
centred on whether or not the defence should be abolished completely, particularly because it is 
seen as a way out for those who should feel the full force of the law. Some proponents of 
abolition argue that criminal responsibility is a matter of law and should be left to juries for 
deliberation and not to the assessment of psychiatric experts. Slovenko says that they argue that 
'psychiatry is corrupting the criminal justice system by expanding the concept of mental illness, 
always at the expense ofthe concept of responsibility' (1995, p.34). 
2.2.2 Automatism 
The American approach to automatism shares commonalities with the English approach even 
though the former does not explicitly employ the concepts of sane and insane automatism in its 
federal law. Schopp (1995) says that the American Penal Code recognises that involuntary 
behaviour can arise from pathology and a successful defence will result in a NGRI verdict and 
commitment to a psychiatric centre. The American Penal Code also recognises that automatism 
may result from non-pathological causes such as dissociation which is often described as 
psychological blow automatism. This complete splitting between mental and physical activity 
renders the accused incapable of controlling hislher actions (Schopp, 1995). A successful defence 
of sane automatism results in acquittal. While English courts have clear-cut guidelines as to the 
interpretation of this defence, American courts have failed to develop any clarity as to their 
interpretations. Schopp (1995) says that some courts have viewed automatism as a variation of 
the insanity plea while others have expressly rejected this notion and considered it as a separate 
defence. This uncertainty has increased the scepticism with which the defence is viewed 
particularly in cases where dissociation is claimed to be the causative factor. This is because a 
complete splitting of mental and physical activity, is very rare clinically. Finkel (1988) refers to 
sane automatism as an 'atypical' insanity defence because the jury rules on whether there was an 
act and does not concern itself with the existence of disease of mind or the issue of intent. He 
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argues that psychiatric testimony provides 'the room, shadings, and interpretative leeway' 
(Finkel, 1988, p. 291) which enables lawyers to employ the defence if other avenues have failed. 
As can be seen from the above, the insanity defence in America has been fraught with 
controversy. Public opinion has contributed greatly to the evolution or abolition of the defence in 
various jurisdictions, where the negation of criminal responsibility has been deemed 
unacceptable. The concern that offenders should be adequately punished for their deeds, has 
extended to defences such as diminished capacity which allow for varying degrees of criminal 
responsibility. 
2.2.3 Diminished Capacity 
Morse (1984) describes the doctrine of diminished capacity as 'undiminished confusion'. He says 
that both courts and legal commentators have confused the concepts of diminished capacity and 
diminished responsibility when in fact the latter is a variant ofthe former. Diminished capacity 
allows the psychiatrist to testify as to the accused's mental condition without the accompanying 
NGRI plea. Testimony as to mental state at the time of the offence, is introduced so as to negate 
the requirement of intent. The consequences of a successful plea is that the accused is exonerated 
from the initial charge of murder and may be found guilty of manslaughter. Thus it does not 
result in complete exculpation as in a NGRI plea, nor is there mandatory commitment to a 
psychiatric facility. 
Morse (1984) says that diminished responsibility on the other hand, allows for the consideration 
of mitigating evidence of cognitive or volitional impairment which would not negate the 
intentional or volitional requirements of the insanity test. Diminished responsibility is more than 
an evidentiary issue and is an independent defence which is employed for both the reduction of a 
charge (i.e. murder to manslaughter) and in mitigation of sentence. Morse (1984) says that there 
is a fine line between diminished capacity and diminished responsibility which has resulted in 
confusion between the two. 
The doctrine of diminished capacity has, like the insanity defence, been a bone of contention in 
various American jurisdictions. Slovenko (1995) says that the doctrine has been adopted in 
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approximately one third of the states and is primarily employed in cases of first-degree murder. 
Where the defence has not been adopted. the rationale has been that criminal responsibility 
cannot be assessed in varying degrees and that only insanity negates criminal intent. In fact, it has 
been argued that the defence of diminished capacity is merely the introduction of the insanity 
defence in another form, which does not carry the consequences of a NGRI verdict. 
2.2.4 Provocation 
While there has been a trend away from the doctrine of diminished capacity, some American 
jurisdictions still recognise the common law defence of provocation which also has the effect of 
reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter. Dressler (1982) says that the American Law 
Institute's Model Penal Code defence of 'extreme emotional disturbance', where a person is 
subjected to overwhelming stress and has an extreme reaction, has largely been replaced by the 
defence of provocation which negates the existence of malice. The ALI recognises provocation as 
a mitigating factor in homicide cases because it concedes that the accused was provoked to such 
an extent, that s/he was unable to exercise self-control. Unlike in English law, American courts 
do not hold that words alone are grounds for provocation and therefore some physical threat has 
to be present (Dressler, 1982). The notion of physical harm and the accused's reaction to it, has 
played a role in the recognition of battered 'women's syndrome as grounds for provocation. As 
with considerations made by English courts, American jurisdictions have also come to accept the 
effects of cumulative physical provocation on a woman's ability to control her behaviour. 
However, since American courts employ the 'reasonable man' test, criticisms have been levelled 
at it as it seen as ignoring social reality and the subjective experience of women (Theron du Toit, 
1993). 
The proliferation of 'syndrome' evidence in both diminished capacity and provocation defences 
in American jurisdictions, has resulted in a rather ambivalent relationship between the legal and 
mental health professions. On one hand, manuals such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (1994) has provided expert witnesses with a range of disorders which may 
explain and hopefully exculpate the accused's criminal behaviour. This is to the perceived 
advantage of lawyers in that it provides scientific grounds for arguing partial responsibility. 
However, legal commentators such as Dershowitz (1994) are sceptical of this kind of evidence 
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and refer to the' abuse excuse' as a means of evading responsibility. He comments on psychiatry 
and psychology's complicity in helping offenders to evade appropriate punishment by providing 
them with 'cop-outs' and 'sob stories' couched in psychological jargon. He feels that this kind of 
evidence threatens the foundations of the American legal system. 
The preceding discussions have focused on the status of the insanity defence in American and 
Englishjurisdictions. As has been shown, the defence has been fraught with controversy because 
it was formulated as a means of negating criminal culpability and has therefore been subject to 
public and legislative scrutiny. While this contentious situation has primarily occurred within 
American jurisdictions, the controversy raised by the role of psychiatric and psychological 
testimony in establishing legal principles, seems to have plagued both English and American 
courts. South Africa on the other hand, seems to have adopted a more liberal approach and it 
would seem that the judiciary has been more accepting of the role of psychological factors in its 
understanding of human behaviour. 
2.3 The Insanity Defence in South Africa 
As with the American system, the roots of South Africa's insanity defence lie within English 
Law. In the late nineteenth century the scope of the McNaughton Rules was broadened in South 
Africa so as to include the 'irresistible impulse' rule. The courts acknowledged that mental illness 
or defect could impair conative functioning and therefore negate responsibility (Kruger, 1980). In 
R v Koortz 1953 (1) SA 371 (A), the reformulated McNaughton Rules were accepted by the 
court: 
A person is not punishable for conduct which would in ordinary circumstances have been criminal if. at 
the time, through disease of mind or mental defect-
(a) he was prevented from knowing the nature and quality of the conduct, or that it was wrong; or 
(b) he was the subject of an irresistible impulse which prevented him from controlling such conduct 
(Gardiner and Lansdown cited in Kruger, 1980, p.156). 
Where the insanity defence was raised, most cases were decided under the' irresistible impulse' 
rule but several difficulties arose in its application. These centred around establishing whether in 
fact the impulse derived from mental illness and not from emotional factors such as jealousy, 
greed or revenge. In addition, it was difficult to establish whether the impulse was indeed 
irresistible and whether the accused genuinely had no control over it (BurchelL Milton & 
Burchell, 1983). These problems and perceived loopholes within the law were addressed by the 
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Rumpff Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and 
Related Matters (RP 6911967), following the assassination ofHendrik Verwoerd by a mentally ill 
offender (Kruger, 1980). While the questions raised by this case did not match the upheaval 
caused by the Hinckley acquittal in the United States, there was sufficient cause for concern 
regarding the criminal responsibility of mentally ill offenders. The Rumpff Commission 
concluded that a person's responsibility for hislher actions is based on the ability to exercise free 
choice and the ability to distinguish between right and wrong (Kruger. 1980). The 
recommendations of the Commission subsequently gave rise to the provisions in Section 78( 1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) (herein after referred to as the CPA) which states: 
A person who commits an act which constitutes an offence and who at the time of such commission suffers 
from a mental illness or mental defect which makes him incapable 
(a) of appreciating the wrongfulness of his act; or 
(b) of acting in accordance with an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his act, 
shall not be criminally responsible for such an act. 
These criteria which courts apply with respect to responsibility embody a right-from-wrong-test 
which assesses the capacity to act according to the appropriate insight. The test has biological 
(i.e. presence of mental illness) and psychological components (i.e. impairment of cognitive 
and/or conative functions) and a successful defence requires the presence of both. The law does 
not provide a definition of mental illness or mental defect and therefore makes provision for 
expert psychiatric testimony to establish this (Van Oosten, 1990). However, Snyman (1995) says 
that the fact that a person has been declared mentally ill in terms of the Mental Health Act 18 of 
1973, does not imply that slhe is also mentally ill in terms of s78(1) of the CPA. This is because 
the latter is chiefly concerned with how mental illness negates responsibility, and not with the 
nature of mental illness itself. 
A successful defence of insanity will result in a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of mental illness' 
and the accused will be remanded into the care of a state psychiatric hospital for an indefinite 
period of time (Kruger 1999). Provision is made for the review of the patient's progress and the 
hospital may recommend a discharge based on the prognosis of the illness and the danger which 
the patient poses to himlherself and society. This process has to be ratified by the courts, 
particularly where the offence has been violent (Kruger, 1980). 
The criterion of pathology as diagnosed by a psychiatrist, means that South African law has 
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retained the 'disease of mind' criterion of the McNaughton Rules, by focussing on cognitive 
functioning. However the law provides some latitude by acknowledging that mental illness can 
impair conative functions and therefore the second leg of the test makes provision for this 
(Burchell, Milton & Burchell, 1983). As will be discussed in greater detail later on, South African 
law also recognises the defence of non-pathological incapacity, which substantially broadens the 
circumstances within which an accused may be exculpated. Thus provocation, emotional stress, 
threats and fear are some of the circumstances falling within the ambit of this defence (Snyman. 
1989). What is significant at this point in the discussion, is that the test for both pathological and 
non-pathological incapacity is the same. Petty (1998) argues that this is problematic as the 
provisions within s78(1) of the CPA are applied to what are in fact, two distinct mental states. 
The test is applied where pathology negates responsibility as well as where affective and 
volitional factors lead to non-responsibility. The dilemma which this poses is exacerbated by the 
fact that because the law construes mental illness in tenns of the degree of criminal responsibility, 
no diagnostic parameters have been set. Thus not all diagnostic categories of mental illness are 
recognised by the courts because they are concerned with whether the accused met the criteria for 
the test and not with the illness itself. Petty (1998) feels that the lack of conceptual clarity and 
the fact that the test is applied to both pathological and non-pathological incapacity. places the 
expert witness in a rather difficult position. Given that experts are called to testify to cognitive 
and/or conative impainnent, the same kind of evidence may be adduced in cases of pathological 
and non-pathological incapacity. The essential difference is that in the former, mental illness 
(however that may be defined) is diagnosed, while in the latter other psychological factors are 
taken into account. Thus in practice the defences can be raised in the alternative. Petty highlights 
the fact that the boundaries between the defences of pathological and non-pathological incapacity 
are blurred thus resulting in 'an anomalous, circuitous process whereby the court applies the test 
for criminal capacity .. .' (1998, p. 4). 
2.3.1 Automatism 
The provisions within s78(1) of the CPA are chiefly concerned with the extent to which mental 
illness affects criminal capacity. Thus while the court acknowledges that an offence has been 
committed, its chief concern is whether the accused can be held criminally responsible. However, 
when there is doubt as to whether the act was voluntary, the defence of automatism is raised 
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(Kruger, 1999). South African courts as with English courts, distinguish between sane and insane 
automatism because a verdict of not guilty has differing consequences for these variants of the 
defence. Sane automatism does not have a pathological basis and may arise from factors such as 
concussion, intoxication, amnesia or dissociation. A finding of not guilty results in acquittal. 
Insane automatism on the other hand, derives from mental illness and a finding of not guilty 
results in confinement to a state psychiatric hospital for an indefinite period oftime (Burchell, 
Milton and Burchell, 1983). In a defence of sane automatism the onus of proof is on the State 
but the accused has to lay a foundation for the defence in evidence. As in other jurisdictions, 
claims of sane automatism are viewed with caution by South African courts because it relies on 
the accused's account of an event which allegedly occurred in an automaton state. In addition, 
this defence is seen as providing a way out, because psychological testimony can be adduced 
without questioning the accused's sanity. The difficulty which arises is that expert psychological 
evidence is based on a claim of a discrete period of dissociation which occurred some time before 
the assessment. Kruger (1999) says that the reliability and truthfulness of the accused are crucial 
factors in laying a factual basis for the defence. This raises the question as to whether the expert 
is placed in the position of assessing the reliability of the accused or whether such claims are 
accepted on the face of what the accused has said. This points to an ethical and professional 
dilemma - does the expert have to assume the role of moral judge when asked to adduce evidence 
of such a nature? In addition, if the accused's truthfulness is questioned by the court, how is the 
expert testimony which is based on the accused's account, then viewed? 
Burchell, Milton and Burchell (1983) say that psychiatric and psychological expert testimony is 
based on an examination of the accused some time after the offence has occurred and therefore it 
has to rely on the accused's version of events. This has prompted courts to be circumspect about 
such testimony, in light of the guidelines of the Rumpff Commission: 
The courts usually accept well-grounded and responsible evidence from psychiatrists. The testimony of 
psychiatrists is not accepted (I) when the court does not accept the facts upon which the psychiatrist based 
his diagnosis and (2) when the psychiatrist's conception of non-responsibility in a particular case does not 
agree with that of the court 
(cited in Burchell, Milton and Burchell, 1983, p. 278). 
While the courts do not view psychiatric testimony lightly, it would seem as if they do apply 
some kind of cautionary rule in instances where sane automatism is raised. This caution extends 
to other defences of a temporary non-pathological nature. 
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2.3.2 Diminished responsibility 
South African law, in line with English and American jurisdictions. also enshrines the doctrine of 
diminished responsibility which acknowledges that there are varying degrees of criminal 
responsibility. Section 78(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act (51 of 1977) states that: 
If the court finds that the accused at the time of the commission of the act in question was criminally 
responsible for the act but that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act was diminished by 
reason of mental illness or mental defect, the court may take the fact of such diminished responsibility into 
account when sentencing the accused. 
In terms of this provision, the accused's illness does not fulfil the requirements for the legal test 
of insanity but is considered to be a mitigating factor in the level of responsibility. Psychopathy, 
epilepsy and mental retardation are some examples which have been forwarded as part of this 
defence. A defence of diminished responsibility does not afford the accused complete 
exculpation, but may result in a reduced sentence instead of indefinite confinement to a state 
psychiatric hospital (Burchell, Milton & Burchell, 1983). 
2.3.3 Provocation 
South African law differs greatly from the way in which American and English jurisdictions view 
the defence of provocation. Snyman (1991) says that provocation has become a full defence in 
South African law and a successful outcome results in the negation of criminal capacity arid 
therefore the accused will be acquitted. Provocation may constitute words or behaviour or a 
combination of the two, and the test which is applied is subjective (Snyman, 1995). Unlike the 
objective, 'reasonable man' test applied in American and Englishjurisdictions. South African law 
is concerned with the effect of provocation on the accused, taking into account personal 
characteristics such as temperament which may explain behaviour. In addition. the courts 
consider the accused's state of mind at the time of the offence (Theron du Toit, 1993). 
An example of the way in which expert testimony has been adduced in this defence, is that of 
spousal homicide. Theron du Toit draws on the work of Hoffman and Zeffert (1988) by saying 
that '[t]he opinion of expert witnesses is admissible whenever, by reason of their special 
knowledge or skill, they are better qualified to draw inferences than the court. The admissibility 
of the evidence of expert witnesses is furthermore governed by the relevance of that evidence' 
(1993, p. 247). She says that developments within case law regarding spousal homicide, have 
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pointed to the need for psychiatric or psychological evidence in ascertaining criminal 
responsibility. In the case of S v Campher 1987 (l) SA 940 (A). the court acknowledged this 
need and consequently expert testimony regarding battered woman syndrome was considered to 
be relevant and admissible. However, as cases such as S v Wiid 1990 (l) SACR 561 (A) have 
shown, expert testimony is not indispensable, particularly when a factual foundation for non-
responsibility has been laid in evidence. The result is that the onus is on the State to prove that 
the accused was criminally responsible. When a factual foundation has been laid. expert 
testimony may serve the purpose of facilitating this process but in the final analysis. it may well 
be superfluous (Theron du Toit, 1993). This antithetical situation highlights the difficulties which 
arise in defences which fall within the ambit of non-pathological incapacity. On one hand. expert 
testimony serves the purpose of outlining the psychological factors which lead to non-
responsibility. On the other, expert testimony is not required by law because the court may be in a 
position to make a finding based solely on the factual evidence (Van Oosten. 1993). 
2.3.4 Non-pathological criminal incapacity 
In the last twenty years, South African courts have come to recognise the salience of 
psychological factors in the assessment of criminal responsibility. The provisions within s78(1) 
of the CPA have been interpreted in such a way, that factors other than mental illness have been 
considered in the issue of non-responsibility (Strauss. 1995). Thus the biological component of 
this test (i.e. mental illness) is not the sole negating factor and psychological factors such as 
affective and conative functions have been held to affect criminal capacity. Burchell (1995) 
questions whether South African law is correct in applying a subjective test of criminal capacity 
and prefers a normative yardstick such as the 'reasonable man' test which is applied in Anglo-
American jurisdictions. He argues that particularly where provocation or emotional stress have 
been raised as defences, it is useful to have some kind of objective test by which to measure the 
accused's behaviour. In addition. he does not view the complete exculpation offered by these 
defences as being justifiable. 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity refers to a wide range of temporary emotional 
reactions which may affect the accused' s ability to distinguish between right and wrong or the 
ability to act in accordance with an appreciation of wrongfulness (Snyman. 1989). As with the 
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concept of insanity, non-pathological incapacity is not a psychological construct and merely 
refers to non-responsibility which does not arise from mental illness. This tenn was first coined in 
S v Laubscher 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) where the judge sought to distinguish the defence. which 
centred on the 'tydelike aantasting van die geestesvennoens' (9 54F -G) (temporary disturbance of 
psychological functions), from mental illness. The defence has been interpreted to include a wide 
range of psychological phenomena which have been described as . emotional collapse'. emotional 
stress, . total disintegration of personality' or have included reactions such as shock. fear. anger or 
tension. Courts have also accepted that temporary disturbance of cognitive and/or conative 
abilities may result from provocation which the accused has suffered at the hands of the victim. a 
situation which often occurs within the context of spousal abuse (Snyman, 1995). 
Several landmark cases heralded the acknowledgement of non-pathological incapacity as a 
complete defence in South African law. In S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C), the accused shot and 
killed his wife with whom he had a longstanding conflictual relationship. Subsequent to their 
marital separation, the deceased became a striptease artist which exacerbated the conflict. Prior to 
the shooting, the couple were involved in a serious argument and the deceased bent forward, 
displayed her bare breasts, and referred to stripdancing. The court found that this was an act of 
provocation on the part of the deceased which rendered the accused incapable of distinguishing 
between right and wrong and consequently unable to exercise control over his actions. In fact. 
the expert evidence stated that the accused's 'conscious mind was so flooded by emotions that it 
interfered with his capacity to appreciate what was right or wrong and because of his emotional 
state, he may have lost his capacity to exercise control over his actions' (263C-D). The court 
found that the emotional stress which the accused had been subjected to resulted in an automaton 
reaction, and therefore he was acquitted. While the court accepted that no act in the legal sense 
was committed, it acknowledged that factors such as 'extreme emotional stress' can result in non-
responsibility. 
In S v Campher 1987 (1) SA940 (A), the accused was charged with the murder of her husband 
following years of marital strife. The deceased was verbally and physically abusive throughout 
their marriage and on the day of the offence had engaged the accused in an argument. He forced 
her to help him drill a hole in the lock on the birdcage but she was unable to assist him and 
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consequently the hole was skew. The deceased then threatened to attack her with a screwdriver 
whereupon the accused ran into the house to fetch a gun to protect herself. The deceased forced 
her back into the cage and instructed her to kneel and pray for the hole to straighten. As a result 
of her emotional state she killed the deceased. The court found that the accused could not rely on 
the defence of provocation and found her guilty with extenuating circumstances. However on 
appeal, the court considered whether in fact the accused was criminally responsible. While the 
conviction was upheld for several reasons, two ofthe judges acknowledged that the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity exists as a complete defence in South Africa law. Significantly, no 
expert testimony was led by the defence and therefore the court had to rely on the accused's 
account of the effects of cumulative provocation by the deceased. However, the 
acknowledgement of factors other than mental illness in the negation of criminal responsibility 
signalled a significant step forward in South African law. 
In S v Laubscher 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) the accused killed his father-in-law after an argument 
which he had with his wife concerning their child. The accused felt that his wife's parents were 
undermining his role as father and were intruding upon his marital relationship. The shooting 
occurred as result of a conflictual relationship with his parents-in-law which had lasted for two 
and a half years. Following the argument with his wife, the accused confronted his father-in-la\\' 
whereupon he fired twenty-one rounds into various rooms thereby killing the deceased. Both 
psychological and psychiatric evidence was led at the trial and the accused was said to have 
suffered from a 'total personality disintegration' which implied a negation of responsibility. 
However both the trial and appeal court held that the expert testimony did not accord with the 
facts of the case. These facts showed that the accused demonstrated insight into what he was 
doing and that his actions were goal-directed and voluntary. The Laubscher judgement also 
commented that expert testimony is not indispensable in this defence and that the court is in a 
position to make a decision based on the facts ofthe case. 
These three cases paved the way for the recognition of psychological factors in the negation of 
criminal capacity and distinguished South African law from its Anglo-American counterparts 
who adopt a more conservative approach. 
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Snyman (1995) says that for a successful defence, it is not necessary for the accused to prove that 
the emotional reaction resulted from specific causes or pathology. Ifthe court after perusing the 
evidence, is satisfied that at the time of the offence the accused's cognitive and/or conative 
abilities were impaired, then the defence will be successful. Unlike the insanity defence, the 
accused does not bear the onus of proof, instead the State is required to prove that slhe is 
criminally responsible. However, the accused has to lay a foundation in evidence which the State 
then has to rebut (Boister, 1997). Burchell (1995) argues that there is an 'inherent injustice' in 
placing the burden of proof on the accused claiming insanity, while a plea of non-pathological 
incapacity places the onus of proof on the state. This 'injustice' is extended to the successful 
outcomes of these defences. In the former, it means confinement to a psychiatric hospital while 
the latter provides for complete acquittal. Burchell (1995) feels that a complete revision of 
legislation and burden of proof standards may address these problems but he is not optimistic 
about this occurring. It would seem that the courts are intent on applying the subjective test of 
criminal capacity particularly in the case of non-pathological incapacity. 
Given that this defence allows for the consideration of psychological factors in negating criminal 
responsibility, the concern has arisen that it may be abused by those who have exhausted all other 
avenues in an attempt to escape punishment. Snyman (1991) says that the courts have therefore 
treated such defences with great caution because they can be easily raised. In the same way that 
courts are circumspect with regards to sane automatism, so too do they view non-pathological 
incapacity. Snyman (1995) says that in those cases in which the defence has been considered 
seriously, the accused had shown a cumulative build-up of stress and/or provocation, which 
resulted in temporary impairment of cognitive and/or conative functioning. While the whole 
notion of temporary emotional reactions suggests an interplay of psychological phenomena, there 
is no statutory requirement for expert evidence in such cases. Snyman (1995) says that while a 
significant number of reported cases have relied on expert testimony, it is unclear whether the 
courts consider this evidence as indispensable for the defence to succeed. Kruger (1999) however, 
argues that psychiatric and psychological evidence do not play an indispensable role because the 
court itselfis in a good position to make a decision based on the facts of the case. Burchell (1995) 
feels that this indecision regarding the importance of expert testimony, is detrimental in that there 
are instances when courts do not receive a balanced view of the accused's actions, particularly 
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when the state has not adduced psychiatric or psychological evidence. He suggests that judges 
should require the state to lead such evidence so as to mitigate against a one-sided view of the 
accused's behaviour. 
The ambivalent attitude which courts have towards expert testimony, is further fuelled by their 
concern regarding the accused's reliability and truthfulness, since this defence hinges on the 
accused's account of events. Burchell (1995) says that the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
by its very nature, is viewed with caution and if the accused's reliability and truthfulness is 
questionable then expert testimony will also be viewed in the same light. He argues that one of 
the problems which arises in the forensic assessment of an accused, is that it occurs before the 
evidence has been heard in court. Burchell (1995) feels that in the pursuit of the truth, it would be 
advisable to allow the expert to re-evaluate hislher opinion after the factual evidence has been led. 
He feels that greater weight may be given to such evidence after it has been established that the 
accused has provided the court with a convincing account of events. 
While South African law seems to have adopted a more liberal approach to the insanity defence 
than its Anglo-American counterparts, it has been plagued with controversies surrounding the 
role of psychiatric and psychological testimony in the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
The discussion has shown that South African courts have been more accepting of the role of 
psychological factors in negating criminal responsibility, but it would seem that a rather 
ambivalent attitude towards expert testimony prevails. As Boister concludes '[t]his indicates 
clearly that the crucial aspect of the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity is not its 
psychological validity but its legal validity' (1996, p. 373). 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This chapter outlines the method of research which was employed in the study. It discusses 
various methodological issues such as the qualitative framework employed, the nature of the 
sample, the data collection process and the analysis of the data. 
3.1 Research design 
In order to explore conceptions of the defence of non-pathological incapacity, this study 
compared the views of a group of a lawyers with a group of mental health professionals who 
have experience in working with the defence. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
participants and the results were analysed thematically. 
3.2 Sample 
The' snowball' method of sampling was used to identify potential participants as it was necessary 
to target professionals who had some experience in working with the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity. This sampling method is beneficial when appropriate resources from which to sample 
are not available. It involves identifying one 'sampling unit' who is then asked to identify 
potential participants who will meet the requirements of the research (Mason, 1996). 
A clinical psychologist who is attached to the forensic unit at a state psychiatric hospital was 
asked to provide the names of mental health professionals (psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists) who had experience in adducing psychological testimony in this defence. 
'Experience' was defined in terms of the number of cases in which the practitioner had 
participated. Thus in the case of lawyers, potential participants had to either have prosecuted or 
defended at least two cases in which the defence was at stake. In the case of mental health 
professionals, potential participants had to have presented expert testimony in at least two cases 
in which the defence was forwarded. A list often names comprising clinical psychologists and 
psychiatrists was generated and each person was contacted telephonically to enquire whether they 
had any experience in working with the defence. Their assistance was then requested in the study. 
Six of the ten agreed to participate in the study while the other four did not have any experience 
with this defence and therefore declined to participate. An advocate who has had some experience 
in this defence was asked to provide a list of names of other lawyers with similar work 
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experience. A list often names was generated and each person was contacted telephonically to 
request their assistance in the study. Four advocates agreed to participate while the remainder 
declined because of work commitments. Thus the sample comprised mental health professionals 
(3 clinical psychologists and 3 psychiatrists) and lawyers (4 advocates). Of the mental health 
professionals, two worked in the public service while the other four were in private practice. Of 
the four advocates, three worked in the public service while one was in private practice. 
Given that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is infrequently raised in court, the number 
of practitioners who have experience in this defence is limited. In addition, the resource base was 
limited to the Cape Town region because the participants had to be accessible for interviews. The 
small population from which to sample and the geographical limitations, therefore resulted in a 
limited number of participants who were eligible for this study. 
3.3 Method of data collection 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with each of the participants so as to elicit their 
conceptual understanding of the defence and its application in practice. Each interview was tape-
recorded with the consent of the participants and lasted approximately one hour. 
Mason (1996) provides useful guidelines which were used to compile an interview schedule to 
explore the views of participants. She suggests that broad research questions be used as a point of 
departure from which 'mini-research questions' are generated. These 'mini- research questions' 
then serve as a basis for developing questions or topics to be explored in the interview (Mason, 
1996). The two broad areas of focus for the study, namely, an investigation into participants' 
conceptual understanding of the pertinent issues regarding the defence, and the application of this 
understanding in practice, were used as point of departure for generating questions to be explored 
in the interview (see Appendix A). The rationale behind each of these questions will be discussed 
in tum. 
1. Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court in assessing 
criminal responsibility - how would you define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
Since the defence of non-pathological incapacity hinges on the assessment of criminal 
responsibility due to non-pathological factors, it was necessary to ascertain how lawyers and 
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mental health professionals defined the concept of criminal responsibility as this understanding 
guides the assessment and understanding of such cases. 
2. Thefollowing dictum by Ogilivie Thompson JA in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A) at 365 B-C. reflects 
the court's perspective of the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility: 
.... it must be borne in mind that... in the ultimate analysis, the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibility 
for his actions at the relevant time is a matter to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the Court itse(f In 
determining that issue - initially the trial Court and on appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not on(v to 
expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts of the case, including the reliability of the appellant as a 
witness and the nature of his proved actions throughout the relevant period'. 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal 
responsibility - how would you view the role of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of 
criminal responsibility? 
Given that the literature reflects the court's ambivalence to psychological testimony in this 
defence, as well as its indecision as to the indispensability of such evidence (Snyman, 1995; 
Kruger 1999), it was necessary to explore how practitioners viewed the role of expert testimony 
in such cases. It was necessary to explore the level of importance accorded to such testimony and 
whether they felt that the defence could successfully be forwarded without it. 
3. What was the nature of the cases which you were involved in, where the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity was raised? 
Landmark cases such as S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C), S v Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) and 
S v Laubscher 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) involved murders where the accused and deceased had some 
kind of familial or intimate relationship. A review ofthe relevant reported cases over the last ten 
years revealed that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is usually raised where the charge 
is murder and where the crime has occurred within the context of an intimate relationship. 
However defence has also been raised in other kinds of cases such as in S v Van Zyl 1996 (2) 
SACR 22 (A), where the charge was assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and where the 
accused and victim did not know each other. In order to gain insight into whether the ambit of the 
defence is limited to violent crimes, participants were asked to reflect on the kinds of cases which 
they had been involved in. 
3.1 Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the 
factors which you took into account to support (forward/prosecute) such a defence? 
One of the main aims of this study was to explore participants' conceptions of the defence and 
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how they apply this understanding in practice. In order to elicit the kinds of factors which they 
would consider, mental health professionals were asked to reflect on a case in which they had 
provided expert testimony while lawyers had to reflect on a case in which they had either been 
the defence or prosecuting advocate. This question was primarily used as a device to enable 
participants to think concretely about the factors which they had taken into account when 
presented with a case where such a defence was raised. 
3.2 Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological 
incapacity? 
Consequent to the preceding question, participants were asked to list the pertinent factors which 
they would always consider when such a defence is raised. In this way both their interpretation of 
the defence and their application of this understanding could be elicited. 
3.3 In addition to the factors which you have already outlined, would you consider any ofthefollowing to 
be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
1. Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5. Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7.Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdown of 
conscious awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
Given that the interpretations of the defence have been varied and that the courts have 
subsequently considered a wide range of psychological phenomena, a list of factors which have 
been considered in several cases was generated (see S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A); S v 
Potgieter 1994 (I) SACR 61 (A); S v Nursingh 1995 (2) SACR 331 (0); S v Moses 1996 (I) 
SACR 70 I (C); S v Pederson [1998] 3 All SA 321). The participants were asked to comment on 
whether or not they would consider any of these factors in addition to those which they would 
normally consider to be pertinent to the defence. The list was therefore used to ascertain whether 
participants' conceptions of the defence were narrowly defined or whether they were prepared to 
consider additional factors within the latitude of this defence. 
4. Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is synonymous with sane automatism? 
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Consequent to the preceding question and with regard to the apparent conceptual confusion 
between sane automatism and the defence of non-pathological incapacity, participants were also 
asked whether they thought that the two were synonymous. This conceptual confusion is referred 
to by Petty (1998) who says that courts have come confuse the volitional aspect (loss of control) 
of the test for criminal capacity with the involuntariness associated with automatism. 
5. Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-
responsibility? 
As has been discussed in the literature review. the defence allows for psychological factors other 
than mental illness, to be considered as grounds for non-responsibility. It therefore follows that 
courts have come to acknowledge the existence of certain psychological states which can negate 
responsibility. However, this has not been without controversy and they have fact been quite 
circumspect when such claims are raised. For this reason participants were asked to comment on 
whether they believed that transient psychological states were grounds for exculpation and if so, 
what the nature of these states were. 
6. Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
Consequent to the above question, participants were asked to comment on the validity of the 
defence so as to establish whether in fact they felt that it was justified in providing an avenue for 
those who claim non-responsibility on the basis of non-pathological factors. 
7. Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised. in how many instances has your 
testimony (opinion) been accepted by the court and on what basis? 
In order to gain insight into the factors which courts have taken into account in their 
deliberations, participants were asked to comment on the success of cases in which they had been 
involved. This question provided an avenue for exploring the factors which courts have 
considered as being relevant, as well as a means of establishing a sense of the extent to which the 
defence has succeeded. 
A similar interview schedule was employed for both lawyers and mental health professionals. 
Various words were substituted with ones which were relevant to the specific profession (i.e. 
those denoted in brackets). 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
The data elicited during the interviews was transcribed (see Appendix D) and analysed 
thematically. The transcripts were divided into two groups (mental health professionals and 
lawyers) so as to enable the identification of areas of consensus and areas of difference both 
within and between the groups. 
The coding technique forwarded by Miles and Huberman (1994) was used to identify pertinent 
themes which emerged from the data. This technique involved re-reading the interview transcripts 
a few times so as to identify emergent themes. The relevant sections of the transcript were then 
colour-coded so as to reflect the various themes (see Appendix B). In order to ensure that the 
themes which were identified were a reliable reflection of the abstractions of the interviews, 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that the data be coded by another practitioner. This 
technique of 'check-coding' enabled a sharper definition of the meaning of the codes and the data 
which they represent. For this reason, two transcripts (one from each group) were selected and 
coded by a colleague. The agreement was in the 85% range (six out of seven themes) which 
indicated that the data relating to each theme was representative of that theme (see Appendix C). 
Three main themes emerged from the analysis, with several sub-themes. A comparison of the two 
groups comprising mental health professionals and lawyers was made, by focussing on areas of 
consensus and areas of difference where these themes were concerned. 
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter presents an analysis of the data which was obtained from the interviews. Three main 
themes, namely, conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility. salient factors considered 
in the defence. and perceptions of the defence, emerged along with several sub-themes. A 
summary of each group's responses as they relate to a particular theme, is presented in tabular 
form so as to facilitate the comparison between mental health professionals and lawyers. 
4.1 Conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility 
Definitions of criminal responsibility 
Table 4.1.1 Mental health professionals' definitions of criminal responsibility 
Definitions of criminal responsibility Level of consensus I 
- Criminal responsibility is a legal and not a psychological construct 6 
- The ability to appreciate wrongfulness i.e. to know right from wrong 
- The ability to act in accordance with that appreciation 
Table 4.1.2 Lawyers' definitions of criminal responsibility 
Definitions of criminal responsibility Level of consensus 
- The ability to distinguish between right and wrong 4 
- The ability to act in accordance with that appreciation i.e. to be able 
to direct your will accordingly 
A comparison of mental health professionals' and lawyers' definitions of criminal responsibility 
reveals that there is consensus as to the essential elements of this concept. Both groups cited the 
two legs of the test for criminal capacity as being central to the definition of criminal 
responsibility. They referred to the provisions within Section 78( 1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 which recognises that a person cannot be held criminally responsible if slhe is 
incapable of appreciating wrongfulness or acting in the accordance with that appreciation. 
Criminal responsibility is a legal and not a psychological construct and refers to the mental ability 
which a person must have in order to be held liable for an offence. I t is an essential requirement 
for criminal liability and it has to be established that a person had the requisite mental capacity to 
The level of consensus refers to the number of practitioners out of each group (mental health 
professionals n=6 and lawyers n=4) who were in agreement regarding a particular theme. 
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commit an offence (Snyman, 1995). Given that the courts' are concerned with whether the 
requirements of the legal test have been met, it stands to reason that both groups in this study 
employed the legal definition of responsibility. While their particular applications of this 
definition may differ, both mental health professionals and lawyers were concerned with the 
requirements of the legal test. Thus it can be seen that from both legal and psychological points of 
view, criminal responsibility was defined in statutory tenns. 
The role of expert testimony 
Table 4.1.3 Mental health professionals' views of the role of expert testimony 
Role of expert testimony Level of consensus 
- Experts provide opinions on the accused's mental state at the time of the 6 
offence 
- Experts provide opinions regarding the impairment of cognitive and/or 
conative functioning due to psychological factors 
- Experts do not make a finding regarding criminal responsibility - that is 
the court's role 
Table 4.1.4 Lawyers' views of the role of expert testimony 
Role of expert testimony Level of consensus· 
- The role of expert testimony is not as crucial as in the defence of mental 4 
illness 
- Experts assist the courts in determining responsibility by providing 
opinions on factors in the person's background which could have led to 
the offence 
- Experts provide opinions on the person· s mental state at the time ofthe 
offence 
- The court will assess the factual foundation on which the expert 
testimony is based and will disregard it if that foundation is incorrect 
Both groups agreed that the role of expel1 testimony in the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
is to provide the court with an opinion regarding the accused's mental state at the time of the 
offence. Thus the role of the expert is not to pronounce whether or not a person is criminally 
responsible, instead s/he will adduce evidence regarding the cognitive and/or conative 
impainnent of the person at the relevant time. Essentially what this points to is that experts 
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provide the court with opinions which may help to establish whether the requirements for the test 
for criminal capacity have been met. Given that responsibility is a legal question, this falls within 
the ambit of the law and not psychology or psychiatry. In light of this, the parameters which both 
groups have defined in this study, make sense in that they viewed expert testimony as being 
another body of evidence which courts have to consider. While both groups were in agreement, 
the lawyers stressed the fact that such testimony is subjected to the same scrutiny as all the other 
evidence in these cases. It seems that the courts view such testimony in a rather dubious light, 
particularly because it is based on the accused's account of a transient condition. and does not 
hinge on pathology. Judgements such as S v Potgieter 1994 (1) SACR 61 (A) and S v 
Kalogoropolous 1993 (1) SACR 12 (A) reflect the views expressed by the lawyers in that they 
highlight the fact that it is the court's role to determine responsibility and that expert testimony 
does not fulfil an indispensable role in these cases. While both groups in this study were in 
agreement as to the role of expert testimony. the subtle difference related to how lawyers viewed 
the importance of this role. 
The role of factual evidence 
Table 4.1.5 Mental health professionals' views of the role offactual evidence 
Role of factual evidence Level of consensus 
- The facts of the case are a crucial aspect which informs the forensic 4 
assessment of the accused 
- The factual evidence is central to assisting the court in determining 
responsibility 
- The facts are not an important consideration in the forensic assessment I 
of the accused 
- Clinical opinion will not change even if the factual foundation upon 
which it is based is unfounded 
Table 4.1.6 Lawyers' views of the role (if factual evidence 
Role of factual evidence Level of consensus 
- The courts are in a position to make a finding on the facts alone 4 
- The facts of the case are crucial in this defence 
- Expert testimony is not indispensable and will be disregarded if its 
factual basis is found to be untrue 
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The majority of mental health professionals agreed with the lawyers that factual evidence has an 
important role to play in the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 'Factual evidence' refers to 
the objective facts of the case and includes forensic evidence and testimony from witnesses. This 
kind of evidence enables the court to construct an objective picture of events surrounding the 
offence. The facts were considered to be important by practitioners because it impacted on their 
particular work. For mental health professionals, factual evidence was important because it 
informed their forensic assessment of the accused by providing a picture of the circumstances 
surrounding the offence. This view is substantiated by cases such as S v Kalogoropolous 1993 (1) 
SACR 12 (A) where the court acknowledged that the expert witnesses had taken into account the 
facts deposed to in the trial, and had drawn inferences about the appellant's control over his 
actions. In the same judgement the court also stated that it routinely engages in the same exercise 
i.e. it draws inferences about the accused's behaviour from the objective facts which are deposed. 
Thus the factual evidence is crucial in these cases as it objectively points to whether or not the 
accused was temporarily mentally impaired. This view was shared by lawyers in the study who 
pointed out that because expert testimony does not fulfil an indispensable function, the courts are 
in a position to make a finding based on the facts alone. Thus to a large in extent, both groups 
were in agreement as to the importance of factual evidence in these kinds of cases. 
4.2 Salient factors considered in the defence 
Free responses 
Table 4.2.1 Salient factors elicited through free re!.ponse (mental health professional!.) 
Salient factors considered in the defence 
'Sane Automatism' 
The accused's behaviour before, during and after the incident is very 
important: 
- Antecedent event involving a build-up of emotional stress and/or 
discord 
- Trigger event which constitutes provocation of some kind 
- The absence of complex, goal-directed behaviour 
- The presence of reflex actions, automatic behaviour 
- The absence of conscious thought with an inability to appreciate 
wrongfulness or act in accordance with that appreciation 






- The presence of a personality disorder which predisposes the person to 
reduced capacity 
- The emergence of transfer entia I issues between accused and deceased 
- A catathymic crisis which constitutes a sudden emotional crisis 
resulting in behaviour which can be out of character or reflect a 
particular pattern ego rage reactions 
- The person is able to regain equilibrium after the offence 
- The person is able to recall what transpired i.e. there is no amnesia for 
the offence 
'Psycho-social history' 
- History of major stresses in the past which is typified by a theme of loss 
- History of previous trauma which has left the person emotionally 
scarred 
- Emotional overload prior to event 
- Person sudden Iy acting out of character prior to and during the event 
-Trigger event 
Table 4.2.2 Salient factors elicited throughfree response(lawyers) 
Salient factors considered in the defence 
'Sane Automatism' 
The person's behaviour before, during and after the offence is crucial: 
- Trigger event which constitutes provocation (eg. long-build-up of 
aggression, alcohol or drugs) 
- The person loses the ability to reason or control his/her actions 
- Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
- Complete amnesia for the offence (as opposed to selective amnesia) 
'Importance of factual evidence' 
The facts of the case must accord with the defence 






The majority of practitioners in both groups cited the elements of sane automatism as being 
salient factors in the defence. The accused's behaviour before, during and after the offence was an 
important consideration in determining whether or not s/he acted in a goal-directed manner. The 
precipitating factor must be a 'trigger' which may constitute provocation of some kind. This is 
followed by an automatic act which lacks conscious direction and s/he experiences amnesia for 
the event. Thus practitioners highlighted the sequential elements in the defence which point to 
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temporary cognitive and/or conative impairment. The factors which these practitioners listed. 
point to the fact that they considered the defence of non-pathological incapacity to be predicated 
on both legs of the test for criminal capacity - thus both cognition and volition must be impaired 
for such a defence to succeed. This view is in direct contrast with the views of two mental health 
professionals who listed factors which do not expressly require that both legs of the test for 
criminal capacity be satisfied. Thus for example, where a catathymic crisis was claimed such as 
in S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 701 (C), the defence was predicated on the second leg ofthe test. 
i.e. conative functioning. The Moses judgement highlighted the fact that the defence can be 
predicated on either ofthe two legs and that it is possible for someone to lose control while still 
being able to appreciate the consequences ofhislher actions. While the overriding view seems to 
be that the essential elements of the defence constitute sane automatism, 'dissenting' practitioners 
raise the important point as to ways in which the defence (and thereby the legal test) can be 
interpreted. 
Cued responses 
Table 4.2.3 Salient factors elicited through cued response (mental health professionals) 
Cued responses Level of 
consensus 
Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 6 
Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to the 5 
event 
Physical and/or verbal threats by the deceased 5 
Breakdown of conscious awareness and vol itional control 6 
Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 5 
Inability to exercise control over actions 6 
Inability to recall events during a discrete period oftime as a result of a 5 
breakdown of conscious awareness 
Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 3 
Previous psychiatric history 3 
Personality disorder 3 
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Table 4.2.4 Salient factors elicited through cued response (lawyers) 
Cued responses Level of 
consensus 
Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to the event 4 
Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 4 
Physical and/or verbal threats by the deceased 4 
Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 4 
Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 4 
Inability to exercise control over actions 4 
Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a 
3 
breakdown of conscious awareness 
Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 2 
Previous psychiatric history 4 
Personality disorder 2 
The majority of mental health practitioners agreed with the lawyers that the first seven cued 
responses were important elements in the defence. These factors pertained to the particular 
sequence of events surrounding the offence i.e. antecedent event, 'trigger', cognitive and conative 
impairment, amnesia. This finding concurs with the free responses where participants highlighted 
the factors which they considered to be pertinent to the defence. The remaining three cued 
responses did not receive overwhelming support in each group. Where participants agreed, the 
rationale was that these factors make a person vulnerable to reacting in particular ways and 
therefore should be grounds for exculpation. Those participants who disagreed as to the 
importance of these factors, did not consider intoxication, psychiatric history or personality 
disorder to be essential elements of the defence. The argument was that a consideration of these 
factors would raise various problems pertaining to the person's potential to re-offend ifs/he was 
exonerated. In addition, if a person was particularly vulnerable because of these factors, then slhe 
would be expected to avoid situations which may result in violence. This view seems to be 
underpinned by the notion of antecedent responsibility whereby the individual can be held 
responsible if s/he chooses to be in situations where there is a likelihood of susceptibility to 
violent reactions (Snyman, 1995). Thus participants in this study believed that it is the 
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individual's responsibility to avoid such provocative situations. The individual's predisposition 
to vulnerability raises questions as to whether slhe can be expected to always react in that way. 
and if so, should society not be protected from them? While there was a high degree of 
consensus amongst practitioners regarding the first seven cued responses. the last three responses 
were the source of contention. The latter raised the question as to whether the courts have a 'duty' 
to excuse individual vulnerability or whether their responsibility to society's norms and values, 
supercedes this. 
4.3 Perceptions of the defence 
Conceptions of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity 
Table 4.3.1 Mental health professionals' conceptions of sane automatism and non-pathological 
incapacity 
Sane automatism vs non-pathological incapacity Level of consensus 
The concepts are not synonymous: 
4 
- Sane automatism requires a clinical diagnosis of dissociation 
- Non-pathological incapacity has a much wider ambit and can cover 
a wide range of diagnoses 
The concepts are synonymous: 
2 
- Sane automatism constitutes automatic behaviour which lacks 
conscious direction. It is characterised by cognitive and conative 
impairment and amnesia 
- A clinical diagnosis of dissociation is made 
Table 4.3.2 Lawyers' conceptions of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity 
Sane automatism vs non-pathological incapacity Level of consensus 
The concepts are not synonymous: 
2 
- Non-pathological incapacity can be predicated on either of the two 
legs of the test for criminal capacity ego conative functioning can 
be impaired while cognitive functioning remains intact 
- Sane automatism requires an impairment of both cognitive and 
conative functioning which results in a dissociative episode 
The concepts are synonymous: 2 
-The evidence must show that the person was not acting in a goal-
directed manner 
The majority of mental health professionals agreed that sane automatism and non-pathological 
incapacity are not synonymous. The lawyers, on the other hand, were split as to whether or not 
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the two are synonymous. While there were differences in the number of responses between the 
two groups, the reasons which each group offered were similar. The diagnostic features of 
dissociation were considered to be the essential elements of a defence of automatism while non-
pathological incapacity was seen as allowing for a wider range of diagnoses. Gillmer's (1996) 
review of several cases involving the defence of non-pathological incapacity, reveals that it 
encompasses a wide range of psychological phenomena such as a 'total psychological 
disintegration', a 'narrowing of consciousness', 'a separation of intellect and emotion' as well as 
sane automatism. Thus the latter has been accepted by the courts as falling within the rubric of 
the former. On one hand, this situation can be understood since sane automatism arises from non-
pathological causes. However, the question before the court is whether an involuntary act was 
committed and if so, it does not constitute an act in law. In light ofthis, the accused cannot be 
held liable because the actus reus is an essential element of criminal liability (Snyman, 1995). 
Thus the requirements for voluntariness of the act is the central issue in automatism while in the 
case of non-pathological incapacity, the focus is on the requirements for criminal capacity. Petty 
(1998) points out that the courts have not resolved the differences between the two defences, 
which merely adds to the confusion as to whether in fact they boil down to one and the same 
thing. This semantic and perhaps conceptual confusion, may explain why some practitioners in 
this study viewed the two as being synonymous, thereby giving the defence a clear-cut diagnosis 
i.e. dissociation. This seems to avoid the 'psycho-babble' (Gillmer, 1996, p. 20) which the courts 
have allowed in the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
Exculpatory psychological states 
Table 4.3.3 Mental health professionals' perceptions of exculpatory psychological states 
Exculpatory psychological states Level of consensus 
Exculpatory psychological states do exist: 
5 
-Examples: personality d isorders( except anti-social), impulse control 
disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression. dissociation, rage 
dyscontrol disorder 
-These conditions can make a person vulnerable to impaired capacity 
Exculpatory psychological states do not exist: 1 
-Psychological states can only diminish responsibility and not completely 
negate it 
-An acknowledgment of such conditions as grounds for non-responsibility 
would defeat the retributive aspect of criminal law 
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Table 4.3.4 Lawyers' perceptions of exculpatory psychological states 
Exculpatory psychological states Level of consensus 
Exculpatory psychological states do exist: 2 
- An interplay between personality factors, socio-economic circumstances 
and alcohol abuse can make a person vulnerable to committing violent 
crime 
- It is conceivable that a person can be provoked to such an extent that s/he 
loses control and reacts violently 
Exculpatory psychological states do not exist: 
- On Iy pathological states (mental illness) can lead to crim ina I incapacitation 1 
- non-pathological states cannot lead to cognitive or conative impairment 
Unable to commit to an answer I 
The majority of mental health professionals agreed that certain psychological states can be 
grounds for exculpation, while the lawyers were split on this theme. Where there was consensus, 
the examples which were given ranged from personality disorders (such as borderline personality 
disorder) to depression and dissociation. The central aspect which all participants referred to was 
that these conditions predisposed the individual to impaired capacity. Thus the interplay between 
external factors such as provocation, and internal factors such as a personality disorder, would 
render a person non-responsible. From a mental health perspective, a wide range of biological, 
psychological and social factors are taken into account in order to explain human behaviour. This 
may explain why this group was more accepting of the existence of exculpatory psychological 
states. While the number of 'dissenting' practitioners was negligible, they raised thought-
provoking points. One objection raised by a mental health professional, was that an 
acknowledgment of such states would mean that most murders would be excusable and this 
would defeat the retributive aspect of criminal law. This seems to reflect a concern for the 
morality of excusing such behaviour and whether, in doing so, the purpose of criminal law would 
not be subverted. Another objection raised by an advocate, centred around the belief that only 
mental illness can impair cognitive and conative functioning and that sane individuals are able to 
exercise control over their actions. This reflects the view that an interplay between internal and 
external factors cannot render a person non-responsible as s/he is able to exercise hislher will 
regardless ofthe circumstances. The contrast provided by the overwhelming consensus anlongst 
mental health practitioners and the lack of consensus amongst the lawyers, points to how 
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individual behaviour is construed by their disciplines, as well as to whether issues of morality 
impinge on the way in which non-pathological states are viewed. 
Validity of defence 
Table 4.3.5 Mental health professionals' perceptions of the validity of the defence 
Validity of the defence Level of consensus 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is valid: 4 
- There are psychological states which can lead to non-responsibility and 
therefore the defence is justified in acknowledging this 
- Because of its latitude, the defence is open to abuse by offenders who do 
not have other legal avenues open to them 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is not valid: 
2 
- Only pathological states can impair cognition and volition 
- The defence is not justified in acknowledging that non-pathological factors, 
such as affect, can impair cognitive and conative functioning 
Table 4.3.6 Lawyers' perceptions of the validity of the defence 
Validity of the defence Level of consensus 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is valid: 
3 
- People cannot be held responsible for acts which they did not commit 
intentionally or over which they had no control 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is not valid: I 
- Only pathological factors can impair cognitive or conative functioning 
- Loss of control due to non-pathological factors cannot be accepted as 
grounds for non-responsibi I ity because people are able to exercise control 
The majority of practitioners in both groups agreed that the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity is valid. Agreement (and disagreement) on this theme was linked to how participants 
viewed exculpatory psychological states. Thus where the existence of exculpatory psychological 
states was acknowledged, participants agreed that the defence was justified in recognising these 
factors. However, these participants raised concerns that it may be open to abuse by offenders 
who are trying to evade punishment. It was seen as a loophole in the law which enabled offenders 
to easily claim exculpatory transient mental states. While in practice these claims are often 
refuted by courts, the defence seems to provide recourse when all other avenues have failed. 
Snyman (1995) says that while the law cannot punish those offenders who did not intentionally 
commit a crime, the courts are circumspect towards claims that non-pathological factors have 
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negated responsibility. This is because the defence can be easily raised and the burden of proof is 
on the State. While the courts do not seem to question the validity of the defence. case law 
reflects their circumspection regarding claims made by offenders. The status quo is that it has 
been accepted as a valid defence in South African law but this does not mean that it will succeed 
easily. Where participants in this study stated that the defence was not valid, this related to their 
scepticism regarding the existence of exculpatory non-pathological states. Thus only pathology 
was held to negate criminal capacity. It would therefore seem that they felt that defence was not 
justified because the existence of 'true' non-pathological states was questionable. While to a large 
extent there was agreement as to the validity of the defence in South African law. the reservations 
expressed by some participants point to a moral concern about providing an easy way out for 
those who should in fact be punished. This can be understood in terms of a legal point of view, 
but it is interesting that mental health professionals have also been drawn into this moral debate. 
4.4 Additional tl,eme: Nature and quality of State expert testimony vs defence expert testimony 
Table 4.4.1 Nature and quality of State expert testimony vs defence expert testimony 
Nature and quality of expert testimony Mental health professionals Lawyers 
-State expert testimony only focuses on 
4 1 
automatism 
-The courts have been influenced by this 
perspective such that the defence is often 
interpreted in this way 
-The forensic assessments by state experts are 
limited 
An additional theme which emerged from the views of five participants (who were private 
practitioners), concerned the nature and quality of State expert testimony as opposed to defence 
expert testimony. While this theme did not emerge in all the interviews. it was deemed important 
because it related to how the adversarial nature of the legal system lays the foundation for 
opposing views regarding the interpretation of an accused's transient mental state. This theme 
revolved around private practitioners' perceptions that State experts defined the defence only in 
terms of sane automatism. This in tum seemed to influence the court's perceptions of the defence. 
The quality of State experts' assessments was criticised for not employing a wider range of 
psychological assessment techniques. The quality of reports written by these experts was 
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highlighted as being of a formulaic nature. Thus the form and content of State experts' enquiries 
was seen as problematic. The participants felt that this did not allow for alternative ways of 
interpreting the defence or for acknowledging a variety of transient mental states. In addition, the 
perceived influence of State experts on judicial understanding of psychological phenomena did 
not leave much leeway for defence expert testimony, particularly when it was not predicated on 
proving automatism. While on one hand, the adversarial system allows for diametrically opposing 
views, this may well exacerbate the rather tenuous position occupied by such testimony. The 
following quotation reflects the sentiments of one practitioner who felt that State experts were too 
rigid and formulaic in their interpretation of the defence : 
In a sense all I'm doing there is providing psychological evidence to the judge which he will link to the rest 
of the evidence. I don't hold the burden of determining responsibility. That's the difference between the 
evidence as I lead it and what I've heard coming out of Val ken berg. They tend to say this so - this person is 
responsible, this person has capacity. no explanation, there was no automatism and therefore they have 
capacity and that's it. That's very nice for the judge and I've seen certain judges respond to that because 
they don't have to raise the questions which the defence raises but to me that is the most simple way - quite 
a binary way - it considers no psychological theory, it doesn't consider the facts in terms of the 
psychological theory, it's looking purely at the narrow definition of capacity.2 
Thus it can be seen that these private practitioners felt that State experts' perspectives 'damaged' 
the psychological standing ofthe defence by limiting it to sane automatism. 
2Mental health professional 1 : verbatim quotation from the interview (see Appendix D) 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
This chapter provides a discussion of the salient issues which emerged from the data analysis. On 
one level, the analysis revealed the areas of consensus and disagreement between mental health 
professionals and lawyers, regarding the defence of non-pathological incapacity. At a meta-level 
the themes generated thought-provoking questions about how interpretations and applications of 
the defence are underpinned by issues of morality and a confusion between pathology and 'non-
pathology' . 
The discussion is presented in the following way: 
Firstly, it considers the ways in which psychological discourse has been contaminated by legal 
conceptions of morality. It explores this idea by referring to the various themes which emerged 
from the analysis. The discussion then illustrates this notion of contamination with various 
examples from the analysis. Illustrations are provided so as to capture the essence of the issues 
which emerged at a meta-level. 
Secondly, it focuses on the apparent confusion between pathology and 'non-pathology' by 
arguing that the concepts seem to refer to the same thing. The discussion then explores this 
circular reasoning by drawing on examples from the analysis. 
Finally, the discussion departs from the norm by posing some philosophical ideas regarding the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity. This departure is not directly linked to the analysis itself 
but flows from the salient issues referred to above. It explores the idea of 'moral character' as a 
novel way of understanding both legal and moral excuses and arrives at some understanding of 
the core issues of the defence. 
5.1 A contamination of psychological discourse 
From the analysis in Chapter 4, it can be seen that the areas where there was an overwhelming 
consensus, pertained to the conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility. The sample of 
ten participants were in agreement as to what constitutes criminal responsibility and the role 
which expert testimony plays in its assessment. Both lawyers and mental health professionals 
agreed that criminal responsibility is a legal construct which refers to a person's mental capacity 
at the time ofthe offence. Consequent to this, both groups of participants agreed that the role of 
expert testimony is to provide opinion on the individual's mental state. Thus the role of 
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determining responsibility belongs to the court, while experts, merely offer additional evidence 
which may assist it in this process. An example which illustrates this, is the following mental 
health professional's view: 
My role is to determine the mental state of the individual at the relevant time and the facts of the case are 
very important and relevant to that. In other words, is there any change in his mental state prior to. during 
and after the offence, and that opinion we can then otTer the court. The decision is the court's and not ours 
but we need to argue for changes in the person's mental state during the relevant period. It's a legal matter 
and we make clinical judgements about the person's behaviour and the ability to perfonn:l 
However, as lawyers within this study emphasised, expert testimony does not fulfil an 
indispensable function in cases of this nature, and therefore the court is in a position to make a 
finding based on the factual evidence. Given that such cases rely on the subjective account of the 
accused, the courts have emphasised the importance of factual evidence, as this seems to 
represent an objective yardstick whereby they are able to determine whether or not cognition 
and/or volition was impaired. This view was held by all the lawyers while the majority of mental 
health professionals stressed that factual evidence was important in helping them to ascertain how 
the impairment occurred. From the results it can be seen that mental health professionals and 
lawyers purport to engage with the concept of responsibility in different ways. The former is 
concerned with explaining how impairment occurred while the latter is concerned with proving 
whether the person meets the requirements of the test for capacity. On the surface it would seem 
as if the parameters between lawyers and mental health professionals are clearly defined. In fact, 
the views expressed by participants concur with the views of the court in S v Cunningham 1996 
(1) SACR at 636 b-c (A) where Scott JA stated the following: 
It follows that in most ifnot all cases medical evidence of an expert nature will be necessary to lay a factual 
foundation for the defence and to displace the inference just mentioned. But ultimately it is for the court to 
decide the issue of the voluntary nature or otherwise of the alleged act and indeed the accused's 
responsibility for his actions. In doing so it will have regard not only to the expert evidence but to all the 
facts of the case, including the nature of the accused's actions during the relevant period. 
The assessment of criminal responsibility is therefore a legal and moral issue and the views 
expressed in this study are in line with judicial thinking. However, it is argued that the issue is 
not that straightforward. The question arises as to whether the disciplines oflaw and psychology 
have managed to maintain parameters such that the former evaluates and judges individual 
behaviour while the latter merely attempts to explain it. Even though participants in the study 
emphasised that mental health professionals are not equipped to determine responsibility, this 
3Mental health professional 2(see Appendix D) 
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does not mean that their moral views do not impinge on the way in which they view cases of this 
nature. 
The majority of mental health professionals agreed that exculpatory psychological states exist 
and listed several conditions such as personality disorders, depression and dissociation, which fall 
under this rubric. The purported vulnerability and susceptibility of individuals who suffer from 
these conditions, require that they should not be accountable for their actions. The reasoning 
seems to be that the same considerations which are extended to mentally ill offenders, should be 
extended to those who suffer from transient mental conditions. Thus in the same way that the 
former do not receive moral or legal condemnation, so too should the latter. An example which 
illustrates this is the following mental health professional's view: 
I would have to say personality disorders because that would render the person vulnerable to stressors and 
cause them to react in a particular way. I would say that such a situation would lead to non-responsibility.l 
wouldn't risk any other specific diagnosis but would say a personality disorder plus the stressors. Take for 
example, Borderline personality disorder, where the person can be quite impulsive and can have quite 
intense emotion and put that person in a very difficult situation where a lot of things build-up - you can 
expect that person to somehow have an outburst of emotion. I don't like to say that we can excuse all kinds 
of crime but in certain people we can explain why they did what they did - not out ofmaliciousness it was 
just a reaction to stressors.4 
Thus it would seem as if there is some moral flavour to how such individuals (and cases) are 
perceived. The issue seems to be that individuals who are particularly vulnerable because of their 
psychological make-up, should not be classified as 'bad'. They do not fall within the same 
category as habitual offenders and therefore should not be measured with the same legal and 
moral yardstick. This perception seems to have extended to the way in which participants in the 
study viewed the validity of the defence. 
The majority of mental health professionals and lawyers agreed that the defence is justified in 
acknowledging that non-pathological factors are grounds for exculpation. While participants 
expressed reservations regarding the potential for abuse by offenders, they agreed that there are 
instances when it is valid. The underlying notion seems to be that individuals who commit 
offences because of psychological vulnerability, should not be punished. Given that these 
individuals are unlikely to re-offend, they cannot be categorised with ordinary criminals and 
therefore should not be sanctioned. The idea seems to be that the defence rightfully provides a 
4Mental health professional 3(see Appendix D) 
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legal and moral excuse for those individuals who are not intrinsically bad. An example which 
illustrates this, is the following view expressed by a mental health professional: 
Yes, I think that it is valid because I agree with the law. It's alternative thinking to the idea that someone is 
wrong so let us punish them. I believe that in law as well you have to understand this person and what they 
did in order to rehabilitate them. And from that point I think it's important that we can point out the 
person's problems with psychotherapy - rather than let them sit in jail for a few years. We can build 
someone up again and that is why I think that it is valid. \ 
The moral undertones of the views expressed by mental health professionals, in particular, may 
be understood when one considers the expectations of the RumpffCommission ofInquiry into 
the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters (RP 69/1967) : 
What is required of the psychiatrist and the psychologist is a sense of responsibility, towards the views of 
society and the purpose and essence of punishment... 
(cited in Burchell, Milton and Burchell, p. 257, 1983). 
It would seem as if mental health professionals are expected to be mindful of the link between 
criminal responsibility and the retributive aspect of punishment. Therefore they are expected to 
assist the courts in ensuring that those who are bad are punished while those who suffer from 
pathology should not be sanctioned. 
From the above it can be seen that there has been a contamination of psychological discourse by 
the moral underpinnings ofthe law. After alL when experts are asked to testify to impairment due 
to non-pathological factors, they are offering an opinion regarding non-responsibility, albeit at 
subtle level. Henderson (1988) argues that courts require experts to forward opinions in relation 
to moral issues since legal tests for responsibility are concerned with moral questions. He 
suggests that when experts are asked to offer an opinion, their testimony may include some kind 
of moral judgement. 
It would seem that this contamination of psychological discourse by the law, has occurred 
somewhat surreptitiously. Where non-pathological incapacity is concerned, the law has been 
faced with a conundrum in that it has not made statutory provision for the recognition of 
affective factors which have become integral to the defence. It has therefore turned to psychology 
whose explanatory frameworks have provided viable recourse (Gillmer, 1996). Thus it would 
seem that the legal and moral conundmm which faces lawyers, has subtly been transferred to 
mental health practitioners. These ideas are borne out by Gillmer, Louw and Verschoor (1997) 
5Mental health professional 3(see Appendix D) 
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who question whether 'psychologists are called as expert witnesses to give opinion based on 
scientifically derived principles' or whether psychology is 'allowed in when jurists are loath to 
grasp the social and moral nettles which they have permitted to grow around the feet of those in 
the adversarial arena' (p. 20). 
5.2 Pathology vs non-pathology 
In eliciting the factors which participants considered to be pertinent to the defence of non-
pathological incapacity, seven out often listed the elements of the defence of sane automatism. 
The majority of mental health professionals referred to the diagnosis of dissociation as being 
pertinent to this defence, while two lawyers listed elements of sane automatism as it is defined in 
law. This interpretation of the defence is illustrated in the following view expressed by a mental 
health professional: 
You have to assess the person at three main stages - before the offence. during and after the offence. The 
most critical aspect is during the offence and what I need to be convinced of is that the person behaved 
automatically. In other words they weren't cognitively able to know right from wrong and they weren't 
able to control themselves ... What one is looking for is an antecedent event where the person was subjected 
to a lot of conflict or stress, which built up to a crescendo, and then there's a trigger which is usually 
provocation of some sort ... Afterwards, the person comes to, they realise what they've done, feel 
bewildered and often don't try and get away, but try and help. But there is supposed to be amnesia - if you 
were in a true automatic state. you must have amnesia because your mind couldn't lay down memories." 
This definition of sane automatism was also reflected in the cued responses. which revealed that 
the majority of lawyers and mental professionals agreed that five basic elements i.e. antecedent 
event (trigger), cognitive and conative impairment, automatic behaviour and amnesia. were 
important aspects of the defence. Where mental health professionals disagreed with this 
definition, they offered other diagnoses such as personality disorders, which illustrated the 
presence of some kind of pathology. A review of several cases reveals that the courts have 
considered the elements of the test for capacity and consequently. whether a voluntary act was 
committed. Expert testimony on the other hand, while considering some if not all the elements 
listed above, has not necessarily confined itself to defining the defence in terms of dissociation 
(see S v Wiid 1990 (1) SACR 561 (A); S v Potgieter 1994 (1) SACR 61 (A); S v N ursingh 1995 
(2) SACR 331 (D); S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 701 (C); S v Pederson [1998] 3 All SA 321; S v 
Henry 1999 (1) SACR 13 (A». Even though expert testimony in these cases differed in terms of 
diagnoses, the conclusion is that established diagnostic categories such as dissociation or 
personality disorders were considered as typifying the defence. However, these diagnoses were 
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seen as referring to conditions which ostensibly fall within the rubric of "non-pathology' i.e. 
conditions which are not pathological in nature. This notion extended to participants' views about 
the existence of exculpatory psychological states. From a mental health perspective, a wide range 
of diagnostic categories were listed as falling within the rubric of temporary non-pathological 
states. Five participants listed conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and 
personality disorders, while two lawyers listed the features of automatism. While these conditions 
were forwarded as examples of 'non-pathology' , they in fact fall within the range of pathologies 
as defined in the DSM IV (1994). This begs the question as to how one distinguishes between 
pathology and 'non-pathology', when they in fact refer to the same diagnostic categories. After 
all, since dissociation has specific features, when is it pathological and when is it not? If a 
particular personality type is prone reacting in particular ways, when is the behaviour 
pathological and when is it not? While arguments are made for a distinction between pathology 
and 'non-pathology', it is unclear how this is achieved. Even if the idea of a temporary state is 
used as a yardstick, how does this account for personality disorders, which are enduring 
conditions? It would seem as if there is some circularity in the way that pathology and "non-
pathology' are construed. Since there is a lack of textbook diagnoses for temporary impairment 
(Strauss, 1995), this leaves practitioners with recourse to the nosology of pathological conditions. 
Ultimately it seems as if existing notions of pathology have been moulded to fit the requirements 
of the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
These claims may seem exaggerated but when one considers that the circular reasoning stems 
from the test for capacity, then the challenge facing mental health professionals in particular, 
becomes clear. In addition, the question then changes from how one distinguishes between 
pathology and 'non-pathology', to when this distinction becomes pertinent. Essentially the test 
for criminal capacity is applied to both pathological and non-pathological states which means 
that the same expert psychological evidence can be adduced in both instances (Petty, 1998). 
From a legal point of view, the issue is not the nature of pathology or 'non-pathology', instead it 
has to be proven that the accused suffered from cognitive and/or conative impairment. Thus the 
requirements of the test are crucial and lawyers are not caught up in the diagnostic confusion 
experienced by mental health professionals. The latter have to provide explanations for 
6Mental health professional 4 (see Appendix D) 
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impairment, by making diagnoses which fall within either pathology or 'non-pathology". 
However, the nature of the diagnosis depends on the kind of defence which is forwarded. lt 
would seem that the distinction between pathology and 'non-pathology' is made when there is 
hope of an acquittal and, of course, in the absence of florid psychosis. The distinction therefore. is 
more than mere semantics. In the face of florid psychosis with poor prognosis. the insanity 
defence is forwarded. Where seemingly sane individuals commit unthinkable crimes. some 
explanation which does not fully qualify as pathology but retains the same scientific credibility. 
is forwarded. Thus the argument seems to be that in the latter, the person was 'a bit mad' but not 
insane enough to be hospitalised indefinitely. If this sounds confusing then it may well be a 
reflection of the current state of affairs as far as the psychological interpretation and application 
of the defence is concerned. Petty (1998) argues that the root of the problem lies in the 
application of the same test for both pathological and non-pathological incapacity which results 
in the boundaries being obfuscated between the two. 
5.3 Philosophical reflections on the defence of nOll-patllOlogical incapacity 
The two salient issues which emerged from the analysis, revolved around morality and the 
conceptual confusion regarding pathology and 'non-pathology'. While it may seem that these 
problems only plague the defence of non-pathological incapacity, these kinds of debates have 
plagued the insanity defence in Anglo-American jurisdictions. As was discussed in Chapter Two, 
the heart of the debate within the American legal system in particular, has been whether the 
insanity defence is justified as a legal and moral excuse. The concern for punishment and the rule 
of law have provided fuel for the debate between American commentators from legal. 
philosophical and mental health backgrounds. While these debates have focussed on the insanity 
defence in that jurisdiction, this does not mean that useful inferences cannot be used to 
understand the defence of non-pathological incapacity as it is applied in South Africa. Despite the 
fact that the two defences are essentially different, the philosophical questions regarding 
excusable and punishable behaviour are the same. The framework forwarded by Reznek (1997) is 
informed by philosophy and psychiatry and provides a useful vehicle for further exploring the 
defence. His analysis includes an understanding of those psychological conditions which do not 
fall within the rubric of the traditional insanity defence and which require closer analysis to 
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establish whether they qualify as excuses. Reznek's (1997) analysis may help to provide some 
interesting insights into the issues surrounding the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
It is conceded that this brief philosophical interlude represents a departure from the normal form 
and content ofa study of this nature. The ideas which are forwarded depart from the foundations 
set in Chapter Two, and therefore do not deal with the elements of the defence per se. but present 
a further attempt at establishing what underlies the current legal precept. It is argued that by 
gaining some insight into the philosophical roots of this defence, this may illuminate some of the 
niggling questions around the ways in which the defence is interpreted and applied. 
Reznek's (1997) central concern is whether the insanity defence is justified and consequently, 
which circumstances qualify as grounds for excuse. He argues that in order to understand the 
notion of excuses, one has to understand the concept of moral character. While the notion of 
intent is central to criminal responsibility, the concept of moral character is important in 
understanding who deserves to be punished. A person's moral character traits refer to dispositions 
which incline himlher to act morally or immorally. Moral character is central to the kinds of 
excuses which are accepted in law, and the the concept of 'evil character' which is the 
'propensity to harm others in the pursuit of his own selfish interests' (Reznek. 1997. p. 13). is 
important in understanding who should be sanctioned. Evil characters therefore. should be 
punished because they are intrinsically bad and can always be expected to behave in immoral 
ways. This brings one to the question of who deserves to be excused. 
There are circumstances such as stress and provocation and indeed mental illness. which can 
temporarily change a person's character such that slhe commits an evil deed. However, this does 
not mean that the person is intrinsically evil. The argument is that such behaviour should be 
excused because an underlying good character exists i.e. s/he is not evil and therefore should not 
be punished (Reznek, 1997). The distinction between evil characters and good characters who 
commit evil deeds, leads one to question how to establish whether a person has a good character. 
The key issue is whether the person was' acting out of character' such that criminal behaviour is 
seen as an aberration of normal behaviour brought about by abnormal circumstances (such as 
stress, provocation, duress). Reznek's (1997) analysis concludes that conditions such as mental 
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illness and factors such as extreme emotional stress can result in temporary changes in moral 
character and consequently, these circumstances should qualify as grounds for excuse. 
How can Reznek's ideas be applied to the understanding of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity? 
The concept of moral character provides a thought-provoking way of understanding why sane 
individuals are capable of committing heinous offences. A review of several reported cases shows 
that where individuals experienced provocation, momentarily they were not themselves, and were 
capable of inflicting harm on other people (see S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C); S v Wiid 1990 
(l) SACR 561 (A); S v Nursingh 1995 (2) SACR 331 (D) . The picture painted in these cases 
reveal individuals who fall within the rubric of what Reznek (1997) considers to be good 
characters. They were not evil and did not routinely inflict harm on others. Instead, the 
circumstances surrounding the offence such as extreme emotional stress and provocation, were 
abnormal, and gave rise to behaviour which did not fall within the individual's normal repertoire. 
Expert testimony in these cases focussed on the antecedent factors which gave rise to the offence 
and emphasised that the accused was a sane individual whose capacity was temporarily impaired 
by these factors. The importance of understanding the antecedent events in cases of non-
pathological incapacity, was emphasised by participants in this study as they believed that it 
created the milieu within which to understand why the person acted out of character (see Chapter 
4: Salient factors considered in the defence). The nub of the defence is that criminal beahviour 
is not intrinsic to the person's behavioural repetoire and therefore society does not have to be 
protected from himlher. In addition, because the law recognises that capacity can be impaired 
temporarily, such behaviour should be excused. As has been discussed in Chapter Two, South 
African law has in the last two decades, accepted these circumstances as grounds for legal excuse 
(Snyman, 1995). Perhaps at a moral level the defence has caused greater debate. particularly 
because there is concern that it provides leeway for those who are trying to evade punishment. 
However, if one takes Reznek's (1997) argument into account, then it may bring some closure to 
these debates. If one accepts that there are non-pathological factors which can impair the capacity 
of a character which is essentially good, then it follows that a temporary change in moral 
character can occur. 
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Reznek's ideas concerning temporary change in moral character may also be useful when 
exploring the apparent differences in diagnostic categories which are used to describe non-
pathological states. Given that experts often differ in terms of diagnosis, this results in situations 
where they seem to be referring to different things. As has been discussed in Chapter Four (see 
Nature and quality of State expert testimony vs expert testimony), the adversarial nature of the 
legal system lays the foundation for opposing expert views on transient mental conditions. This 
may well contribute to the way in which expert testimony is viewed by the courts but may also 
serve to further muddy the waters as far as psychological interpretations of the defence are 
concerned. The case of S v Moses 1996 ( 1 ) SACR 701 (C) is a pertinent example as it illustrates 
how disparate arguments between the prosecution and defence, resulted in disparate testimony by 
experts. The expert for the prosecution focussed on sane automatism and emphasised that only 
pathology can impair capacity. The defence expert on the other hand, focussed on the accused's 
inability to control himself after being provoked. His actions were sketched within the context of 
a wide range of psychosocial factors. At the end of the day both experts were trying to explain the 
accused's actions even though different diagnoses were used. If one adopts Reznek' s ideas 
concerning temporary change in moral character. then it is possible that they were unwittingly 
questioning the accused's moral character. Reznek argues that, 
'Extreme emotions change a person's desires, values and beliefs - that is his character. .. They might be law-
abiding, caring people when not subjected to such pressures. But when provoked, they cease to care, 
becoming different moral characters. When the original character is restored -when the person has calmed 
down and cares more about others - we have no inclination to punish him as he is a different character from 
the one who acted' 
(1997, p.229). 
Similarly, the same understanding can be applied to automatism. in that Reznek (1997 ) argues 
that a person in a dissociated state is acting on a narrow set of values-and desires which is 
different from the normal character. He says that this may explain why goal-directed acts can be 
committed in such states because the person is completely focussed on satisfying a single desire. 
If one adopts the concept of moral character as being central to understanding non-pathological 
conditions, then various diagnostic categories may merely be describing the same thing. Whether 
it be 'total psychological disintegration', 'a narrowing of consciousness' or . dissociation' 
(Gillmer, 1996, p. 20), a temporary change in moral character is the underlying construct which is 
being described. 
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Reznek's (1997) argument that the excuse of temporary change in moral character be accepted as 
grounds for exculpation in American federal law, provides an interesting tool for interpreting the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity in South Africa. This presents challenges for the law as it 
may require that the test for capacity be revisited. In addition, the excuse of character change is 
useful for psychology as it may provide a focal point which experts can work from. This may 
resolve some of the tensions which arise when experts offer diametrically opposing views by 
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APPENDIX A: Intenriew Schedule 




1.2 Work experience: 
1.3 No of cases involving non-pathological incapacity: 
2. Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court in 
assessing criminal responsibility - how would you define the concept of criminal 
responsibility? 
3.The following dictum by Ogilivie Thompson JA in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A) at 365 
B-C, reflects the court's perspective of the role of expert testimony in the assessment of 
criminal responsibility: 
' ... it must be borne in mind that...in the ultimate analysis, the crucial issue ofthe appellant's 
criminal responsibility for his actions at the relevant time is a matter to be determined not by 
psychiatrists but by the Court itself. In determining that issue - initially the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also 
to all the other facts ofthe case, including the reliability ofthe appellant as a witness and the 
nature of his proved actions throughout the relevant period' . 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of 
criminal responsibility - how would you view the role of psychologists and psychiatrists in 
the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
4. What was the nature of the cases which you were involved in where the defence of non-
pathological incapacity was raised? 
4.1 Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to 
highlight the factors which you took into account to support (forward/prosecute) such a 
defence? 
4.2 Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
4.3 In addition to the factors which you have already outlined, would you consider any ofthe 
following to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
1. Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5. Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
63 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7. Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdo\\'11 of 
conSCIOUS awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
5. Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is synonymous with sane 
automatism? 
6. Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-
responsibility? 
7. Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
8. Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised, in how many instances 
has your testimony (opinion) been accepted by the court and on what basis? 
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APPENDIX B: Coding 
Codes employed in the analysis 
CRiDEFN - definition of criminal responsibility 
PSYIROLE - role of expert testimony 
FACIEVD - role offactual evidence 
FREEIRESP - salient factors elicited through free response 
CUED/RESP - salient factors elicited through cued response 
AUTINPI - sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity 
EXCIPSY - exculpatory psychological states 
VALlDF - validity of the defence 
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APPENDIX C: Inter-rater reliability 
Inter-rater reliability of sub-themes elicited from the interviews 
Sub-theme Agreement Disagreement 
Definitions of criminal responsibility './ 
Role of psychological testimony './ 
Role of factual evidence '/' 
Salient factors elicited through free response './ 
Salient factors elicited through cued response './ 
Conceptions of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity './ 
Exculpatory psychological states './ 
Validity of the defence './ 
Agreement on 6 of the 7 sub-themes: Inter- rater reliability of 85% 
Inter-rater reliability on main themes 
Theme Agreement Disagreement 
Conceptions and assessment of criminal responsibility './ 
Salient factors considered in the defence './ 
Perceptions of the defence './ 
Agreement on all 3 main themes: Inter-rater reliability of 100% 
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APPENDIX D: Interview Transcripts 
Mental health professional! 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various Instances In assisting the court in assessing criminal responsibility - hoI\' would yo II 
define the concept of criminal responsibilit)'? 
Well, I just define it in terms of the Act in terms of the ability to know right and wrong. To be able to act in accordance with that. I don't think 
that there is any psychological detinition which I have found which improves on that or, detracts from that. It's a very clear definition and when 
I approach a case I use that definition. 
The following dictum by Ogilivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A) at 365 B-C reflects the court's perspective of the role of 
experttestimon)' in the assessment of criminal responsibiltt)' . 
.. it must be borne in mind thal. ... in the IIltimate analysis. the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibilityfor his actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the Court itself In determining that issue - initially the trIGI Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the otherfacts of the case. including the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the nature of his proved actions throughout the relevant period' 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - hOIl' wouldyou view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
Purely in an advisory role you see I see myselfas expert witness and informing and trying to give information to the judge to help him to come 
to a decision about criminal responsibility. Can I give you an example to illustrate this? In the Hermanus murders I gave evidence in mitigation 
with one of the defendants. I can't remember their names but the case was well-publ icised. These two youngsters went out on a murdering spree 
one night and in the morning there were three corpses and one badly assaulted man. It was about two years ago. But in that case in the middle of 
my evidence thejudge turned to me and said I don't understand this case and I said that's my problem too - the defendant had not taken me into 
his confidence so I alii can do is conjecture on what happened and this is my conjecture in term of the process. That in essence captures what I 
am trying to say. In a sense alii 'm doing there is providing psychological evidence to the judge which he will link to the rest of the evidence. I 
don't hold the burden of determining responsibility. That's the difTerence between the evidence as I lead it and what I've heard coming out of 
Valkenberg. They tend to say this so - this person is responsible, this person has capacity, no explanation. there was no automatism and 
therefore they have capacity and that's it. That's very nice for the judge and I've seen certain judges respond to that because they don't have to 
raise the questions which the defence raises but to me that is the most simple way - quite a binary way - it considers no psychological theory, it 
doesn't consider the facts in terms of the psychological theory, it's looking purely at the narrow definition of capacity - as I said in the 
beginning I will approach it with that definition and then begin to examine capacity in terms of the evidence and my psychological a.~sessment 
and then advise the judge about what happened: about how I believe what happened in terms of the crime - he will make the detennination, 
what psychiatrists at Valkenberg have a tendency to do is to make the determination without providing all the linle steps which led up to the 
crime. One way or the other way in terms of the defence or prosecution - and I've been asked to testifY for the prosecution - there was a case 
where the person claimed no memory and when I assessed him.1 found that he was quite psychopathic and a pathological liar. I could explain 
the events leading up to the crime and that is what I did. I produce as much infornlation as I can to help the judge to come to a decision about 
capacity. 
Have you been asked to pronounce an opinion on capacity? 
I have been goaded into the position of pronouncing my opinion on capacity - I have dealt with it once very badly but mostly well. The 
particular case was the Marazwe case where I was misled by the accused. he had shot a man who had humiliated him in the naval mess. He went 
and got a gun, came back andjust discharged the magazine into the man. It presented very clearly as a case ofcatathymic crisis and I was happy 
to appear for him, The advocate hadn't considered all the facts of the case - what I hadn't been told was that on the way back to the mess he had 
stopped to salute the officer - so then I had to change my theory of catathymic crisis to diminished capacit} - the cross-examination was about 
diminished capacity. The prosecutor quoted from the Appellate Division which said that an emotional storm of any kind is no excuse for 
murder - although there are a couple of AD decisions which dispute that, the issue then became one oftrying to define capacity. The approach 
taken by the court was that you either have capacity or you don't - I said that it is possible for capacity to be diminished by certain factors. I 
think that I lost credibility because I didn't have all the facts from the start. So as you can see all the facts are crucial. 
Could YOIl provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity In order to highlight the factors which you took into accollntto support 
such a defence? 
In the Moses case we had all the evidence, the guy had been a good and very reliable witness. The man had a history of rage reactions - he had 
them three or four times in the past, and he had gonen into rages which extended over a very long period of time. On one occasion he had 
smashed up his sister's home I think and on another he had tried to drive people otT the road and in these instances he was in a rage. These 
things he had volunteered early on in the assessment and he was presenting a defence: because he didn't know what we were looking for, this 
fitted into that kind of process. What I felt was important when he got into these rages was that each time the person had fallen into a 
transference relationship with him, so he was reaching back into very early experiences and particularly with the father figure who had been 
abusive. Those were if you like, the kindling factors - in the backdrop ofcomse we had the personality disorder and I don't believe that you can 
even consider non-pathological incapacity without personality disorder and those are the factors which then presented. He was also depressed at 
the time, then this event happened and he lost it. The COUlt struggled a bit with his behaviour after the event but I think that it's Irrelevant, 
because it's a non-pathological process, when you gain equilibrium, you are very conscious. 
Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapaCIty? 
So these are the factors I would look at - background factors - is this an offence preceded by similar kinds of behaviour, and is it in the context 
of a transference, is it in a context a of a personality disorder. That doesn't rule out the possibility that you can have a single event as m the 
Marazwe case but then other factors come into play. Let me explain because it is quite complicated. In the Moses case the outcome - rage 
reaction and attack were similar. In the Marazwe case what we had as similar the reaction of humiliation - it just so happened that on this 
particular occasion he took it one step further -I think that there were other factors - he had an abnormal EEG which theJudge wouldn't allow 
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nor the evidence from FA - he wouldn't accept that. He liked the Vall,enberg evidence which was simple - no fugue state therefore he is guilty. 
he's got capacity. There was a personality disorder. brain damage - so there are whole lot of other factors which predispose the personality to 
such reactions. I'm very bad with names of cases but in the case of the kid who killed his mother and grandmother in Natal. the psychiatrist 
made a similar finding and I think that it is consistent. The guy who wrote the book on Violent Attachments also seems to make that point - that 
we have to look at these behaviours in terms of personality. So in my opinion it is a personality disorder which predisposes to reduced capaciry 
and then we get particular events which occur in that particular case - a background of abuse. the emergence of transference issues. similar kinds 
of abuse happening now and then you have the catathymic crisis or fugue state or whatever it is. If you don't have those three components then 
it is very difficult to mount the defence. 
If you look at the Cohen case - that I think was a catathymic crisis. V gave the evidence- he used a very interesting concept which hasn't been 
used again. He referred to the impeccability ofthe personality. I wouldn't go along with that - if you say that he was such an impeccable person 
that whatever his wife told him was too much for his impeccable personality to deal with and so he broke down. He had to say something like 
that because the judge said that 'he either pleads guilty or I'm going to hang this guy'. I wouldn't use such a defence - he's such a good guy 
that he couldn't tolerate it so he killed the guy. 
You have referred to the concept of a catathymic crisis - holl' lI'ould you define it? 
Catathymic simply means emotional crisis and it's been sound since the 1950's as a defence - it accounts tor those sudden episodes of violence-
a good example a child hurts the mother and she lashes out without even thinking. It explains those sudden murders which seem inexplicable. It 
can be out of character or be part of a consistent pattern - the Nursingh case which was out of character but I think there what happened there 
was the pressure cooker model - there was steam building up and this kid had been abused over a long period of time. The kid cracks and then 
follows with a sequence of normal activities leading to the murder of two people. As soon as the steam is discharged it's all over and everything 
is normal. 
We are talking about a specific psychological process in which there are certain consistent patterns- this idea which Valkenberg hao; that one 
commits an act and has no memory tor it is ridiculous - we all have episodes where we do something wrong like run a red light and then say 'oh 
my god what have I done' - that's a kind of catathymic episode where you !lip modalities - where you act on impulse without the mediation ofa 
thought process and you have memory for it. I think that the kind of thing which would drive a person to lose memory is far more elaborate. far 
more complicated and we don't often see it. Valkenberg are on a good wicket because one doesn't ever see this kind of thing - where someone 
has had an amnestic state unless it's due to an epileptic state or schizophrenia. But they rule out the possibiliry ofa catathymic episode in certain 
personality disorders and I think that that is wrong because it confuses the courts. I don't believe that catathymic crisis or NPI is a defence-I 
think that it is a mitigation but then I don't like it when psychiatrists use old fashioned psychiatry to rule even that possibility Oul. I think that it 
possible for clients to get an acquittal but I think that the person is guilty of murder. 
I think that very rarely it's valid as a full defence. You see in the Moses case. both the psychiatrist and I were upset at the acquittal. We thought 
that he would get 10 years instead of life. People often say that he had a great detence team and I said no. he had a great prosecution team 
because they didn't prove their case - they were proving that there was no automatism - and there was none. we never said that there was. I don't 
think that S understood the defence - he was on some kind of mission. It was interesting, Moses came to the advocate alter the trial and said 'can 
I have my car back' So as you can see we are dealing with a personality disorder here and diminished capacity on the second leg. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is synonymous with sane automatism') 
I think that if the courts understood psychology better then there would be no need for a balanced view - if they understood what psychologists 
and some psychiatrists were saying then there would be no need for that. The tallacy of the psychiatric arguments which people like Valkenberg 
are using merely confuse the issue. Unfortunately in the Marazwe case the judge didn't understand psychology and I couldn't get through to 
him for love or money. He was an acting judge for starters and handled the case very badly. He entered into examination and cross exmnination 
and had no respect for the process. His child had been hospitalised during this time - he had me in the box tor 12 hours and lost his temper on 
the second day. At the end he gave a sentence of 8 years which you couldn't get tor murder. He discounted FA's evidence even though 
Valkenberg hadn't done an EEG - that in itselfwas cause lor reasonable doubt. Until you can sophisticate the bench you are going to need lots 
of rebuttal witnesses. That is why they accept the old school psychiatry - he's a bad guy, he knew what he was doing. - its very simple - either 
it's pathological or not, they don't take a history - what I do in 10-15 hours they don't do in 3 weeks so it's not helpful. Part of my anger with 
them is that it's not a debate - if( go into the witness box and I've got a psychiatrist who offers a competent assessment and I'm debating my 
assessment with his then what we are doing is trying to come to a middle point that can advise the judge. I don't like oftering a diametrically 
opposite view to another professional but 1 can't help that because they are presenting such puerile psychiatry. But if we have a debate. we can 
adduce evidence supported by literature and then help the court to come to a conclusion even if we diller at some point - we can make 
concessions but come to some agreement. But in every case I've been involved in. they've ollered the same detence - you know exactly what 
the guy is going to say when he enters the witness box. I'd like to see cases where it turns on points of psychological process rather than in 
large disparities in diagnostic categories. So what I would have liked Valkenberg to have debated in the Moses case is whether a history of 
aggression is sufficient to account for the murder - where is the divide when he previously stopped short of hurting other people - why in this 
case was it different. I had to argue why it went that tar - that should really have been the turning point - what were the psychological processes 
intrinsic to his personality which may explain his behaviour. And then thejudge could have come in and said in terms of his understanding of 
criminal capacity, was Y's argument sufficient to explain the behaviour. And that wasn't necessary in this case because ofthetr stance. And of 
course it adds to the judicial confusion - you have one guy coming in and saying 'bad guy -good guy' while the one comes in with science 
tiction - what is catathymic crisis - some kind ofreligiosity? It's weird tor ajudge to sit in a case like this but ifboth people are agreeing on it 
but the debate turns on a particular point then its a different matter. 
Whatll'as the nature of the cases which you were involved in where the defonce of non-pathological incapaclly was raised? 
Generally they've been murder cases always the same kind of relationship where there's a violent attachment - whether its long or short term. 
The Horne case is coming up in November and a brilliant case for this defence. He is of German extract has no tather and was raised by his 
mother - he was left on his own a lot and she beat him with a hanger. Eventually he gets into a children's home - he gets himself a lover at the 
age of 15. she is an older woman and he sees her every aftemoon after school. One day he arrives. and she has left - she is heartbroken. Prior to 
that incident he was racing on his bike with friends on Table Mt and he tails and sustains brain damage but recovers. He has a history of 
drugging. had 27 jobs, he smokes dope, crack etc and goes from woman to woman. He gets involved with an abusive woman - he does 
everything for her. She is a masseuse and he takes her around to clients - what he doesn't know is that she is a prostitute - consciously that is. 
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One day they have a row, he's washing the dishes, she's screaming at him, she comes up to him and stamps on his foot and she says at least the 
other men pay me - in stamping on his toot she breaks it. He's holding a carving knife and slides it into her and does that three times and she's 
dead. My question to him was why did you stop after the third time and he said that she said 'I'm dying' - he came to and she dropped into the 
floor. He gets hysterical, phones the police, gets into the bath, cuts his wrists. A wonderfiJl case ofa catathymic crisis - He will get acquitted I 
think, He had a previous girlfriend who used to beat him up and he never retaliated - I interviewed her. He has a history of non-violence 
although the prosecution is going to say that he said that he was going to kill her. But judges don't quite realise that there is ditlerence between 
I'm going to kill you and I'm going to kill you. They were saying that to each other and the state will argue that there was premeditation. That's 
the kind of case where you have one-on-one violent attachment usually with a history extending into childhood The FBI calls it the 
disorganised domestic homicide which is a mainly what I've dealt with. 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. would you consider any of the following to be pertment to a de.lence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I. Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4.Inability to exercise control over actions 
5.Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdown of conscious awareness 
6.Breakdoll'n of conscious awareness and volitional control 
i.Automatlc behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
I'll tell which of these I wouldn't consider.. 
I.Cumulative build up of stress I would agree with 
2.Cumulative abuse is important 
3.Physical and or verbal threat by victim - has not really been a factor in the cases which I have seen. Psychological or emotional threats I would 
most definitely consider. A physical threat would be a ditTerent defence that would be selt~defence. 
4.lnability to exercise control - is an interesting one because they have said that they knew what they were doing but couldn't control 
themselves, so I would go with that one. 
S.J'd consider the inability to remember but in terms of screening tor other pathologies but not in terms of this defence 
6.Conscious awareness can be shattered like glass in these episodes and that has some impact on volitional control and I would like to see what 
the potential is for this personality to tragment and under what circumstances and what is the history. So in the Home case for example, he had a 
good history of control but when she broke his toot it shattered the controls. 
7.J'd eliminate automatic behaviour very quickly because ifit is there I'd be looking at pathology. 
8.lntoxication - I don't think that it's relevant - people can get very drunk and still have control 
9/10. A previous psychiatric history is very important and if the personality disorder isn't there it isn't a non-pathological defence. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsibility~ 
Yes there is such a state - Borderline PD - and if you understand the structure of such a personality - its tendency to split I'm talking about ihe 
actual mechanism of the personality, the existence of very primitive detences and the core of anger which is basis ofthe personality disorder I 
think you see how vulnerable these people are and the interpersonal relationships are always transterential no matter who they're dealing with. 
So they are always in a catathymic state - they are always on the edge and you never know where you stand with them. The thing about the 
catathymic state is that it occurs mentally and they are always in a ruminative state - they get cut otTat a tratlic light yesterday and they are still 
angry about it today - they are still loading themselves emotionally and if you try to talk themselves out of it they get angry at you. And if you 
are going to use this detence it will have to contain these elements otherwise it will be very ditlicult to argue it. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapaCity is a valid defence? 
I think that it's a valid detence only in particular cases - as a general rule it should be used in mitigation so in Moses it wasn't a complete 
detence but in Home it is. In mitigation it points to a reduced capacity and when it's a complete detence it points to no capacity. In the Home 
case, the speed at which things happened, the violence involved and then again the amount of abuse over months and years, the history of being 
abused and not being violent then this episode stands out as being ditTerent - then this is much more ofa catathymic episode and therefore a full 
defence. In Moses he had similar rage reactions before, which shows a pattern and points to diminished capacity. I get approached by attorneys 
who say this guy has no memory and see the defence as a window of opportunity and if they can find somebody to say that that is so then they 
will go with it. And when you interview the guy you realise that he is a hundred miles away from the detence - attorneys don't understand the 
defence. If you take this thing to court you have to be incredibly sure of what you are saying. Two things happen if you aren't sure - tirstly the 
court goes with Valkenberg's defence and that is no good for other people who come along and lead this defence and the whole field of 
psychology gets a bad reputation. The window has two panes to it - the one is the actual defence and the other is mitigation 
I think that in this country it's a very bad defence to have because there is no death penalty - if there was one then people would very quickly 
own up under the defence. You get less ofa sentence for killing someone than for stealing his money. You can get away for it. And this is why 
in America, the equivalent diminished capacity or temporal), insanity is very rarely used - so if you are gUilty you'll be executed whereas here 
you lose and that's it. So this is serious stutf and you can't mess with the detence - attorneys have to think very carefully about this and not just 
look for someone to support them. I sent the Mosesjudgemcnt to attorneys in America and they said that he had a very good prosecution team 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised. in how many Instances has your testimony been accepted by the court and 
on what basis? 
I've never had my testimony rejected outright - elements have been accepted or it has been accepted in its entirety. The reason is that 1 take a lot 
of care in what I present. I remember I did a case in Jo'burg - it was a patient of mine who had pinched something for the third time - he was 
charged with theft. I remember going beyond the facts and the magistrate came down on me like a ton of bricks -I learnt my lesson - keep to 
what is factual, relevant and to what you can argue and defend and don't go beyond it. And that is why it has always been accepted or accepted 
part. Even in Marazwe it was accepted in part because at the end of it all I wasn't aware of the full facts and this atlected my testimony 
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Mental health professional 2 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances 111 assisting the court in assessing cntninal responsibility - holl' It'ouldyou 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
Criminal responsibility in tenns of the law refers to the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act and to act in accordance with that 
appreciation. If you want to break that down funher then you look at what the ability to appreciate means and which factors affect the behaviour 
which flows from that. There are three measures cognitive, conative and emotive which are recognised by the law. In other word there is 
intellectual appreciation, emotional appreciation and the ahility to perform self-control. And then the one thing which is not pan of criminal 
responsibility but often reflects it, namely mensa rea which is the guilty mind or ability to plan an act. The lirst thing is the ability to appreciate 
wrongfulness which means that you must be conscious to appreciate wrongfulness - any impairment of consciousness will immediately aftect 
responsibility. Intellectual appreciation - relers to grades of intell igence testing and higher cognitive function. All three factors are detennined 
by mental illness or detects and the issue is whether we are dealing with pathological or non-pathological factors which can be things like 
intoxication. In other words are those three measures impaired by pathological or non-pathological tactors. 
The following dictum by Ogi/ivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (1) SA 340 fA) at 365 B-c' reflects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibiltl)' . 
.... It must be borne in mind. .. that in the ultimate analysis. the crucial issue of the appellant's crt/ninal responsibilil)' for his actIOns at the 
relevant time isa mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the COllrt itself In determining that issue - lI1itiallythe trw I Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessll)' have regard not only to expert medical evidence bllt also to all the other facts of the case. including the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the nature of his proved actions throllghoutthe relevant period'. 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role of expertlestimony in the assessment of criminal responsibilil)' - holl' wouldyou view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
My role is to detennine the mental state of the individual at the relevant time and the tacts ofthe case are very imponant and relevant to that. In 
other words, is there any change in his mental state prior 
to, during and after the oftence and that opinion we can then ofter the coun, The decision is the coun's and not ours but we need to argue for 
changes in the person's mental state during the relevant period. It's a legal matter and we make clinical judgements about the person's 
behaviour and the ability to perfonn, 
What was the nature of the cases which yOI/ were involved in where the defence of non-pathological incapacity was raised.? 
The cases largely have been homicidal murder cases usually of marital or relationships discord - the crimes of passion cases hut it could be other 
kinds of relationship like discord with a boss but usually a case of intense amnesia is mounted and then the issues are non-pathologicaL I can't 
think of a case where a stranger was the victim in such a ddence. 
In terms of criminal capacity involving mental illness - about 2520 cases. In tenns of non-pathological incapacity were less frequent - not many 
went to coun so I had about 5 a year so in total about 35 cases in the last 7 years. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the factors which YOlltook into accol/ntto support 
such a defence.? 
Let me just say that in not one of the cases which I've testilied in was the delence upheld - it's always tailed so I don't believe that the defence 
actually exists. The case of Michael Europa where this chap was accused of murdering his wife. There had a been a long history of discord and 
issues of inlidelity of the wile which was the issue of their arguments. In a last ditch stand the two of them went away lor the weekend and 
there was lots of drinking, even on the way home. When they got there she went about her chores and he was carving a chicken with a knife and 
then tor some reason he went to bedroom and lound a photo of his wife sprawled on the boardroom table with her lover and he brought it to the 
kitchen and pasted it on the cupboard. He continued car. ing the chicken, the wife came into the kitchen and he confronted her with the 
photograph which was nothing new. He then systematically went about stabbing her about 40-odd times. It basically staned in the kitchen 
progressed into the lounge then the bedroom, bathroom etc as she was heing chased. He then wrapped the knile and threw it into the 
neighbour's yard. He then went to the garden and waited tor the police. Those are the facts of the case. The defence obviously argued that it was 
a non-pathological delence in the sense that there are tour criteria which were fullilled. Firstly, was there antecedent build-up of discord usually 
of an emotional nature and increasing in intensity and that was the case. Secondly, was there a trigger tactor and there was - the conlrontation 
about the photograph. Thirdly, was there a severe degree of unprovoked violence and that was considered. And of course amnesia for the event. 
This is what the defence put forward. The reason the whole thing lell was in terms of my argument - Firstly, there was a sutlicient period lor 
reflection or rumination and planning to occur before he acted violently. Secondly, despite him stahbing her after being provoked, it wasn't 
done automatically and not in one area but it was followed hehaviour which requires a cenain amount of thoughtful action and that negated the 
defence. What the judge tenned dolus eventual is referred to the lact that even though he didn't have intent. he had it on the basis of that 
behaviour. If I did not have the facts of the case I would very well have given him the bene lit of the doubt because he was so emotionally 
charged that he could very well have sutTered a loss of controL I used the photographs of the crime scene to map out what happened. I think that 
another case which illustrates this is about this guy who killed his mother-in-law and wife. He was estranged Irom his wile and there was some 
wrangling about custody issues. He went to talk about it to his wite as he daughter wanted to stay over - she then tried to get him out of the 
house, he then shot her, turned around and saw the mother-in-law and shot her - he went into another room contronted the mother-in-Iaw's 
boyfriend with the gun and then left. He drove around with his daughter belore notifying the police. I was called in at the end stage not having 
evaluated the guy and the defence argued that - can you oller an opinion only based on the tacts of the case. Of course you can't do that on the 
basis of the photographs - you have to evaluate him clinically and marry that with the facts and we sent him lor observation and were then able 
to present a stronger case and the detence was dismissed. 
The veracity of the evidence is relevant to the mental state because if a person is lying he is not mentally ill and he can appreciate wrongfulness 
and can therefore mount an exculpatory defence. Secondly in this defence, malingering is very relevant and we have to determine truthfulness 
even though ultimately it's for the coun to decide whether to accept what is said - we have to comment on mental state. 
Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
Well, personality functioning, emotional status of relationship are imponant and as I said the four lactors have to be there - Antecedent build-
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up, the trigger, the automatic act and then amnesia - often cases focus on the act without considering the other factors and you can't have that-
you have to present all those factors. However if you look at the legal definition which only focuses on the act and the amnesia and not the other 
factors which I've mentioned. The defence is sane automatism because we look at retlexes and there is no capacity forthoughtful retlecllon and 
even if it is seemingly goal-directed it must be automatic. Once you start thinking or acting with a conscious mind then the defence tails tlat 
I've not had a case of automat is III and don't believe that it exists although it would be prejudicial lor me to admit that -I've had to do that under 
oath. Although, there are grades or degrees of the defence which can be used and we move a"ay from the absolutes - I'm talking about 
diminished capacity on the basis of emotional issues. I'm thinking about Z' s case - a chap who had been accused of hacking is wife to death - he 
claimed automatism I was on the state's side and he acted tilr the defence. It was open and shut because the accuse had to prise the axe in Irom 
underneath the burglar bars to get it through the window - he then bashed the wife up. The son came into the room and he took him aside and 
told him 'sit maar so' and continued - there was an interruption to the whole thing. Z then went tor diminished capacity on the basis of 
emotional issues - it affects sentencing - he got four years suspended for two and was out in 18 months lor killing his wife. 
I think that another one which needs sorting out with the lawyers is the issue ofloss of control. Not non-pathological incapacity but the issue of 
control which is a very different matter. Moses tor example claimed that - my problem is that I don't think that non-pathological tactors can 
impair control. I've only seen pathological tactors affecting control- such as command hallucinations or delusions./ can't see emotional factors 
overwhelming control or cognition to such a degree. The rage reactions which they spoke about is merely a theoretical construct it's a means of 
explanation but it can't impair physical behaviour. The issue is that it's expected of any sane person to retlect on behaviour when they are 
emotionally charged and to act in a responsible manner - we often are enraged but we expected to act responsibly and that requires thought. If 
you do act you either wilfully are letting go or it was pre-meditated. I don't think that you can divorce the elements you must see it in totality. 
In addilion 10 Ihe faclors which you have already ollliined. would you consider any of Ihe folloll'ing 10 be perlinenl 10 a dejimce of non-
palhological incapacity? 
I.Cumulalive build-up of emolional slress prior 10 evenl 
2.Cumulalive physicallemolionallsexual abuse by deceased prior 10 even! 
3. Physical and/or verballhreals by deceased 
4.1nability 10 exercise conlrol over aClions 
5.1nability 10 recall evenls during a discrele period of lime as a resull of a breakdown of consciolls all'areness 
6.Breakdoll'n of conscious awareness and volilional conlrol 
7.Alllomalic behaviour which lacks conscious direclion 
8. Inloxicalion (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychialric his lOry 
10. Personality disorder 
The first seven would form part of those lour factors which I spoke about earlier. The last three I think create a context for the defence. The 
inability to control actions may be an element of the defence but not a detence in itself. In other words we spoke about degrees of impairment 
and this would be relevant to that. So in a state of intoxication you may ask do you lose control - and the courts have accepted this as a defence 
although we may argue differently, because we are saying that if you are that impaired by intoxication then you cannot perform. This can be a 
real minefield where drug usage is involved especially in small amounts. But then again where people have used drugs it becomes a 
pathological condition because consciousness is impaired and it acts centrally. Thus you have insane automatism because even though the drug 
is an extrinsic factor which is taken in, it acts internally to cause a pathological condition. Thus there's a lot of confusion about the sane vs 
insane automatism. 
Previous psychiatric history is very broad - obviously it doesn't reter to the fact that the person is mentally ill - but it has an effect in terms of 
mitigation of sentencing as opposed to the actual event. A recent case where a guy was accused of killing a neighbour who refused sexual 
intercourse with him illustrates this. He is a known schizophrenic who was psychotic prior to the ollence and relapsed after the event and even 
though he was accountable at the time of the offence, the court considered his history and it atfected the sentencing. On the one hand, with non-
pathological incapacity what does happen with the so-called cumulative build-up of stress is that often there have been episodes of a depressive 
nature and it becomes relevant to the emotional quality of that antecedent build-up. In the same way personality disorder will also come into 
consideration but at the end of the day both depression and personality disorder are conscious issues and non-pathological in nature and will not 
affect criminal capacity. What the defence does is to say that don't look at things in black and white: in absolutes, rather look at the person in 
totality and consider things like intoxication and personality - these factors create the milieu or context for understanding what harpened. 
Do you Ihink Ihallhere is a parlicular psychological or menIal slale which can lead 10 non-responsibility~ 
Yes, only if you can prove beyond reasonable doubt that a particular personality is vulnerable to dissociation. In other words, in periods of 
extreme stress or trauma that there has been documented evidence of dissociation, then if it happens during the otTence then I will accept it, but 
you have to prove previous periods of dissociation. Dissociation is therefore the psychological state and comes from a personality type which is 
vulnerable to dissociative amnesia. There may some sort of pre-existing psychiatric condition such as depression which adds to this but I would 
be looking for dissociative amnesia in this delence. 
Do you Ihink Ihallhe defence ofnon-palhological incapacity is a valid defence? 
I don't think that people can act without conscious control - there always has to be an element of consciousness in the act - that is the most 
pertinent thing. But I think that ifunder stress a person can truly dissociate then perhaps it's valid but in my limited experience that has never 
happened. If there is such a person then the court will ask you if the issue of antecedent liability doesn't come into these - should the person not 
be taking preventative measure to avoid such dissociative episodes. 
Where Ihe defence ofnon-palhological incapacity has been raised. in holl' man)' inslances has your testimol1Y been accepted by the courl and 
on whal basis? 
Well, except for Moses, my testimony has always been accepted. I think that the problem there was that it was not a problem with my testimony 
but rather with the prosecution who went for the defence of automatism while the defence went tor loss of control - so they were at cross-
purposes and the prosecution didn't pick up on that. But then again, to focus on loss on control was problematic purely because there was vel) 
deliberate action during the entire event - he used three dillerent weapons retrieved from three ditlerent areas - the statue was in the lounge, 
knives in the kitchen and lamp in the raom. He had to go ta three ditferent places and come back and assault the chap - there wa.< na way that 
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there was loss of control. If you look at mental state before during and after - he cleaned that place up and if was spotless no fingerprints. no 
blood spattered all over the place - what mental state allows one to do that. Secondly, the guy solicits sex from a hitchiker. The other thing was 
that he came there for a business transaction and the deceased sold his car for sex so the guy knew full well what was involved. A second thing 
which was relevant was the revelation of HIV status which of course he had to consider in tenns of his lifestyle and relationship status - it 
couldn't have been something very overwhelming and ne\\. So that defence should never have been upheld. 1 think that in the judgement there 
were certain submissions which he thought was true - this person was assessed as having borderline personality disorder and had rage reactions 
previously and there was evidence that there was a pattern -I agreed with that. And that was what perhaps helped to uphold the judgment. The 
defence team went to town on the history which went into reams and reams and compared to our little half a page report which obviously 
couldn't compare in quality. Having said that I must say that it's not so much in tenns of the preparation it's the interpretation which is 
important and that is sometimes not seen - in the context of all this evidence it is what you make of it that matters and the judge was unable to 
see this. And that is why the judge accepted the prepared argument purely because it was planned and prepared. If you wanted a fifth factor to 
this defence then it would be quality of information - This defence is based purely on infonnation - both clinical reports and evaluation and all 
other information. This doesn't mean that the state has less access to information because in another case that I did. I acted for the defence and 
the state went to town and produced extensive neuropsychiatric reports for their case - and all the defence had was me. So it really is not so 
much access to infonnation but the interpretation and when you give your opinion you have to be able to back it up with evidence. And of 
course psychodynamic elements are often brought in and that confuses the whole thing. There are a few guys who like doing that like T. He 
speaks of many years of experience and that has to be credited but he often uses that psychodynamic jargon which confuses the court. And of 
course another thing which often happens is that he changes his mind a lot and that doesn't gel with the court. You have to sound credible then 
courts will be more accepting of your opinion. 
Mental health professional 3 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the COllrt in assessing criminal responsibility - holt' It'Ould you 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
To my knowledge criminal responsibility is when the person is psychiatrically healthy and recognised as an adult in tenns of the law (ie over 
18 years); and that person has full knowledge of what s/he has done and knows the difference between right and wrong. I'm tocussing mostly on 
psychological issues as I teel that I would be overstepping my boundaries ifl get too close to what the legal eagles are saying: but you have to 
look at their definitions as well to know what they term as criminal responsibility. So that we can see ifmy findings fit in with what they see as 
criminal responsibility. Otherwise at the end of the day we are looking at two ditferent things. I look at cognitive ability and broad emotional 
factors. 
The folio wing dictum by Ogilivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (1) SA 340 (A) at 365 8-C. ref/ects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility.' 
it must be borne in mind ... that I the ull/mate analYSIS the crucial issue of the appellant's crill/inal responsibility/or his actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer /0 be determined not by psychiatrists but by the COllrt itself In determining thatlsslle - initially the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts 0/ the case. Including the 
reliability of the appel/ant as a witness and the nature of his proved actions throughout the relevant period' 
Thejudge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - holt' wouldyou view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
Our role is basically to explain to the court how the person was functioning at that stage and how that tunctioning could lead to that behaviour. 
To me it is not to try and explain the crime but rather the functioning of the person. I do think that we can comment on criminal responsibility 
but we shouldn't have the final say. But as this quote says. the expert evidence is also very important. I have noticed that in the cases that I've 
done, our opinion nonnally weighs quite a 101. However if I can retlect on my experience this morning in court. once we get to things that's 
technically ditlicult in psychiatry and psychology to explain in court. I think they sometimes don't take our opnion because they don't 
understand what we are trying to say. And it is sometimes very ditlicuh to explain psychological conditions to them. So this morning I had to 
explain that this person over a four week period had a clouded sensorium over a four week period and he can't remember his actions - he can 
remember some but not all of it. Now tor them, this person is malingering and to try and explain that it is a possibility - that it is real 
dysfunction and not malingering and they can't understand that. You can see from their facial expressions and the questions they ask afterwards 
that they don't understand. And I don't think that it is really our inability to explain that is the problem - if you aren't working in the field of 
psychology or psychiatry then sometimes our concepts are ditlicult to understand and that in itselfis ditlicult. For example cognitive. affective 
and conative -those three things they don't understand. Trying to explain that cognitively this guy couldn't concentrate and his memory was 
stutled up and with the atfect he had a major depressive disorder which is something that can be seen and then how his will was atfected. These 
three things come out of their own notes with regard to the three legs which the decision stands on - but their questions sbow that they don't 
even understand those concepts. I do feel we can comment on whether a person had the cognitive ability or conative ability to something. I 
really don't think that we can leave it up to the law because if they don't understand what we are trying to say about the three legs. then how 
can they make a decision - if that is what it rests on. I think that the facts of the case don't always explain the timctioning of the person. The 
onus rests on the State to prove that this person was not incapacitated so how are they going to do that without expert testimony. 
This morning in court the magistrate asked me what I had hased my opinion on and I said that I had taken into account what the accused had 
told me as well as my assessments. He asked me if the facts on which I had based my opinion on changed. whether my opinion would change. I 
said that my opnion wouldn't change because the clinical picture wouldn't change. The clinical picture stays the same regardless of whether the 
facts of the case change. 
So do you think that the factual evidence is not that important in these kinds of cases? 
The facts of the case have nothing to do with me -I am not a lawyeror policeman so I don't have to concern myselfwith that. Even if the facts 
should change as the magistrate suggested, my clinical picture wouldn't change - after all that is what I'm qualified to do -to provide a clinical 
picture of the person. So the facts are not that important in my view and my assessment does not depend on that. As I said. I don't think that 
they can make a finding without our input and the facts 
72 
What was the nature of the cases which you were involved in lI'here the defence of non-pathological incapacity was raised? 
Two were murder, two fraud and I theft (shoplifting). The murders were where one person shot the partner so they were in a relationship 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the factors which you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
I will take this morning's one because it is freshest in my memory. He was charged with fraud. He was very into sport and he made a false 
insurance claim for stolen sport gear. What also happened was that he had an injury just before all this happened; he hurt his knee and had to 
have an operation. He was in immense pain and after the operation the doctor told him that he would probably never walk again. Sport is this 
man's life so 1 started with the emotional side of this loss and what this meant to him. So llooked at his history psychodynamically, what makes 
his ego and what makes him tick. And then other factors of loss such as the death of his dad around this time, the pain which he was 
experiencing and the role of medication and I got the doctor to give his opinion. And with the injury which he had he had concussion and that 
was taken into consideration. I looked at the cognitive and emotional effects and the physical pain. I took all these factors into consideration to 
explain how they led up to the emotional situation which he was in so that he couldn't decide and react. He committed the fraud during this 
sensorium. I feel that we have to explain more than the act, we have to explain the person. 
Generally speaking which factors lI'ould you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological incapacityry 
I would also look at major stresses of the past, previous traumas and what kind of scars they left on them. I would look at the emotional 
overload in this person combined with the stressors. In both the murder cases there was abuse in the past and ohviously left the necessary 
psychodynamic scars which would be there for people to react when other things come their way later in life. Mostly in these defences. it's 
where someone suddenly acted out of character and you have to explain that. And you need information like this otherwise you can 'I. You have 
to explain what made this person vulnerable to a certain trigger event. I have to make sure that there is no psychopathy otherwise you are 
looking at malingering as well. 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. would you consider any of the follOWing to be pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I. Cllmulative build-lip of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4.Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5.Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6.1nability to exercise control over actions 
7.lnability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdown of conscious awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 





5.Yes - that happens in most of the cases and that is what they will have a problem with - they can't understand why the person can't remember. 
One has to try and explain psychogenic amnesia as something which may come out after years of therapy but at the moment is not 
psychologically there for the person. 
6.Yes 
7. I haven't had one like that but I know that there have been cases like that 
8That's very often the case - like in the situation this morning 
9. Yes - things like depression or anxiety makes a person vulnerable 
10. That's a difficult one and I try to steer clear of it but yes, PD is very often there - Anti-social and borderline specifically. I try not to make 
too much of an issue of it because you get caught up in all sorts of tangles trying to explain that the person is just like that and that this is a 
disorder - it is difficult to get that across. A PD is not an excuse but it makes a person vulnerable to certain stresses and in such situation things 
happen. 
Do you think that sane automatism and non-pathological Incapacity are synonymous.? 
No, I think that non-pathological incapacity can be interpreted in various ways - it isn't restricted to a diagnosis of dissociation alone -which is 
what automatism refers to. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsibilioP 
I would have to say personality disorder because that would render the person vulnerable to stressors and cause them to react in a particular 
way. I would say that such a situation would lead to non-responsibility. I wouldn't risk any other specific diagnosis but would say a personality 
disorder plus the stressors. Take for example, Borderline personality disorder where the person can be quite impulsive and can have quite 
intense emotion and put that person in a very difficult situation where a lot ofthings build-up. You can expect that person to somehow have an 
outburst of emotion. I don't like to say that we can excuse all kinds of crime but in certain people we can explain why they did what they did -
not out of maliciousness it was just a reaction to stressors. A trigger event is normally necessary to cut-out pre-meditation. And when I think of 
the stressors - all the cases I did carried a strong theme oflosses of relationships like death in the family or moving home. 
Do ),ou think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
Yes. I think that it is valid because I agree with the law. It's alternative thinking to the idea that someone is wrong so let us punish them. 
believe that in law as well you have to understand this person and what they did in order to rehabilitate them. And from that point I think it's 
important that we can point out the person's problems with psychotherapy - rather than let them sit in jail for a few years. We can build 
someone up again and that is why I think that it is valid. 
73 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised. in holl' many instances has your testimony heen accepted by the court and 
on what basis? 
Well this morning's one still has to be decided. But in the other four, my testimony was accepted and the people were acquitted. In three cases 
there were rebuttal witnesses and the fourth one a report was submitted but the expert didn't appear. In this morning's case there wer~ no 
rebuttal witnesses and my opinion was supported by the psychiatrist. And the rebuttal witnesses are also not a nice thing - having two 
psychologists with different opinions gives psychology a bad name - you can have five psychologists with five different opinions. The reason 
for the court accepting my arguments is that where there were rebuttal witnesses their assessments weren't very good. For example in one the 
diagnosis was post-traumatic epilepsy, which isn't even in the DSM IV and personality problems - this is after 30 days observation in the state 
hospital. And I saw the person for only a few hours. 
Mental health professional 4 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in variolls instances in assisting the court in assessing criminal responsibility - hOlf ,,'ouldyoll 
define the concept of criminal responsibility~ 
There's the legal definition of mens rea. It's basically the ability to form intention. There's the cognitive aspect of knowing right from wrong 
and being able to exercise judgement in accordance with that. There are many psychologists and psychiatrists who apply their own definitions 
of what criminal capacity entails and I think that they argue that as long there are psychological - psychiatric factors at play those to some 
degree diminish criminal capacity. But essentially it is a legal concept. 
The following dictum by Ogilivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3·/0 (AJ at 365 B-c' reflects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility . 
.. it must be borne in mind ... that I the ultimate analysis. the crucial isslle of the appellant's criminal responsihilityfor his actiuns at the 
relevant time is a matter to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the Court itself In determining that issue - mitially the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts of the case. includmg the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the natllre of his proved actions throllghoutthe relevant period' 
The judge expresses a particular vie'" on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - how 1I'0uldyou view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
Any mental health professional otlers basically one extra piece of evidence which the court uses. We provide another piece which the court can 
consider - we don't provide all the assessment of criminal n:sponsibility. What generally happens in our courts is that they accept the experts' 
opinions entirely - there's a problem they have when experts disagree -they accept the best reasoned argument- and if there's one expert then 
it's very rare that the court would reject that expert. What the mental health professional has to say is usually crucial especially where non-
pathological incapacity is concerned. It will decide which way the case is going. First of all our courts are becoming more subjective in the way 
they look at things. In the old days the defendant in particular crime was found guilty and would just receive a particular sentence. Nowadays 
courts are more interested in what the person is thinking and feeling and what his willpower was at the time of the olfence and that is why 
experts are being used increasingly. So the courts are very interested in what the person's subjective leelings were particularly when 
provocation was involved and what the eftect ofthe provocation was. You need the expert evidence and it depends on where you put that expert 
evidence - you make a finding on the facts tirst and then expert testimony is used in extenuation or mitigation. But the way it is used now - it is 
used a complete excuse and with that I don't agree. 
What was the natllre of the cases which YOll were involved in where the d~fence ()f non-pathological incapacity was raised.? 
30 NPI cases 
All murder cases - usually in intimate relationships: husband-wile, girlfriend-boyfriend relationship and I've had a couple where il's been a 
sexual encounter where the person has been shocked by what has been asked of them. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlightthefactors which you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
In 19921 assessed a lady called Connie Potgieter who had a long stormy relationship with a successful businessman in PE. On the day thatlhe)' 
got married he asked her to sigh an ANC and she didn't want to do it and he called oll'the wedding. It was very humiliating for her as she had to 
walk through guests and announced that the wedding was otT. He then threw her out of the house and she then returned with a gun and hid it 
under a mat in the bathroom where he couldn't see and then shot him, She claimed that he had tried to grab her and hit her head ag;linstthe wall. 
She was so dazed by this that in an automatic state she went and letched a gun and shot him once through the heart. Now there the facts of the 
case didn't support her and there were also suggestions that he was fast asleep at the time but what was interesting was that the psychiatrist for 
the defence made this huge issue about how the ego disintegrated and even though it had occurred over a long period oftime, she didn't know 
what she was doing. I just said look at her actions at the time -they were very purposeful - she wasn't someone who was used to handling the 
gun and when she went to the bathroom she had to look for it. She had to prepare for firing 
and she has to know what she was going to use it for. I was quite prepared to entertain diminished responsibility because she had been 
humiliated and was very angry. I couldn't find a trigger - they tried 10 produce a trigger -that just before he had pushed her up against the wall 
and banged her head and she had found this to be extreme provocation and acted accordingly - but I didn't find that. 
Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a d~fence ()f non-pathological mcapactty? 
You have to assess the person at three main stages - belore the offence, during and after the olfence. The most critical aspect is during the 
offence and what I need to be convinced of is that the person behaved automatically, in other words they weren't cognitively able to know right 
from wrong and they weren't able to control themselves. So they have to act in an automatic way and that is where the cases fall down - from 
the evidence the accllsed showed some sort of planning and some new set ofaclions which he couldn't have learnt belore. so his mind must 
have been working and he was acting purposefully and he therefore must have known what he was doing. Volition was probably reduced by 
anger or something like that but that is not a complete excuse. What one is looking lor is an antecedent event where the person was subjected to 
a lot of conflict or stress which built up to a crescendo and then there's a trigger which is usually provocation of some sort - it usually 
unexpected and caught them unawares and of an unexpected intensity - they knew that it was coming but not to that extent - this brings on an 
automatic state where someone is killed. Afterwards, the person comes to, they realise what they've done, feel bewildered and often don't try 
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and get away but try and help. But there is supposed to be an amnesia - if you were in a true automatic state, you must have amnesia because 
your mind couldn't lay down memories. Most cases get referred because of the claim of amnesia. I try and workout what the person's actions 
were. 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. would you consider any of the folloll'lng to be pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological Incapacity.? 
I.ClImulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Climulat ive physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdo wn of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5. Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7.Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a resliit of a breakdown of conscious awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric htstof)' 
10. Personality disorder 
I wouldn't consider the last three as being elements. The reason is that intoxication reduces your control anyway and then you would have to 
try and distinguish between non-pathological due to emotional stufi'or due to intoxication. When a person is intoxicated you are in a dif1erent 
territory. I would only consider it if the person was a new user but if you've been taking something for awhile then you know what the 
consequences are. So if you drink alcohol for the first time and do something strange then you may be excused although some people will argue 
that everyone knows the etlects of alcohol anyway so it can't be excusable. 
Psychiatric history does not imply that you have no control over yourself - even a schizophrenic has control and they don't go around killing. 
Psychiatric history takes you into different territory as the disorder which caused the person to lose control takes precedence - then you are 
talking about pathological incapacity. 
Personality disorder is very much on the fence because it isn't pathological but it can't be non-pathological because it is intrinsic to the person. 
What you then say is that the person can be expected to behave in such a way - it will place the thing in context. I would take it into account 
and perhaps motivate for diminished responsibility. But then again what if the PD is psychopathy then diminished responsibility becomes ris!..]' 
because then dangerousness comes in. This defence rests on the assumption that the person won't do it again. So if you rest it on pre-existing 
PD you can't say that because it will happen again because the personality is involved. 
Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction is the most important as far as I'm concerned. This is the nexus of the defence. All of 
them are elements of the defence: 1-3 are antecedents tor 4-7 which are in tum what you'd expect from dissociation. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsibility? 
I hate to say that I don't think there is because there are al\\ ays exceptions but generally no. Psychological states diminish responsibility they 
don't excuse you entirely. From our side it is dimcult to argue this because you are starting with a person's personality over which they have no 
control and when you are looking at a particular PD where you don't have much control over what you do. and you are under psychological 
stress and get uptight and kill somebody it is logical for us that the person couldn't control themselves. But the flip side is that such people 
mostly are able to exercise control and if they do lose it, it's a relative thing in terms of the detence. Most psychological conditions can lead to 
diminished responsibility and not complete exculpation. I think that dissociation exists and under extreme anger people often describe being 
depersonalised and derealised. If I said that it leads to non-responsibility then it means that all murder is excusable because most murders are 
committed under extreme pressure and there is always an clement of dissociation - but I have to go with public policy and say no. 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised, in how man)' instances has your testimony been accepted by the court and 
on what basis.? 
The court has mostly accepted my testimony and there was only one case I think where they didn't accept my testimon}. In short a chap stabbed 
his stepmother 40 times and the court asked me whether after the second or third blow he could have lost control and I said yes. So the court 
acquitted him because they couldn't determine which of the 45 strokes actually killed her, In other words ifstroke no 10 went through her heart, 
was that not the stroke where he didn't know what he was doing? And at the time I had no inkling where this was going - as far as I was 
concerned when he made one blow he was gUilty for all of them. 
Whenever you can show convincingly which is just about always that the person was acting purposefully then there is no way around it -they 
do something that there was a moment of reflection and then move on. Very often the courts just need one expert to show this moment of 
reflection. Once you can form plans you must know what the consequences are. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapaCity is a valid defence.? 
No. because it is very hard to prove that someone acted automatically because of psychological factors. I can see that happening with 
pathological factors but I can't see it and be convinced that a person acted automatically because of emotional factors. The are possibilities such 
as PTSD where a person is tapped on the shoulder and is right back at the battle scene and without thinking shoots and does something 
automatically - that I can see happening. But the essence of automatic behaviour is that it is behaviour which has been well-rehearsed before and 
given certain cues is brought out. So I can see certain pol icemen drawing a firearm automatically because they are used to handling weapons. So 
there are rare instances where it would apply but generally not. The problem with the legal perception is that they are always looking for so-
called valid defences - they say if you crack or snap it's a valid defence like the crimes of passion - he cracked or snapped when he caught his 
wife in bed with his best friend and shoots him - but is it really valid to shoot a man because he is having sex with his friend's wife? Not really -
for that matter if someone says something really horrible to you - is it valid to take out a knite and stab him? I teel that it is a retrogressive step 
in the law because you should be responsible tor your actions, The defence also allows malingering - once everyone knows what the defence is 
about are you going to tell me that I can tell the court definitely what was going on in his mind at the lime - that he wasn't as angry as he said he 
was or that what this person said to him or what his wite did to him didn't allect him as he said it did. orlhat he doesn't really have amnesia -
mal ingering is a problem and I find it all the time. 
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Mental health professionalS 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in variOlls instances in assistmg the court in assessing crimmal responsibility - holl' lI'ouldyou 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
The capacity to form intent and to discern between right an(1 wrong and the capacity to act in temlS of that knowledge. Criminal responsibility is 
not a psychological concept and therefore I use the legal definition. 
Thefollowing dictum by Ogilivie Thompson JAin R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3-10 (A) at 365 B-C. r~flects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility . 
.. it must be borne in mind. .. that I the ultimate analysis. the crucial isslle of the appellant's criminal responsibility for his actiuns at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the Court itself In determining that issue - initially the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts of the case. including the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the nature of his proved actions throughout/he relevant period' 
Thejudge expresses a particular viell' on the role of expertlestimony in the assessment of crlll/inal responsibility - holl' lI'ouldyou vlell,the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility.? 
Our role is to put in front of the court the presence or the absence of psychological factors which may have been relevant to the actions of that 
person. But the decision as to whether that person was responsible or not that is a legal and not a psychological decision. 
What was the nature of the cases which you were involved m where the d~fence of non-pathological incapacity was raised.? 
3 cases - 2 were murder charges and the third I can't remember. The one was a man who shot his girlfriend. The other was a policeman who shot 
the alleged rapist of his child - the Mpengesi case. I now remember the third one it was about the dentist who poisoned an ex-girlfriend's new 
boyfriend. He then tried to poison himselfso as to divert attention - he was found not guilty but not on psychological grounds - the evidence 
was never led and the case went on the facts. I wasn't convinced that there were non-pathological factors although the defence looked forthose 
but I never actually testified in that case although I compiled a report. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the factors II'hich you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
The Mpengesi case was the most recent and was the purest argument for non-pathological incapacity.] felt that was enough grounds to diagnose 
acute stress disorder, there was amnesia, a period of uncharacteristic behaviour, inappropriate behaviour and certainly the antecedent traumatic 
experience of discovering that his child had been raped by this man. Then the way in which he handled his gun was not the way in which a 
policeman would handle a gun and there these signs which supported the idea that he probably had amnesia for that time because he was in a 
state of numbness and shock -I diagnosed acute stress disorder and in terms of that he could not have had criminal capacity. 
There were differences in my opinion and the State expert's - they didn't consider acute stress disorder, transient conditions, or anxiety disorder 
or depression - they were looking for psychosis and that is what they generally tend to do - hard evidence - that is easy, When they were cross-
examined they said that they had considered it but it was not mentioned in the notes or anything so there was a lot of argument about that. The 
information was available to them but they hadn't considered it and] found it - and this is one of the criticisms - they had said that an EEG had 
been done but it hadn't been done - had it been done they would have found an abnormal EEG and a history of frontal head injuT) with the 
implication that his behavioural control may have been impaired across his whole lifetime - given all these other factors it can explain why- it 
spilled over, And it was disappointing that the judge in his findings didn't make any reference to this evidence - it was essentially that he was 
pol iceman and that he knew the consequences of his actions, he should not have gone back to the pol ice station - it was after he arrived there 
that he shot the man. The judge was not convinced that he was not aware of what he was doing. He accepted the state's case that he had criminal 
capacity. 
Generally speaking which factors lrDuld you consider to be pertinent to a d~rence of non-pathological incapaCity? 
Weill think that the question of non-pathological refers to those psychological states which can be defined as abnormal or disordered but ofa 
transient nature that's different to pathological capacity. If the person is mentally ill and not responsible for eg psychotic then it's relatively 
clear-cut. But when it gets to transient conditions - when a person's momentary condition was such that he didn't have control over his 
behaviour that is non-pathological incapacity. One looks for a person acting out of character a person's behaviour reflecting cognitive 
impairment. emotional impairment or a mood disorder, strange behaviour, any symptoms of whatever mental disorder which are ofa transient 
nature. 
In addition to the factors which you have already Oil/lined. would YOII consider any of the follOWing to be pertinent to a d~rence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I. Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical andlor verbal threats by deceased 
4.Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5.Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7. Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdown of conscious awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug andlor alcohol) 
9. PreVious psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
I.Yes, ] think is pretty common - it is unlikely to happen just after meeting someone except of course if it is very traumatic 
2. Only in one of the cases - the accused alleged that the rnan had molested him as a youngster - that's the only case so I can't say that's a 
feature 






8. Yes but tllat is a diflicult one to argue legally - you know what the elTect is so you shouldn't be taking. it: but from a psychological point of 
view most definitely 
9. Yes 
10. Yes, should be considered although I haven't really had experience with it in my cases. However. it damages the defence because if it is a 
PD then society must be protected from the person. On the other hand, it may explain why the person behaved in that way - so it ~hould be 
considered. 
Do you think that sane automatism and non-pathological Incapacity are synon.vmous? 
No, I think that non-pathological incapacity is much wider hecause you can have various diagnoses of transient conditions. Automatism relers 
to dissociation alone and that is very specific. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsihility? 
I think PTSD, Acute Stress Disorder, depression, rage dyscontrol disorder, temporal lobe epilepsy, bipolar y, - manic phase, personality disorder 
(although not a defence in itself). 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
It creates problems because it is so open to interpretation that's up to the judge and doesn't seem to succeed that often because the state 
psychiatrists have been very careful to put that forward. And T has influenced the bar and judges about automatism who are therefore very 
careful in that respect. I think that it can be abused because it is too open for interpretation but I wouldn't know what is a beller alternative - at 
least it recognises that it is not only clearly psychotic people who are criminally non-responsible but that there are other psychological factors 
which may affect this. At least it opens the possibility of recognising these factors but with that comes the possibility for abusc - it must be more 
carefully defined but how that must be done, I wouldn't know. 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has heen raised. in how /IIany instances has your lestimony been accepted by the court and 
on what basis? 
In the Mpengesi it wasn't accepted as we discussed. In the other one, although it was the plea or delence they brought in psychological factors 
to show that he wasn't his nonnal self at that point - the state hadn't picked up on that issue - that was more than 10 years ago and then the 
concept of non-pathological incapacity wasn't as popular - and there the judge interrupted during the expert testimony and was angry because 
he said that the defence hadn't proved the case and so couldn't proceed with that kind oftestimon}. So in my experience it is a delence that is 
not easily accepted. 
Mental health professional 6 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court in assessing criminal respon,'ihility - how would you 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
It's important to note that criminal responsibility is not clinical tenn - it's a legal term and therefore we should not be commenting on criminal 
responsibility but on mental state at the time ofthe ollence. But then I have to go onto the concept of diminished responsibility which clearly is 
in relation to the mental state - the question now is whether we use the concept of responsibility, accountability or culpability and c1inicallywe 
have difliculty with all three - we tend to lump them all together but there is a ditlerence. With respons'ibility we are going back to the 
McNaughton type rules - where the question is whether they appreciate the wrongfulness of the act and whether they can act accordingly. And 
that is where the levels of responsibility apply - it's not all or nothing - there are levels. 
I think that it is diflicult for us clinically because this is a non-pathological state which means it's transient - unless you are on the scene, you 
are trying to piece together ajigsaw puzzle of what happened and it's extremely ditlicult if you don't have good historians or good witnesses - if 
you've got good witnesses then it's easy to put together and then you've got a good case - then it's easy to comment. But you actually comment 
on what the possibilities were - is it probable or is it possible and you are moving into the legal arena-it's not exact. I have had one case where 
I've been absolutely convinced on all the facts that it was so and in others I'v been damn sure but it's all been a case of giving the patient the 
benefit of the doubt. So how do you we do it - we don't have a crystal ball. 
Thefollowing dictum by Ogilivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3,J() (A) at 365 B-C, re.f/ects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility : 
' ... it must be borne in mind ... that I the ultimate analysis. the crucial issue of the appellant's cml1inal responsibility for hi.' actions at the 
relel'ant lime is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the COllrtltself In determining that issue - initially the trtal Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the otherfacts of the case, Including the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the nature of his proved actions throughollt the relevant period' 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testllllony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - how would you view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
I think that we are expressing opinions and not giving a decision and the judge must decide on the facts. It also depends on the witness - how he 
relates to you and if he can tell you properly and describe what happened and that is what happens in non-pathological incapacity - he has some 
degree if not all amnesia - how do you evaluate someone like that? 
Are you asked to pronounce an opinion on responsibility? 
The question of responsibility is often asked but my answer is that it is the decision of the court and that I can comment on his mental state at 
the time - the court can then take this into account, because responsibility is more than just mental state at the time· I will not comment on that. 
What was the nature of the cases which YOIl were involved In II'here the defence of non-patholog/callncapaLity was raised? 
100 which includes successful and unsuccessful- And of course a lot of them were previously under diminished responsibility. With the 
Laubscher decision, that brought about a lot of cases under this banner. Before that we had Arnold then we had Chretien and then 13uchner-
and it just snowballed. In British law in the case ofR v Cartwright, thejudge said that he didn't want to hearthis evidence as it's the defence of 
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the destitute. The last big one was that one betore the new Act. The big problem is the onus of proof in the way the legislation goes a the 
moment. It just doesn't make sense that you can present your defence but the state has to rebut it without the inlonnation that the defence has-
you have to have all the infonnation to assist with the facts of the case. 
Mostly people with either with a combination of alcohol .,nd emotional stress or with situations of domestic violence - so it could involve 
alcohol along with emotional arousal and disturbed control which results in murder. I've had cases of concussion - which is problematic because 
if it's pathological it's intrinsic and if it's non-pathological then it's extrinsic - I don't agree with this - then it's either insane or sane 
automatism. We also had a series which completely failed which involved sexual otlences where loss of control was claimed - but we 
completely rebutted that. Epilepsy has also been torwarded as non-pathological but it is pathological. Drugs and loss of control and impulse 
control disorders - so-called kleptomania - we had a shoplifting case which actually went the wrong way as she had temporal lobe epilepsy so it 
became pathological incapacity. Child abuse, we 've had others in medical conditions where things like diabetes were involved or where a man 
had a minor stroke and couldn't control the car - it wasn't non-pathological but he wasn't culpable. PTSD, betore it became so fashionable - for 
example guys who came back Irom the Angolan war and were true cases of PTSD. Rage reactions like road rage - not that I know what that is. 
Dissociative states come up frequently - Dissociative Identity Disorder. I've mentioned a wide range but the majority have involved emotional 
arousal. 
You can see how vast this is - this is the detence of the destitute. Because of the doubt and because you don't have all the intonnation people go 
for the gap - because of the probability, possibility and trying to get a doubt. Because the expen can't say yes or no there's a doubt and they 
then go tor an appeal. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the factors which you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
A case which came out right at the beginning before it became fashionable - before Chretien - 'inhibisies het wesenlik verkrummel'. S v 
Mundell was defended by F and prosecuted by K. Mundell was living with a girltriend - he was a pan-time student in engineering and she 
worked at Mobil. He was a nice guy and they had a good relationship. He started to get depressed, not coping with his studies - then there were 
relationship ditliculties, he was very possessive and she wanted to go out while he wanted to stay at home. He came home one night and she 
wasn't there. He panicked, he looked tor her and had a courle of drinks to calm down. Because of his depression he was sexually dysfunctional 
and she had admonished him about this - and that hun him, She comes in the door - he is distressed and says 'where the hell have you been~ 
I've been worried sick' and she says 'it's got nothing to do with you, you're not my boss'. She walks past him and goes to the bedroom and 
changes and goes to have a bath, He gets angry and asks where she's been - she's says that she doesn't want to tell him because he will harm her 
and she had hidden his knife away. He looks tor it and finds it in the cupboard. He goes back to the bathroom and says 'you see I tound it' and 
says that he wouldn't hun her. She tells him to get out and not to look at her like that because he is not her man anymore. Clinically the factors 
are here even though the argument may not be so legally. He then asks her why he is not her man and she says that she's been with his best 
triend and he is a better man. Now whether she meant sexually we don't kno\\', but psychodynamically he interpreted in this way. So he is 
standing over her in the bath and stabs her tive times and walks out. He picks up the phone and is reasonably dazed because we got the tape 
recordings of the flying squad and he is not making sense - he doesn't come around immediately. He asks them to come immediately and the 
police find him in a complete dissociative state. This wasn't a complete non-pathological case because he had to get the knife and had to inflict 
the wounds on the object of this anger - so there was some control and some awareness - those were the days of the 'irresistible impulse'. I was 
asked by the defence whether Mundell's 'inhibisies wesenlik verkrummel' -I said that I understood it as him being disinhibited.1 was asked if 
his inhibitions could have signiticantly disintegrated - and I said not completely, They used Chretien where intoxication was the central case. Th 
judge tound him guilty but found extenuation and because of his mental state - he was sentenced to seven years and I managed him lor tive 
years in the prison. He was unable to remember anything and was in a true dissociative state and also had PTSD. The evidence commented on 
his mental state at the time of the otTence, I don't like the tenn non-pathological so I introduced the term 'diminished responsibility due to 
mental state, not due to mental illness' in Laubscher. 
Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
I think that I'd like to see no pathology; a background of precipitation that is a trigger episode, marked arousal without goal-directed hehaviour 
for which there is amnesia tor the event. I'd like to have a dazing afterwards without full recovery. And also I don't want to see complex 
actions, we are talking about reflex actions - that is automatism. No conscious thought has to be involved - that is automatism. 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. would you consider any of the follOwing to be pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I. Cumulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2.Cl/mulative physical/emotional/sexual abl/se by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitIOnal control 
5.Awomatic behaviour which lacks conscIous direction 
6.lnability to exercise control over actions 
i.lnability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of a breakdown of conscious awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10 Personality disorder 









10. Ok - for eg the impulsivity of the psychopathy - but this is a slippery slope kind of detence because is the psychopath going to get otT 
because he can't control himself. So I'm not so sure about this. 
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Do you think that there is a particlllar psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsibility" 
Impulse control disorders maybe - if it is there because I think that they can control themselves or even explosive disorders some PD's. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence.? 
I think that it is abused - but it is valid in very rare cases - there was only case where I felt that it was valid where someone had a blow on the 
head and was completely concussed - and that was a case of automatism and not non-pathological incapacity. I think that they are ditTerent 
concepts - automatism is easier to comment on because I can give you a clinical diagnosis such as dissociation. Whereas non-pathological 
incapacity is a broad wishy-washy term which doesn't have a direct clinical diagnosis - it covers a wide range of things. 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised. in how /IIany mstances has your testimony been accepted by the cOllrt and 
on what basis.? 
5/6 have been successful - because there was enough doubt raised and the state couldn't prove otherwise. The unsuccessful cases were as a 
result ofthe fact that the defence couldn't show that the person lacked cognitive and/or volitional capacity which rendered him non-responsible. 
Lawyer 1 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court in assessing criminal responsibility - how would you 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
Criminal responsibility refers to the fact a person can be held accountable for his deeds. It takes into account whether he appreciates what he is 
doing and the wrongfulness thereof and whether he is able to direct his will accordingly. 
The/olloll'ing dictllm by Ogilivie Thompson JAin R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3·10 (A) at 365 8-C r~flects the cOllrt's perspeClive of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of crimmal responsibility· 
.... it must be borne in mind ... that I the ultimate analysis. the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibilityfor his actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the Court itself In determining that issue - initially the frlal Court and on 
appeal this COllrt- must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence bill also to all the otherfacts of the case. mcluding the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the natllre o/his proved actions throughout the relevant period'. 
Thejudge expresses a particular view on the role of expertlestimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - holl' wOllldyoll vie ,,·the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
One must consider whether the person sutTers trom mental illness or defect and in this case the psychiatrist's opinion is tinal. However where 
this is not the case and the person doesn't sutfer from mental disease or defect. then the final decision rests with the judge. He will decide on the 
basis of all the evidence whether the person is responsible or not. The psychologist will base his opinion on what the accused has told him and 
the judge then has to decide whether this account is consistent with the factual evidence - he considers all the evidence to determine whether the 
person was cognitively or conatively impaired. 
COllldyou provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlightthefactors which you took into accollnt 10 support 
such a defence? 
In J 996 I did a case where a guy claimed that at a certain point he did not know what he was doing. He and his colleagues were at a nightclub 
where they had been drinking. He was upset because one of his colleagues had left him behind. He went to his room to fetch his gun and then 
went to the gate where the guard was - he asked his colleague why he had lett him behind and then ·snapped'. His next memory was when he 
had an accident with his motorcycle. According to witnesses he had grabbed the deceased and then shot wildly around him. He also shot 
another person but did not kill him. From the facts it became clear that at one point during all of this, he returned to his room and wrote a letter 
to his mother apologising for what had happened. He had stolen the motorbike and had apparently planned to commit suicide but had the 
accident. 
All the facts show that he was responsible and that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. So as you can see in situations like this it 
amounts to much more than what the psychologist has to say because he is not aware of all the factual ev idence and that is what the court takes 
into account - his opinion is one of the factors which is considered. Sometimes the experts disagree and therefore the court cannot leave the 
decision to them - it must make its finding based on the factual evidence. I have tound that the court tends to accept the opinions of the state 
witnesses because they seem to be better able to motivate their opinions. 
What was the nature of the cases which YOIl were involved m where the defence of non-pathological incapacity was raised.? 
5 cases 
All murder cases where the accused knew the deceased and otten alcohol was involved. And of course where the was some kind ofdiscord 
between parties - often in family relationships. Often there were only two people present and then the factual evidence becomes important 
because you don't have other witnesses besides the accused. 
Generally speaking which factors would YOll consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
All the factual evidence is important and has to point to the fact that the accused did not know what he was doing and theretore couldn't control 
his actions - it must be proved that he acted automatically and that he had no memory of his actions - this has never succeeded in my experience 
but it often forms the basis of this defence. They usually argue that the accused was provoked to such an extent that he reacted and didn't know 
what he was doing and then had no memory of it or he was so angry that he couldn't control himself even though he knew that what he was 
doing was wrong. 
Do you think that sane automatism and non-pathological mcapacity are synonymous? 
I don't think that they are one and the same thing, and people confuse the two terms. Non-pathological incapacity is a legal term and the court 
will interpret a claim of sane automatism as non-pathological incapacity - so it is used as one and the same thing even though I don't think that 
they are. Because there are instances such as when your volitional control is diminished and you couldn't control yourself - that isn't 
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automatism because in these kinds of cases you may well appreciate wrongfulness but couldn't act in accordance with that appreciation, Non-
pathological incapacity is a broader term than automatism because it encompasses more than automatic behaviour. What usually happens in 
these cases is that the defence does not reveal what their deli!nce is going to be - so they won't call it non-pathological incapacity or automatism 
- they will lay down the factual basis tor the defence and say that the accused at a certain point didn't know what he was doing and had no 
memory - they usually leave it up to the court to decide - they are quite vague about what the defence is going to be, This results in the 
prosecutor sometimes not picking up on the defence and when no expert evidence is led it makes it worse because at the end they may only 
reveal it. But expert testimony is important if you want to prove or disprove the defence - it adds weight to the case if you want to convince the 
judge,lt's not fatal if you don't lead the evidence but it docs add weight to your case, Of course this defence is often used when nothing else 
will work, 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. would you consider any 0/ the /olloll"lng to he pertment to " defence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I.CI/mulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5.Al/tomatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7. Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a resllit of a breakdown 0/ consciolls awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
I. Definitely 
2. Yes 
3. I think that it depends on the personality of the accused and how he reacts in such situations but I don't think that the threats are so important. 
4. This is important 
5. Not that important - because we aren't really concerned with the fact that he can't remember afterwards - we are concerned with his capacity 
at the time of the offence - whether he knew what he was doing or whether he could control himself 
6. Yes 
7. Yes - that is the first leg of the test 
S. A big no because I think that your volitional control ma~ be diminished but I don't believe that it can be to the extent that you can't control 
yourself at all - besides you know full well what you are doing. 
9. That is important 
10.1 don't think that is important because in the case of psychopathy you can't be excused for that - so it shouldn't be an important factor. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or melltal state which can lead to non-responsibility? 
I can't give a definitive yes or no because I'm not very familiar with psychological or psychiatric categories. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid de/ence? 
I think that it is valid but haven't had a case where it had been valid. I am thinking about provocation where a person can get so angry that-he 
behaves uncharacteristically. Whether such a thing is true is another thing - and if that can be proved then the defence is valid. You can't punish 
someone for an act which he did not intentionally commit or over which he had no control. 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised, in how /IIany instances has yOl/r testimony heen accepted by the COllrt and 
on what basis? 
In my experience it has never been successful because everything pointed to the tact that the person was aware of what he was doing, was able 
to control his actions and still went ahead and committed the act. 
Lawyer 2 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the cOllrt in assessing criminal responsihility - how ll"OlIld you 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
Criminal responsibility is the state of mind of the accused at the time of the incident. I would look at what happened betore and after so as to 
assess what the criminal intent was at the time. 
The/ollowmg dictum by Ogilivie Thompson JAin R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3.JO (A) at 365 B-c' rellects the cOllrt 's perspective ~fthe role of 
expert testimony in the assessment ~f criminal responsibdlly . 
' ... it must be borne in mind. .. that I the ul/lmate analysis, the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibility/or hiS actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists but by the COllrt itself In determining that issue - initially the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the other/acts ~f the case. mcluding the 
reliability of the appellant as a witness and the natllre of his proved actions throughout the relevant period' 
The judge expresses a particular view on the role o.f expertlestimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - holl' would you view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of Criminal responsibilllY? 
I think that they can play quite an important role but I don't mean that they can lead the court by the nose by telling it whether the person was 
criminally responsible at the time - they are adept at interpreting the person's actions- so what we might see as abnonnal may well be nonnal in 
ternlS of that specific person's make-up, I really feel that in murder cases it is always useful to have expert opinion to help us with our 
understanding of the person. I think that they can commelll on responsibility but of course that will be based on the account that the accused 
gave them - they often come to court with this view and when you put to them the tactual tindings then they have to concede that they are 
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wrong especially where diminished responsibility is concerned. They can express their opinion but they must be open to factors such as the facts 
of the case. The problem is that often experts do not familiarise themselves with the contents of the docket and this leads to problem .. in court. 
Another problem is that the defence does not disclose everything that they have - and then they spring it on the psychologist or psychiatrist 
when they are in court and then they have to think on their feet. An example is S v Thompson which is a rape case and we led the evidence 
afterwards and then new information was submitted by the defence and then I had to recall the state's witnesses. They see it as their right to 
silence. In this case the Supreme Court of Appeal was very scathing of the defence expert as he wanted to put the accused in the best possible 
light - they claimed diminished responsibility but their detence back tired - they diagnosed ADHD while the state experts diagnosed Borderline 
PD which doesn't have a good prognosis and therefore should be a candidate for I ife imprisonment. The psychological factors which were taken 
into account were his support systems which were very poor, and his low level of emotional maturity. So it's important how the evidence is 
presented as it can backfire. He was sentenced to lite imprisonment. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological Incapacity in order to highlight the factors which you took into account~ 
S v Henry - this guy was divorced from his wite, they had three kids and he was very close to the youngest one and she would spend weekends 
with him. There were a lot of problems between him and his ex-wife particularly because she was seeing somebodyelse at that stage. He went to 
drop the child at home one evening and she was upset and didn't want to go inside. He went to the house and announced himselfat the door - he 
said that he wanted to ask ifshe could stay with him. He had the gun with him and there was evidence that he removed the gun from the holster 
before going into the house. There were other people in the house and they heard a number of shots after the argument. He said that he couldn't 
recall anything but under cross-examination he was able to remember some things - he had selective amnesia and could not rememba the bad 
bits - he remembered the argument and seeing her falling down and someone else entering the room whom he tired shots al. He then walked out 
of the house and it was clear that he had goal-directed actions during this period. That is why it blew up in his face - there was no trigger before 
he left the car which could have set off the situation, the argument was not out of the ordinary as the situation had been like that for a long 
period of time and this was not the first time that the child was unhappy to go home. The fact that he had selective amnesia also counted against 
him - so the court did not uphold the sane automatism detence. 1's defence was commended by the court because it was so clear and unbiased. 
The defence claimed that the argument was the trigger which caused him to snap and because he was such a good shot he could fire without 
thinking. But the type of weapon used, required that the weapon be cocked every time before shooting and that requires some thought. It was 
only at the end of the defence case that J testitied and he had the whole record and had the facts and could base his opnion on that as well. 
Generally speaking which factors would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
One would look at some kind of trigger which would cause the person to lose their ability to reason which can be as a result of a long build-up 
of aggression or due to alcohol or drugs - it doesn't really matter. The immediate actions at time of crime - is it goal-directed, it's a big problem 
if you don't have any other witnesses but then you can use the forensic evidence to explain what happened. Thirdly, his actions immediately 
after the ofience. And of course if there is amnesia then it has to be complete - you can't have selective amnesia. Amnesia can be taken into 
account but it doesn't always have to be there. 
For example this case which is starting now S v Philander - the woman who strangled her daughter - in this case until minutes before she killed 
the child she was tine and there were no signs of stress and anxiety. Afterwards she indicated to the son that the little one was sleeping when she 
was in fact dead - she told him not to disturb her as she had a bad night - which means that she knew that she had done something wrong. You 
would not expect someone who did such a thing to react like that- when she came out of the 'snapped' state - to try and hide it - she would 
should be bewildered and upset, horrified at the realisation of what she had done. In addition, she was not in a trance-like state as she still 
prepared his sarmies and said good-bye to him at the door. 
In addition to the factors which you have already olltlined. lI'ollld YOIl consider any of the follOll'ing to he pertinent to a defence of non-
pathological incapacity~ 
I.Cumlllative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4. Breakdoll'n of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5.Alltomatic behaviollr which lacks consciolls direction 
6.lnability to exercise control over actions 
7.lnability to recall events during a discrete period C?ftlme as a result C?f a hreakdown of conscIOus awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
I. Obviously 
2. Yes 
3. Yes - but you don't need NPI detence because this can fall under selt~detence. But then again the expert can argue that this acted as a trigger 
and then of course you have to take that into account. 
4. If there is drug or alcohol intake 
5. Yes 
6. Yes 




Do you think that there is a particular psychological or melltal state which can lead to non-responsihility') 
1 haven't seen one and I don't think that there is any situation where you are in such a state that you don't know what you are doing or have no 
control over it. Unless of course you are mentally incapacitated and have mental illness and then you would use the insanity defence 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence ~ 
1 haven't found it to be because I don't believe that you can act and not be aware of what you are doing. I think that all of us are in good control 
of our emotions and if you let yourself lose control then that is a conscious decision 
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Do you think that sane automatism and non-pathological mcapacity are synonymous? 
I think that perhaps from the state side we seem to see it very much as the same thing - I haven't thought that much about it but I guess that is 
how it is seen. 
Lawyer 3 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court in assessing crimmal responsibility - how would you 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
In terms of the law if the person can appreciate the wrongfulness of the act and act in accordance with an appreciation of wrongfulness then the 
law considers them responsible lor something which breaches a societal law or nom1. So I think that there should be that link betwe~n the act 
and the intent to act unlawfully. I think it seems to me that over a long passage of time the various elements have been distilled and today it is 
compartmentalised and when any element is absent then he can't be responsible - so the guilty mind and the act are important. The law no\\ 
emphasises personal responsibility but a person may think one thing and the court sees it dilferently. 
The/ollolVing dictum by Ogilivie Thompson J A in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 3-10 (A) at 365 B-C. reflects the court's perspective of the role C?f 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility. 
' ... il must be borne in mind. .. that I the ultimate analysis. the crucial issl/e of the appellant's criminal responsibility for his actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists bl/t by the COl/rtltself In determining that issue - ml//Q/~1' the trial Court and on 
appeal this Court - must of necessity have regard not only to expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts ~f the case. mcluding the 
reliability of the appellant as a lVitness and the nature of his proved actions throughout the relevant period' 
The Judge expresses a particular view on the role of expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility - how wouldyou viell' the role 
ofpsychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment ~f criminal responsibility? 
The court jealously guards its function and at the end of the day expert evidence is relegated to being of assistance in helping the court to 
making a decision and the court is not bound by it. It will make its own independent assessment of the expert evidence and the facts of the case 
and quite often that is why the expert evidence is disregarded in cases ofthis nature where you are dealing with non-pathological incapacity So 
the court will almost always find on the facts that the loundation on which the evidence is based is not correct and therelore disregard the 
evidence. The interstices between two disciplines which don't communicate - they speak different languages and don't understand each other 
and this doesn't lead to a very suitable approach. In SA we have an adversarial system as opposed to an inquisitorial system- you have opposite 
sides involved in some lorm of civilised warfare and that is not conducive to what the truth really is- everyone has their own experts and own 
opinions as to what happened. There is a need lor expert testimony but the law needs to come to grips with psychological and psychiatric 
concepts - and I think that is where the problem lies. 
What was the nature of the cases which you II'ere involved in where the defence of non-pathological incapacity was raised? 
9 cases - a very popular defence in the last years 
Generally murder cases - and it is fairly common that it happens in intimate relationships. But I also had a case of housebreaking and theft. 
Valkenberg has an extremely conservative approach and are Ihated on the concept of sane automatism -I explained with the Moses case. the 
defence goes beyond just automatic behaviour and encompasses a range of emotional/psychological factors which can allect capacity 
Generally speaking whichfactors would you consider to he pertinent to a d~fence of non-pathological incapacity? 
The actuallacts of the case must accord with the defence. And I've had cases where the accused comes and says that he is guilty and then you 
listen to the facts and then legally and morally he might be guilty but on the legal precepts he might be innocent. For example in the Moses case 
he wanted to plead guilty but when I listened to the facts orthe case I realised that he has a case for non-pathological incapacity. I then get an 
expert opinion and usually in these cases they diagnose Borderline or Mixed PD. I concern myselfwith whether the two legs of the test are 
satisfied and whether the expert's opinion accords with this. 
C ollldyou provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity m order to highlightthelactors whIch you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
In Moses, the defence was predicated on the fact that he could not control himself and therelore we were looking at conative functioning 
because he could in fact appreciate wrongfulness at the time. One of the first things that I noticed was the extraordinary levels of violence as he 
almost decapitated the deceased. A problem which arose was that there were in fact three acts which he committed so I emphasised the level of 
violence and that he meant to kill the person. There was a real danger in that court could say that he knew what he was doing and could act in 
accordance with that. Valkenberg argued that was goal-directed behaviour while I said that the levels of violence was a result of lack of control 
so I tried to tum it on its head. The first weapon was inappropriate because it was a fragile ornament and I argued that whatever happened must 
have been a trigger and he must have reacted instantaneously and impulsively and very little thought was put into it and from there the violence 
escalated- it was like a supertanker and once it is on course at a certain speed no-one can stop it. I argued that on the face of it. it may have 
seemed like three acts but in fact it was only one act and that is why I purposefully went on the second leg because I knew that I would have 
problems on the first leg. Of course it could be argued that he knew what the consequences of his actions would be because he wanted to kill 
this guy. I was assisted by the fact that the prosecutor was not on top of things because he argued that our case was mitigatory and not 
exculpatory which fiew in the face of various AD decisions. lied evidence of his previous rages and the cumulative build-up which culminated 
in something which happened over a very short space of time. 
Which factors which would you consider to be pertinent to a defence of non-pathological incapacity? 
I think that you have to look at the nature of the crime - was a gun used? You are talking about automatism - it's an automatic act. Ifthe person 
has never fired a gun before then you have to ask how a person who has no control over his will or is not conscious, can load a weapon. Also 
where was the gun - was it on his person or did he have to go elsewhere to get the gun. You have to ask what was the trigger - what caused the 
person to explode or erupt? If there was this explosion and he happened to have the gun in his hand. how did he know how to load the weapon if 
he was not acting consciously. And then of course it is important to look at his background. Did he have amnesia -I would doubt his claim if he 
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does not have amnesia. You have to look at the person's behaviour before during and after the crime. These factors which I would consider to 
be imponant. 
In addition to the factors which you have already olltlined. would YOll consider any of the folloll"lng to be pertinent to a delence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
I.Cllmulative build-up of emotional stress prior to event 
2. Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abuse by deceased prior to event 
3. Physical and/or verbal threats by deceased 
4.Breakdown of conscious awareness and volitional control 
5.Automatic behaviour which lacks conscious direction 
6. Inability to exercise control over actions 
7. Inability 10 recall events during a discrete period of time as a resllit of a breakdown of consciolls awareness 
8. Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) 
9. Previous psychiatric history 
10. Personality disorder 
I don't specifically refer to these items and I leave it up to the expens. Provocation cenainly fornls the basis for most ofthese cases. Intoxication 
cenainly comes up especially in motor vehicle accidents. All of these cenainly come up in one fornl or another - cenainly a prior history helps 
as was shown in Moses. Amnesia is a ditlicult one because couns can't understand that whole concept and of course the accused can also 
simulate it because they think that they can get ofl 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state which can lead to non-responsibility~ 
It's a difficult issue because that is where you get breakdown between the law and the demands of society - illegal behaviour has to be punished 
but in cenain circumstances the law acquits people. But that is a moral ratherthan a legal issue. The problem is that in a place like the Western 
Cape, there are high levels of alcohol abuse and a large number of crimes are committed when people are intoxicated - that combined with poor 
education, high levels of frustration and anger and inappropriate coping skills - it is not inconceivable that a large number of crimes are 
committed under these circumstances - but if people are constantly acquitted on these grounds then society will not be appeased Alcohol 
definitely plays a role in violent crime and when you bring all these factors togetherthen it falls under the rubric of non-pathological incapacity 
and that of course leads to non-responsibility. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
Yes. ifit is utilised properly because the whole principle underlying criminal law is that a person is only responsible for acts which are under 
their control. If a person because oftheir own unique psychological make-up married with cenain circumstances and events are like two trucks 
racing towards each other. I think in those circumstances it is valid and see it as a progression ofthe existing legal precept and taking it to its 
ultimate logical conclusion. But couns are very loathe to uphold the defence and the facts take precedence - they take the line of Val ken berg 
and look at goal-directed and purposive behaviour - and if you retain a memory then it is panicularly bad. I have a problem with that because 
they fixate on automatism - they say non-pathological incapacity doesn't exist because there is always goal-directed behaviour. It is far too 
reductionisstic. I cenainly don't think that non-pathological and sane autolllatism and are one and the same thing. 
Only Moses was successful. The others weren't because the coun felt that the person acted in a goal-directed manner. 
Lawyer 4 
Psychologists and psychiatrists are involved in various instances in assisting the court is assessing criminal responsibility - hOIl" II"vuldyou 
define the concept of criminal responsibility? 
It is the ability to firstly distinguish between right and wrong and if you can distinguish between the two then you are able to direct your will 
accordingly., In other words I know that it is wrong and can stop myselffrom doing it. Criminal responsibility can stand on two legs. In the first 
place, I am unable to distinguish between right and wrong and am not able to perceive that or secondly, I have the ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong but am unable to control or direct my will accordingly. There is no psychological definition for responsibility and therefore 
they use the legal definition and focus on cognition and volition. 
The role of the expen is to focus on the cognitive and conative abilities of the person and the factual evidence - this what detennines the 
assessment. It also depends on whether he is testitying for the state or for the defence. The information which he gets from the accused who 
claims that he is non-responsible and the factual evidence must concur and on that basis he must determine whether the person is responsible. 
The defence expens base their findings on more than just the facts because they have more information regarding his background available to 
them. For example. they have information regarding the accused's emotional experiences when he was a child and all those other experiences 
which afTected him when he was growing up - they can show repetitive behaviours or patterns which may not be available to state expens -
they therefore base their findings on this kind of information. 
The state has a huge problem with this. If a person is mentally ill then the burden of proof rests on him to prove that he is mad. to use a basic 
term but in the case of non-pathological incapacity the burden rests on the state and it is a huge problem because it is subjective. What was the 
subjective capacity of the person at the specific time and this depends on the accused who must account for his capacity at the relevant time. By 
the time the state closes its case, it still hasn't heard this account. What happens is that the state has to call an expen who works solely with the 
facts and does not have the background infonnation which the defence is privy to. I had a case where I had to re-open my case three times to 
recall the psychologist to rebut the accused's testimony - just because new information was ofTered after his testimony. One would expect this 
to be put to the expen during his testimony but this doesn't always happen. 
HOII" do you account for the differences in the assessment by private and state experts? 
It's not about time - the problem is that the state expen doesn't have the statutory right to consult with the accused and I have to call him before 
he has even had the opponunity to assess the accused. Of course the accused has the right to silence and the burden is on the state to prove hIS 
criminal capacity. In these cases we look at things like provocation and the psychologist looks for the trigger which caused this violent reaction. 
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Very often the state psychologist doesn't know about the accused's background - for example that his father abused him when he was younger 
and when the deceased smacked him all that he saw was his father hitting him - the man whom he looked up to as a father figure. This 
information has an effect on the case - but the benefit is that you can recall your expert to rebut that testimony. 
So are you saying that in these kinds qf cases the accllsed is not always assessed by the state expe,.t~ 
Well. in fact there is no statutory requirement for the accused in these cases to be sent for observation to a state psychiatric institution. In an} 
even when someone is referred it is not to assess non-pathological incapacity but criminal capacity - on the surface it may seem as if we are 
looking at non-pathological incapacity. So if a question regarding capacity is raised then we send the accused to determine if there were any 
pathological causes and whether he is fit to stand trial. However, because the directive of the court is about capacity it often happens that the 
state experts also look for non-pathological causes anyway - they often have the facts of the case at hand because we provide them with it 
There is a problem in these kinds of cases - the precedents have shown that it must be based on some psychological opinion. But there are 
problems in the legal process itselfbecause the defence doesn't disclose much and often they don't tell you at the start that the~ are going \() 
argue non-pathOlogical incapacity. Of course the factual evidence is the most important thing and the problem is that the experts base their 
opinions on the accused's account - and the facts may prove that the accused was unreliable - thus the testimony on which this is based 
becomes problematic. 
Do you think that there are degrees ofresponsibility? 
I'm trying to think of an example, Take for example relationship problems between and man and woman where there's a lot offriction. On one 
occasion, he smacks her and she picks up a knife and stabs him to death. At lirst glance we may say that in the first place he shouldn't have 
smacked her but that was no cause for the stabbing. However if we looked further into their history we may lind that he beat her every night and 
that she had laid numerous charges with the police. There are records to show her injuries and therefore you have a case of diminished capacity. 
She was responsible at the time but her ability to exercise control over her actions was severely impaired - it's as if her will had been 
completely broken even though cognitively there was no impairment. Of course she was responsible because she knew that her actions could 
lead to his death but she was unable to control herselfbecause conatively she was impaired. So capacity is not an all-or-nothing thing - there are 
degrees and this has an influence on sentencing, I had a case ofa man who shot his wife 15 times- it was pre-meditated. He shot his wife after 
she had thrown him out of the house - he waited until the domestic arrived for work the next morning and then followed her into the house as he 
did not have a key. He shot his wife in bed. From the facts it was evident that his entire life had revolved around this woman and he was 
devastated by the separation - he was given 7 years because of this. I don't agree with the sentence in this case but have to say that there are 
circumstances when diminished capacity plays a role. 
The following dictum by Ogilvie Thompson JA in R v Harris 1965 (2) SA 340 (A) at 365 H-C. ref/ects the court's perspective of the role of 
expert testimony in the assessment of criminal responsibiltty : 
." ,it must be borne in mind that ... in the ultimate analysis. the crucial issue of the appellant's criminal responsibility for his actions at the 
relevant time is a mailer to be determined not by psychiatrists. bill by the COllrt itself In determining that issue - initially the trial Court; and on 
appeal this COllrt- mllst of necessity have regard not only to the expert medical evidence bill also to all the other facts qf the case. mcluding 
the reliability of the appellant as a witness and the natllre qfhis proved actions throughout the relevant period' 
The judge eJ.presses a particular view on the role of expertteslimony in the assessment of criminal responsibility- holl' IVouldyoll view the role 
of psychologists and psychiatrists in the assessment of criminal responsibility? 
I think that the role of psychologists is of cardinal importance but in cases other than mental illness. our courts have ruled against the experts. 
Even though they are experts in the filed of emotional factors and post-traumatic stress, at the end of the day what matters is the factual 
evidence. In other words, are the facts acceptable and what can be deduced from that. A psychologist may say that his client had stress and that 
his father molested him when he was a child. Then he was in a bar and a man came up and touched his thigh by accident and he turned around 
and stabbed him. The court will say let's look at the facts and it may come to light that this isn't what happened. Prior to dIe incident he had told 
his friend that he was going to stab the next guy who comes past him. Then the touching of the thigh won't be the motivating factor anymore. 
You understand what I mean. So there are reasons why the psychologist's testimony is rejected. I still regard it as being important because he 
will tell you what the effect of provocation will be on someone who is emotionally overwrought or troubled. We don't live in an ideal world-
not all of us were physically abused or fought in the war and therefore the psychologist is needed to enlighten you about the ell'ects of such 
experiences on a person. But in cases of non-pathological incapacity, the role of the psychologist is less important and not as pivotal as in cases 
of mental illness. 
In this case the Appeal Court judge said that in cases of non-pathological incapacity, the role of the psychologist or psychiatrist is not that 
important and ultimately it is for the court to decide whether the person has capacity or not. The factual evidence has to support the claim that 
the person did not intend to kill- the facts are very important in these kinds of cases. So I agree that the role is not the alpha and omega in these 
cases - of course they have a role to play but it isn't that crucial. In court, the psychologists are expected to be the judge but they are not in a 
position to do that - the court is in a better position to judge the facts. Often what happens is that an expert will come and say that the person is 
non-responsible and this finding is based on a particular fact. But then what happens is that the court linds that that fact does not exist or is 
unacceptable and then the expert's lindings cannot be accepted. Another thing that can happen is that the accused can lie to the police about 
what happened and then of course we have to question his reliability and can't accept what he is saying, as true. So the role of the expert is not 
that crucial as when there is a case of mental illness. 
Criminal responsibility is legal term and it is important to lind out if the psychologist or psychiatrist know what it means - a general tern1 which 
we use is 'did he know what he was doing?'. We are asking legal question here - about cognition and volition. Onen experienced experts know 
that we are concerning ourselves with this, but the newer experts sometimes just focus on the cognitive abilities and forget the volitional aspect. 
Could you provide an example of a case of non-pathological incapacity in order to highlight the factors which you took into account to support 
such a defence? 
In this case S v September the accused was buying lood in a shop while under the influence of dagga and alcohol. He was diagnosed as a 
psychopath. Well, he hassled another customer who told him to get lost. He saw this as a challenge and when this guy turned 10 leave, he 
stabbed him a few times and the guy died. He went back and robbed the shop - he felt victorious and wanted to show off to his friends who 
were also in the shop. Then he attacked two guys who were walking on the opposite side of the road. The police were called and by this time 
there was some ructions in the next street. They found him lighting with his family who were trying to get him into the house. The police tried 
to arrest him and he broke the doors of the van. He also broke the handcutls by pulling them apart. According to their psychiatrist he was non-
responsible and he was acquitted. On appeal however, it was argued that he was responsible because if you looked at the facts then it was 
evident that all the time he had to be conscious of what he was doing. He saw these things as a challenge. It was evident that throughout the 
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whole process he was evaluating his actions and acting consciously. There was no evidence of amnesia and he did not question what had 
happened at all. He was cool. calm and collected the day after all of this. 
In addition to the factors which you have already outlined. 1I'0uid you consider any of the folloll'ing to be pertment to a defence of non-
pathological incapacity? 
3.1.1 Cumulative build up of emotional stress prior to the event - Yes 
3.1.2 Cumulative physical/emotional/sexual abltse by deceased prior to event - yes 
3.1.3 Physical and/or verbal threats by the deceased - Yes 
3.1 . ./ Breakdown of consciolls a\l'areness and volitional control - Yes 
3.1.5 Automatic behaviour II'hich lacks conscious direction Yes 
3.1.6 Inability to exercise control over actions - Yes 
3.1. ~ Inability to recall events during a discrete period of time as a result of breakdoll'n of conscious awareness- Yes 
3.1.8 Intoxication (drug and/or alcohol) - no 
3.1.9 Previous psychiatric history - yes 
3.1.10 Personality disorder - no 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a valid defence? 
Yes.l think that it is valid because I think that there it is possible for someone to be provoked to such as extent that he loses control. Of course 
the problem is that it is open for abuse because people will use it if the can't get joy anywhere else. But I think that ultimately there are 
instances although. very rare where such a defence would be valid. 
What was the nature of the cases which you have been involved in where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised? 
Generally murder and in some cases like the one I mentioned earlier. the accused just ran amok but mostly it happens in families - where the one 
spouse kills the other. So usually there is a relationship between the accused and the deceased. 
Do you think that the defence of non-pathological incapacity is synonymous with sane automatism? 
Yes! think that they are one and the same thing - that is how we interpret it. 
Do you think that there is a particular psychological or mental state II'hich can lead to non-responsibility? 
That's a diflicult one.! think that a person can be provoked to such an extent that they can lose control over their actions - but these Ihings are 
always difticult to prove and in all of my cases the defence has never been upheld. So while! think that there is such a thing which can excuse 
behaviour, the courts are very sceptical about it. 
Where the defence of non-pathological incapacity has been raised. in how many instances has your opinion been accepted by the court and on 
what basis? 
None of the cases which I have prosecuted have succeeded. I have done 5 such cases and in none of these could automatism be proven. 
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